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Abstract 
 
Despite vast research on both policy reform and social movement emergence, their 
relationship is relatively understudied. This thesis helps to address this gap by using 
qualitative methodology to explore the relationship between a Canadian omnibus budget 
bill (Bill C-45) and the emergence of Idle No More movement (INM). Following Snow and 
Soule’s model of social movement emergence, Bill C-45 is identified as INM’s ‘mobilizing 
grievance’. In order to explain why, Bill C-45 is assessed against Wallner’s framework of 
policy legitimacy. Bill C-45—specifically its amendments to the Navigable Waters 
Protection Act and the Indian Act—is shown to lack substantive and procedural legitimacy. 
This legitimacy deficit provides an explanation for why the founders of INM deemed Bill 
C-45 serious enough to require grassroots mobilization. This thesis thus contributes to both 
public policy and social movement literature by explaining how INM’s emergence was the 
direct result of the questionable legitimacy of policy reforms.  
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You know what they say. If at first you 
don’t succeed, try the same thing 
again. Sometimes this effort is called 
persistence and is the mark of a strong 
will. Sometimes it’s called 
preservation and is a sign of 
immaturity. For an individual, one of 
the definitions of insanity is doing the 
same thing over and over again in the 
same way and expecting different 
results. For a government, such 
behaviour is called… policy.  
 
Thomas King 
The Inconvenient Indian 
Page Ninety-Four  
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Chapter 1 – Why Are They Idle No More? 
 
 
In recent years, new and momentous protests and social movements have erupted 
around the world, such as the Arab Spring, the Occupy Movement, and national 
demonstrations against austerity policies. In light of these manifestations of contentious 
politics, “The Protester” was named Time’s Person of Year in 2011 (Time, 2011). Given 
the recent rise in widespread and globalized mobilization, the world may have entered a 
new global protest cycle (see Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005; Tarrow, 1998; Tarrow, 2011; 
Tejerina, Perugorria, Benski and Langman, 2013). 
Within this globalized context, a movement calling itself Idle No More (INM) burst 
onto the Canadian political scene in October 2012. The movement started rather 
unassumingly when four female Aboriginal1 and non-Aboriginal activists (Nina Wilson, 
Sheelah Mclean, Sylvia McAdam, and Jessica Gordon2) held a “teach-in” in Saskatoon, 
Saskatchewan. The subject of this and other teach-ins was the Government of Canada’s 
(GoC) introduction of the Jobs and Growth Act (Bill C-45) and its amendments to dozens 
of pieces of legislation. The founders of INM sought to create a public space to share and 
discuss their concerns, and to translate these fears into meaningful action (Wotherspoon 
and Hansen, 2013). From these grassroots beginnings, INM spread across Canada and 
                                                 
1 The term Aboriginal is used in this thesis when speaking of Indigenous Peoples in Canada. This usage is 
consistent with Canadian standards, following section 35(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 which defines 
Aboriginal peoples as “including the Indian [First Nations], Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada.”  
2 Nina Wilson is a member of the Kahkewistahaw Nation in Treaty Four territory (Saskatchewan) and an 
activist, Sheelah Mclean is a self-identified third generation settler and a professor at the University of 
Saskatchewan, Sylvia McAdam is from the Nehiyaw (Cree) Nation in Treaty Six territory (Saskatchewan) 
and a professor at the First Nations University of Canada. Jessica Gordon is a member of the Pasqua Nation 
(Cree/Anishinaabe) in Treaty 4 Territory and self-employed. 
2 
globally. By early 2013, over 140,000 Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal persons gathered in 
person and online to express their solidarity with INM (Full Duplex, 2013). Some have 
even called it “one of the most significant political mobilization campaigns on the part of 
Canada’s First Nations in modern history” (Hudson, 2014, p. 149).  
While INM is not exclusively an Aboriginal movement, many of its members and 
issues are Aboriginal. Aboriginal mobilization, like INM, is not new to Canada and in fact 
predates Canada as a sovereign nation (Ladner, 2008; Woons, 2013). There have been 
dozens of Aboriginal protest events and movements in Canada’s history, with many as 
direct reactions or responses to the GoC’s policy agenda (Ramos, 2006; Ramos, 2012; 
Wilkes, 2006). The 1969 Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian policy (the 
White Paper) is a well-known example.3 First Nations were unified in their opposition, 
holding protests and releasing alternative policy papers, such as Red Paper (also known as 
Citizens Plus) by the Indian Chiefs of Alberta (Ladner, 2014). The Red Paper criticizes the 
basic premise of the White Paper as being assimilationist, discriminatory, and deeply unjust 
(Indian Chiefs of Alberta, 1970).  
Within this historical context, INM appears to be a resurgence, or possibly a new 
contemporary iteration, of a national Aboriginal movement (Becker, 2013). Unlike most 
other instances of Aboriginal protest in recent Canadian history, INM was launched by four 
women outside the usual power structures (Ladner, 2014). The grassroots members and 
                                                 
3 The White Paper famously proposed the repeal of the Indian Act and the abolishment of Indian status, 
amongst other things.  
3 
supporters of INM were making an explicit political statement that they were no longer 
idle, or as idle as they were in the past.  
However the question remains, what prompted this change from idle to active? 
Initial observation and evidence strongly suggests that Bill C-45 played a key role in the 
emergence of INM. This relationship is demonstrated by Figure 1, reproduced from Google 
Trends4. Working from this initial observation, this thesis analyzes the relationship between 
the legitimacy of Bill C-45 and the emergence of INM in order to explain why a new social 
movement emerged as a substantial and active social movement in Canada and beyond. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Interest Over Time, as measured in Google searches, for “Idle No More” and “Bill C-45 
 
                                                 
4 As explained by Google, “the numbers on the graph reflect how many searches have been done for a 
particular term, relative to the total number of searches done on Google over time. They don't represent 
absolute search volume numbers, because the data is normalized and presented on a scale from 0-100” 
(Google, 2014, ¶2).  
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1.1 How to Reform Federal Legislation  
 
To start to answer this question, we have to look to legislative reform. Legislation, 
as a regulatory policy5 instrument, is “perpetually reformulated, implemented, evaluated, 
and adapted” (Jann and Wegrich, 2007, p. 44). Indeed, the so-called policy cycle provides 
an iterative model for analyzing and understanding policies through five stages: agenda 
setting, policy formulation, decision-making, policy implementation, and policy evaluation 
(Hessing, Howlett, and Summerville, 2005; Jann and Wegrich, 2007). Building from 
Easton’s input-output model, the premise of the policy cycle is that “one policy succeeds 
its predecessor with minor or major modifications,” meaning that there is an evolutionary 
cycle involving feedback loops and changes (Hessing et al., 2005, p. 107; deLeon, 1977; 
Jann and Wegrich, 2007). Policy-making is thus seen as a continuous, iterative process. 
The policy cycle however is a conceptual tool for explaining how policies are developed 
and changed. In reality, the policy process is more complex and may not follow the 
idealized stages; it may result in unintended outcomes (Hessing et al., 2005; Jann and 
Wegrich, 2007). There are often unexpected consequences to policy decisions at different 
stages of the policy cycle. In many fields, including environmental policy, outcomes can 
be inherently uncertain, owing to the complex systems they seek to govern and our evolving 
understanding of socio-ecological systems (Berkes, Colding, and Folk, 2003; Gunderson 
and Holling, 2002) and environmental policy subsystems or networks (see Compston, 
2009; Montpetit, 2003; Saunders, 2013).  
                                                 
5 Policies are defined as “a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors 
concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where these 
decisions should, in principle, be within the power of these actors to achieve” (Jenkins, 1978, p. 15). 
5 
When policies are changed, it can be insightful to answer several analytical 
questions: what changed, how was it changed, why was it changed, who was involved, and 
what were the consequences? The answers to these questions are highly contingent on the 
policy context. Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009) point to democracy and capitalism as 
highly influential contextual institutions. Moreover, the structure of the political system, 
such as a parliamentary or presidential system and the division of power across political 
bodies, is suggested to also influence the policy context. They further contend that the 
policy context is influenced by the capacity and cohesion of state and non-state actors, in 
particular the policy actors (like the bureaucracy and political parties) and the policy 
subsystems they interact within. The actors that can spur reforms vary across time and 
space. For example, how much weight do lobbyists have with the key decision makers? Is 
the rationale for the reforms ideological or evidence-based? What are the governmental 
priorities and law-making authorities?6  
To reform federal legislation in Canada, the GoC follows a procedural process 
based on the parliamentary system by passing a Government Bill—typically originating in 
the House of Commons (HoC) rather than in the Senate (Parliament of Canada, 2006).7 
There are four types of bills the GoC can use to reform existing legislation: bills that contain 
major revisions of existing Acts, bills that contain amendments to existing Acts, statute law 
                                                 
6 For instance, the division of powers (i.e. heads of power) between the Canadian federal and provincial 
governments are largely outlined in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act. For areas beyond these 
sections, as it is with the environment, there is divided jurisdiction based on the existing heads of power.    
7 This bill is the outcome of a policy proposal, a policy decision, and the drafting of the bill to achieve the 
policy goal. Once drafted, the bill is introduced to the HoC, where it goes through First Reading, Second 
Reading (Committee Stage and Committee Report), and Third Reading. If the HoC passes the bill, the 
Senate repeats the steps taken in HoC. If both House pass the bill, it received Royal Assent, thereby 
becoming law. 
6 
amendment bills, and omnibus bills (Marleau and Montpetit, 2000). An omnibus bill is 
unique because it seeks “to amend, repeal or enact several Acts” and it is “characterized by 
the fact that it has a number of related but separate parts” (Marleau and Montpetit, 2000).  
The Environmental Enforcement Act (Bill C-16) is a recent example of an omnibus 
bill; it amended the enforcement provisions of nine environmental acts. Another example 
of an omnibus bill commonly used by the GoC is a budget bill (i.e. An Act to implement 
certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on [date]). These bills typically 
amend federal financial legislation based on that year’s federal budget.  
While the historical numbers are uncertain, the GoC has introduced 24 omnibus 
budget bills since 1992 (see Appendix A). Few have attracted attention, and many going 
completely unnoticed outside the National Capital Region (Massicotte, 2013; Cockram, 
2014). However, the year 2012 marked an exception to that rule.  
On April 26, 2012 the currently elected GoC, a Conservative Party majority led by 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper, tabled the Jobs, Growth, and Long-term Prosperity Act 
(Bill C-38). Bill C-38 began implementing the federal budget, which was on released 
March 29, 2012. The 450-page bill contained changes to approximately 70 federal laws, 
including some of Canada’s key environmental legislation. Specifically, Part 3 contained 
“certain measures related to responsible resource development”. The Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) was repealed and replaced with the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 (CEAA 2012). With the stated aim to streamline and 
reduce red tape, CEAA 2012 has a new designation process that effectively decreases the 
number of projects to be assessed, it lowers the rigor of assessments, and certain processes 
7 
have shorter timelines, which may limit public and Aboriginal participation8. Moreover, 
the approval of a project under the Navigable Waters Protection Act (NWPA) no longer 
triggers an environmental assessment (Walton, 2012). Following Canada’s formal 
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol9, the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act was 
repealed.10 The National Round Table on Environment and Economy Act was also 
repealed.11 The Species at Risk Act (SARA) was amended to remove the maximum time 
limit on permits for activities that impact species at risk, and exempted the National Energy 
Board (NEB) from protections on the critical habitat of species at risk.12 The Fisheries Act 
was amended to change section 35(1), the section that protected fish habitat.13 The existing 
section was replaced with new language that only protects fish that are part of a commercial, 
recreational or Aboriginal fishery, or fish that support such a fishery (Hutchings and Post, 
2013). As the title of Part 3 suggests, these reforms were made to increase opportunities for 
‘responsible resource development.’ 
These changes prompted immediate backlash from environmental groups across 
Canada. Press releases, public interviews, and media coverage all culminated with the 
voluntary ‘blackout’ of hundreds of websites on June 4, 2012 in protest of the 
environmental amendments in Bill C-38.14 There were hundreds of protests, with many 
                                                 
8 Division 1 of Part 3, provision 52, p. 31-94 of Bill C-38. 
9 Canada official withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in December 2011.  
10 Division 53 of Part 4, provision 699, p. 401 of Bill C-38. 
11 Division 40 of Part 4, provision 593, p. 365 of Bill C-38. The GoC believes the advisory role of the 
National Round Table on Environment and Economy can be replaced through existing non-governmental 
research (Government of Canada, 2012b). 
12 Division 7 of Part 3, provisions 163-169, p. 181-184 of Bill C-38. 
13 Division 5 of Part 3, provision 142, p. 158 of Bill C-38. 
14 Black-Out, Speak-Out was an online protest that saw over 500 websites, including the federal New 
Democratic Party, the Sierra Club of Canada, and the Suzuki Foundation, either replace their websites with 
8 
organized by Leadnow, a Vancouver-based advocacy organization, that seeks to promote 
democracy and governmental accountability (Leadnow, 2014). Despite these and other 
efforts to amend the Bill and block its passage, the Bill received royal assent on June 29, 
2012. While protests against Bill C-38 were not sustained, new and larger protests were 
imminent.15 
On October 18, 2012, the GoC introduced Bill C-45 to complete the implementation 
of the 2012 federal budget. This 428-page omnibus budget bill similarly, but to a lesser 
extent, contained reforms to over forty federal pieces of 
legislation. The NWPA was rescoped through Part 4, 
“Various Measures.” Beyond renaming it the Navigation 
Protection Act (NPA), its regulatory regime would only apply 
to projects that interfered with the navigation of waterways 
listed in a schedule to the Act.16 This was a major reduction 
in scope. The NWPA’s regulatory regime previously applied 
to all waterways that could be navigated by any type of floating vessel for transportation, 
recreation or commerce. It also gave additional ministerial discretion to exempt specific 
projects and waterways from the approval process (Ecojustice, 2012). The Fisheries Act 
was amended again to redefine, among other things, ‘Aboriginal Fishery’.17 CEAA 2012 
                                                 
a message against Bill C-38, or convert their website to greyscale and feature a criticism the Bill C-38 
(CBC News, 2012 June 3). 
15 The ‘Death of Evidence’ and other scientist-led protests against the federal government’s commitment to 
science-based decision-making may be considered a more general spin-off.  
16 Division 18 of Part 4, provisions 316-350, p. 275-307 of Bill C-45.   
17 Division 4 of Part 4, provision 175, p. 204 of Bill C-45. Bill C-38 defined “Aboriginal” in relation to a 
fishery as, “fish [that] is harvested by an Aboriginal organization or any of its members for the purpose of 
using the fish as food or for subsistence or for social or ceremonial purposes.” Bill C-45 redefined 
It is though [sic] the 
government had not 
learned from what we 
saw in the spring, the 
kind of opposition we 
saw from coast to coast 
to coast from Canadians 
on Bill C-38. 
 
- Niki Ashton, Member 
of Parliament (MP) 
(Parliament of Canada, 
2012 October 29) 
9 
was amended to correct a loophole, drafting mistakes and English-French inconsistencies, 
and to make “transitional provisions applicable to designated projects, as defined in that 
Act, for which an environmental assessment would have been required under the former 
Act” (Parliament of Canada, 2012c, p. 3).18 The Indian Act was amended to change the 
voting requirements for First Nations communities to designate reserve lands (i.e. lease 
land without surrender) from the majority (50% + 1) of all eligible voters in a referendum 
to the majority of voters in attendance at the vote.19 GoC approval requirements were also 
amended. Despite objections by INM and others, the unaltered20 bill received royal assent 
on December 14, 2012. 
 
1.2 Purpose and Research Questions  
 
Using an interdisciplinary approach, this research seeks to understand why INM 
emerged following legislative reform, particularly in response to amendments with 
environmental implications. While it is documented in the media that INM began after the 
introduction of Bill C-45, there is no scholarly account that systematically and analytically 
examines and explains why and how INM emerged in response to such legislation.  
                                                 
“Aboriginal” in relation to a fishery as, “fish [that] is harvested by an Aboriginal organization or any of its 
members for the purpose of using the fish as food, for social or ceremonial purposes or for purposes set out 
in a land claims agreement entered into with the Aboriginal organization” (emphasis added).  
18 Division 21 of Part 4, provisions 425-432, p. 334-335 of Bill C-45. 
19 Division 8 of Part 4, provisions 206-209, p. 226-228 of Bill C-45. 
20 MP pension-reforms were removed from Bill C-45 and passed separately on October 19, 2012. 
10 
In order to do so, I adopt Snow and Soule’s (2010) framework on social movement 
emergence. It hypothesizes that a ‘mobilizing grievance’ is the most important causal 
variable for the emergence of a social movement. Mobilizing grievances are defined as: 
Grievances that are shared among some number of actors, be they individuals or 
organizations, and that are felt to be sufficiently serious to warrant not only collective 
complaint but also some kind of corrective, collective action. (Snow and Soule, 2010, p. 
24) 
 
Working from this framework (explored further in Section 1.3) and initial observations, the 
research question is: Was Bill C-45 the mobilizing grievance that led to the emergence of 
INM? Why or Why not? 
This question is answered in two parts. First, content analysis is used to determine 
to how often Bill C-45 is identified as the catalyst for INM. In order to establish if Bill C-
45 can be conceptualized as the mobilizing grievance, relative to all other potential 
grievances, Chapter 3 analyzes the content of early versions of INM’s website, media 
articles on the initial days of INM, original social media content on INM, and protest signs 
from early INM demonstrations. This data determines how often Bill C-45 is identified as 
the primary reason for INM’s collective action. The reasons provided for their mobilization, 
whether or not they point to Bill C-45, ascertain the movement’s mobilizing grievance. The 
data reviewed in Chapter 3 supports the initial observation that Bill C-45 was the catalyst 
for INM; it was the mobilizing grievance. No other event or issue is consistently, without 
failure, identified when the emergence of INM is discussed.  
Secondly, I need to identify if Bill C-45 meets the theoretical requirements of a 
mobilizing grievance. Thus, I explore why Bill C-45 could be deemed serious enough to 
warrant collective complaint and corrective action. Snow and Soule do not provide a means 
11 
for such an evaluation, therefore an additional framework is required. Based on the case 
study, seriousness is operationalized using a framework of public policy legitimacy. This 
framework was selected because evaluations of legitimacy (and illegitimacy) determine 
how public policies are initially perceived when introduced and influence the perception of 
how ‘serious’ these policies may be (Wallner, 2008). The legitimacy of public policy is 
conceptualized as the public’s assessment of its substantive and procedural elements 
(Wallner, 2008). 
 In this case study, substantive legitimacy is measured as the alignment of the policy 
reforms with the substantive beliefs and values of the public, in particular the members and 
supporters of INM. The length of policy incubation, the use of emotive appeals by the GoC, 
and Aboriginal consultation are used to measure procedural legitimacy. In sum, the degree 
to which Bill C-45 was substantively and procedurally legitimate is used to measure how 
serious the members of INM considered the Bill and its reforms to be. 
By answering the research question above, this thesis provides an explanation for 
why INM emerged when it did.21 The central argument advanced is that Bill C-45 was the 
mobilizing grievance that led to the emergence of INM because the bill lacked both 
substantive and procedural legitimacy. However, following an interpretative and 
constructivist approach, I recognize that multiple explanations, using different frameworks 
and analytical lenses may produce different explanations that could be valid and 
                                                 
21 This research does not explain why Bill C-45 was a collectively felt grievance—see definition of 
mobilizing grievance. As national policy it impacts collectives, with collective identities, and collective 
structures/processes—not individuals—and therefore it is reasonable to assume the grievance would be 
shared. 
12 
informative. This thesis does not seek to provide a definitive answer, but to provide a 
compelling, internally logical, and well-reasoned explanation by combining social 
movement theory and public policy theory. 
 It speaks specifically to the significant role that environmentally related reforms 
played in the emergence of INM. Additionally, by examining the extent to which the 
emergence of INM (a new phenomenon and thus lacking academic study in general) was 
the result of policy reform, this research contributes to the literature on both public policy 
reform and social movement emergence. This research sits at the nexus of environmental 
policy, contentious politics, and Aboriginal politics.  
The rest of Chapter 1 provides an overview of the guiding theoretical framework 
on social movement emergence, a justification of where this research fits within the 
literature and of how it addresses an existing gap, a review of the methodology, and a 
statement of ethics. Chapter 2 contains a cross-disciplinary literature review. It reviews the 
literature on the common theories of social movement emergence, the emergence of INM 
and Aboriginal mobilization in Canada more generally, and the legitimacy of public 
policies. In order to answer the research question, Chapter 3 explores the degree that 
members and supporters of INM emphasize Bill C-45 when talking about the movement’s 
motivation. This will determine if it was the mobilizing grievance. Chapter 4 explores how 
Bill C-45 meets or fails to meet the conditions of legitimate policy, which would provide 
an explanation for why Bill C-45 was perceived to be serious enough to warrant collective 
complaint and corrective action. Chapter 5 provides concluding remarks explaining why 
13 
Bill C-45 was INM’s mobilizing grievance, the importance of environmental policy reform 
to INM’s emergence, the limitations of this research, and opportunities for future research.  
1.3 Guiding Framework on Social Movement Emergence 
 
Snow and Soule’s (2010) General Model of Social Movement Emergence provides a guide 
to explore and explain the emergence of social movements. As shown in Figure 2, there are 
three major parts to this explanatory model. The first variable is the “mobilizing grievance”. 
The second part is the “contextual conditions,” which are political opportunity, resource 
mobilization, and ecological factors. The “social movement” is the third and final element. 
Snow and Soule’s definitions for each of these elements are included in Table 1.  
 
  
 
  
 
(1) Mobilizing  
Grievance  + 
 
Political 
Opportunity 
Resource 
Mobilization 
Ecological  
Factors 
=   (3) Social 
Movement 
(2) Contextual 
Conditions 
Figure 2. Snow and Soule's (2010) General Model of Social Movement Emergence 
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Table 1. Snow and Soule's (2010) General Model of Social Movement Emergence – 
Definitions 
 
Concept Definition 
Mobilizing Grievance 
“Grievances that are shared among some number of actors, be 
they individuals or organizations, and that are felt to be 
sufficiently serious to warrant not only collective complaint but 
also some kind of corrective, collective action.” 
 
Contextual 
Factors 
Political 
Opportunity 
“Freedom for individuals and collectivities to express their 
grievances and pursue their interest above ground rather than 
below ground,” while recognizing that this freedom is 
“contingent on the degree of openness or accessibility of the 
political system, and thus focus on its ‘receptivity or 
vulnerability’ to organized challenge.” 
 
Resource 
Mobilization 
“Access to sufficient resources to organize and mount a 
campaign to address…grievances.” 
 
Ecological 
Factors 
“The spatial arrangement of movement-relevant populations 
and physical places, often called free spaces, conducive to 
facilitating or sustaining collective challenges to authority.” 
 
Social Movement 
“Social movements are collectivities acting with some degree 
of organization and continuity, partly outside institutional or 
organizational channels, for the purpose of challenging extant 
systems of authority, or resisting change in such systems, in the 
organization, society, culture, or world system in which they are 
embedded.” 
 
Their model is predicated on the complex relationship between the necessary but 
insufficient independent variables (mobilizing grievance and contextual conditions) and the 
dependent variable (the social movement). The complexity of the model and its integration 
of numerous elements is significant. As Jenkins, Jacobs, and Agnone (2003) suggest, “it is 
not a question of opportunities alone being important or grievances or organization alone, 
but all three combining” (p. 293). Indeed, this model is important because it combines four 
theoretical schools: political opportunity theory, resource mobilization theory, and an 
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updated version of relative deprivation theory that incorporates key aspects of framing 
theory (Snow and Soule, 2010). They justify this integrated approach by suggesting, 
…the analysis of social movements is fraught with interpretative dangers when approached 
from the vantage point of a single perspective. The probable result is akin to the storied 
description of an elephant rendered by six blind men on the basis of the part they touched: 
misrepresentation and oversimplification. Such interpretive dangers suggest that there is 
considerable wisdom to approaching the study of social movements in an integrative 
fashion that incorporates a number of different perspectives rather than privileging one. (p. 
20-21)  
 
All of the elements are needed for a social movement to emerge. Inherent in the 
conceptualization of mobilizing grievances are some factors included in “new social 
movement” approaches as well, such as collective identity and emotion (Berkes, Colding, 
and Folk, 2003; Gunderson and Holling, 2002) and environmental policy subsystems or 
networks (see Compston, 2009; Montpetit, 2003; Saunders, 2013). 
However, due to the scope of this research, the contextual conditions of the model 
are not explored in detail. I assume that the three contextual conditions were present for the 
emergence of INM because they are necessary variables. It is assumed that political 
opportunities were seized, resources were mobilized, and ecological spaces were utilized. 
To flesh out these aspects in detail is beyond the parameters of this research, as it would 
amount to a study on the emergence of INM, rather than targeted research exploring the 
role of Bill C-45 as a probable mobilizing grievance in its emergence.  
As shown in Chapter 2, mobilizing grievances are often the catalyst for social 
movements in the literature on social movement emergence. That is, without a mobilizing 
grievance a social movement would not emerge (Snow, 2013). Given the observed 
relationship between the introduction of Bill C-45 and the emergence of INM, it is 
16 
important to determine if and to what extent the bill can be conceptualized as the mobilizing 
grievance for INM.  
 
1.4 Research Gap  
 
John Rawls argues that the intent of civil disobedience “is to stigmatize and change unfair laws or 
policies by making an appeal to consciences—both those of the authorities and of the general 
public.”  
 
- Tescione, 2013, p. 192 
 
As detailed in Chapter 2, the literature on public policy is generally silent on the 
emergence of social movements. Despite a growing awareness of social movements within 
the generally state-centric public policy literature, public policy scholars generally speak 
of social movements as pre-existing stakeholders trying to intervene at two stages of the 
policy cycle: setting agendas or contesting implementation (Ozen and Ozen, 2010; Meyer, 
Jenness and Ingram, 2005; Andrews, 2001). This general gap is exemplified by Eric M. 
Patashnik’s (2008) book. It explores “what happens after major policy changes are enacted” 
and was hailed as addressing a gap in the literature (Campbell, 2010). While Patashnik 
(2008) considers what makes policy reform sustainable, he does not consider the outcomes 
of policy reform that could challenge the reform itself. The relationship between policy 
reform and social movements remains underdeveloped in the public policy literature. 
In contrast, there is an abundance of research on nearly all aspects of social 
movements, including emergence within the study on contentious politics (Williams, 2013; 
Tarrow, 2013). The theoretical and empirical literature on social movements often, 
however, speaks to the relationship between movements and public policy (see Ball and 
17 
Charles, 2006; Burstein, Einwohner and Hollander, 1995; Costain, 1992; Dixon, 2008; 
Giugni, 1998; Giugni, McAdam and Tilly, 1999; Johnson, Agnone, and McCarthy, 2010; 
McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Meyer, 1993; Meyer, 2005; Oberschall, 1973; Ozen and Ozen 
2010; Rochon and Mazmanian, 1993; Sawyers and Meyer, 1999; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 
1978). This relationship is shown to be reciprocal. As Meyer (2004) notes, policy reforms 
may be an outcome of social movements (see Amenta and Zylan, 1991; Piven and Cloward, 
1977), but may also be an independent variable in their emergence (see Costain, 1992; 
Meyer, 1993; Meyer, 2005). Ozen and Ozen (2010) articulate this idea further by asserting, 
“There is a two-way relationship between public policies and social movements. Public 
policies may generate social movements. Likewise, social movements may lead to the 
formation of new public policies,” and they find that literature on social movements focuses 
on the latter (p. 36). 
Indeed, nearly all research on social movement addresses policy issues, either 
directly or indirectly, be it Indigenous peoples and governance policies (Puig, 2010), local 
residents and environmental policies (Cronkleton et al, 2008; McGurty, 2000; Ozen and 
Ozen, 2010), rural residents and policies (Wood, 2003), the suffrage movement and gender-
based policies (Costain, 1992; DuBois, 1999), or immigrants and immigration policy 
(Johnson and Ong Hing, 2007). The majority of this research explores how existing social 
movements respond to or attempt to influence public policy in specific case studies (Meyer, 
2004; see Amenta and Zylan, 1991; and Piven and Cloward, 1977).  
In these case studies, research has shown that some social movements often emerge 
after years of existing public policy/policies, for example the antiapartheid movement (Van 
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Kessel, 2013), anti-colonial movements (Schock, 2013), or the civil rights and black power 
movements (Andrews, 2013; McAdam, 1982; Yertisian and Bloom, 2013). This finding 
suggests that the sheer existence of contestable policies is insufficient to incite social 
mobilization, nor was reform the major driver for mobilization. For example, while the civil 
rights movement in the United States aimed to change institutionalized racist policies, such 
as segregated schools, it emerged long after the policies were in place and for reasons other 
than policy reform, specifically because of “the collapse of the cotton economy, the 
urbanization of black Southerners, and a strengthening of civic and religious organizations 
in black communities” (Andrews, 2013, p. 196). 
Alternatively, the protests and riots against the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank’s neoliberal economic policies, i.e. structural adjustment programs, emerged 
following their implementation—and were deemed a “predictable response”by Joseph 
Stiglitz, the former chief economist of the World Bank (Walton and Seddon, 1994; Wood, 
2013). Through the work of advocacy networks and lobby groups, the strict and punitive 
immigration, refugee, and asylum policies of Australia prompted social mobilization 
(Monforte, 2013; Tazreiter, 2013). However, to have a new social movement emerge so 
soon after policy introduction and so seemingly intended to challenge policy reform is 
unique—or at least studied less in the literature on social movement emergence.  
Meyer’s (2004) article on social movements and public policy is particularly 
informative on this topic. It makes some important claims about social movements and 
contested public policy reforms. First, he suggests that unwelcome changes in policy may 
alert citizens of the need to act on their own behalf (p. 137). Second, that an unfavorable 
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change in policy can spur mobilization, even at such times when mobilization is unlikely 
to have much noticeable effect on policy (p. 137). Third, both unpopular policies and 
increased distance between policymakers and the public increase the likelihood of political 
mobilization. The probability of mobilization is reduced if policymakers can convince 
citizens that they influence policies and if the citizenry believes in the “wisdom of their 
policies” (p. 140). In contrast, the state can create “grievances through policy,” for example 
by treating different groups differently (Meyer, 2004, p. 140). “In a liberal polity with 
numerous opportunities for participation and the prospects of policy payoffs” like Canada, 
Meyer (2004) suggests “we’d expect ad hoc coalitions on an issue-by-issue basis… with 
various constituencies more or less committed to extrainstitutional participation depending 
on the circumstances of the moment” (p. 140). While Meyer recognizes the role that public 
policy reform can have in creating mobilizing grievances, these ideas are only passing 
comments in a different thesis.  
In summary, neither the literature on social movements or on public policy 
generally emphasize the emergence of social movements as an unintentional outcome of 
policy reform. Despite these burgeoning bodies of literature, there is scant research 
explaining why public policy reform may produce social movements because social 
movement scholars concentrate their research on how social movements inform public 
policies, whereas public policy literature generally marginalizes social movements. 
However, Meyer’s hypotheses are particularly compelling about the ability for a policy 
change to directly prompt mobilization. This thesis attempts to start filling a gap by taking 
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an interdisciplinary approach to exploring and explaining the relationship between social 
movement emergence and public policy reforms. 
 
1.5 Methodology  
 
This section outlines the research design, the data sources, the data collection 
process, the method of data analysis, and the ethical considerations of this thesis.  
1.5.1 Research design 
 
Using INM as its analytical focus, this qualitative, explanatory research uses a 
longitudinal, case study design. Due to its historical and contemporary significance, INM 
is a unique case study that warrants in-depth analysis. The decision to use a single case 
study is supported by the ‘how’ and ‘why’ research questions. Furthermore, this design is 
congruent with the existing literature studying the emergence of social movements. 
Empirical research on social movements is often qualitative single-case studies (Amenta 
and Halfmann, 2012). Accordingly, this research design provides a ‘thick’ understanding 
of INM and of the role of Bill C-45 in its emergence. Furthermore, since I am studying only 
one phenomenon, a longitudinal rather than cross-sectional design is appropriate (Kriesi, 
2004; Yin, 2009). Meyer (2004) suggests a longitudinal design is suitable for this kind of 
research because “scholars who conduct longitudinal studies to explain the stages… of 
social protest movements… tend to focus on more volatile aspects… such as public policy” 
(p. 134-135). The timeframe for analysis is generally March 2012 to January 2013, with an 
emphasis starting in October. March 2012 marks the introduction of the GoC’s Budget 
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2012, which Bill C-45 helped to implement. The period between October 2012 and January 
2013 is emphasized because both Bill C-45 and the first INM teach-in took place in October 
2012 and INM transitioned from emergence and growth into full coalescence in January 
2013. It is thus an appropriate place to focus data collection in order to maintain the research 
focus on emergence. As appropriate, data was also collected from the early 2000s to capture 
longer-term agenda setting and other processes, like consultation. 
1.5.2 Data Sources  
 
Two types of data were collected: primary data and literature. Unfortunately, 
requests for interviews with key figures, including the founders and spokespeople, in INM 
went unanswered and limited the use of a snowball method. Policymakers could not be 
interviewed due to the ongoing judicial review of Bill C-45. Despite this limitation, 
discussed further in Chapter 5, substantive primary data (direct and uninterpreted data) was 
collected from the Internet. The primary data includes visual images from protests, 
transcripts of parliamentary committees, and direct quotes and tweets from members and 
supporters of INM.  
A random sample of one hundred images containing protest signs from INM events 
were identified by systematically searching Google Images, Twitter, Flickr, and Facebook 
using combinations of the following words: ‘Idle No More,’ ‘INM,’ ‘protest,’ and ‘protest 
sign’. All images that contained protest signs were collected—regardless of their content—
until 100 unquiet images were sourced without duplicates. The search parameters were set 
to limit the timeframe of results. Only images taken and/or posted between October 1, 2012 
and January 31, 2013 were used. All images were taken in Canada, from across the country.  
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Many GoC websites were used to collect primary data on Bill C-45 and issues of 
legitimacy. The Transport Canada and Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 
Canada (AANDC) websites and Internet archives were searched for information on the 
NWPA and Indian Act, respectively. Finance Canada’s website provided the 2012 budget, 
hundreds of submissions for the budget, and other budget-related documents. LEGISinfo, 
as the home to bills and related documents, was used to get text of Bill C-38 and Bill C-45. 
The Department of Justice’s website was used to source copies of the relevant legislation. 
Official transcripts of parliamentary debates (i.e. Hansard) were collected from 
Parliament’s website. It was also the source of documents from HoC and Senate 
committees, specifically transcripts and reports.  
 Four ‘access to information’ requests (ATIP request) were made pursuant to the 
Access to Information Act. Copies of three previously filed requests were obtained from 
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC): 
1. A-2012-01257 The Consultation Record for Bill C-45; 
 
2. A-2012-01680 Copies of briefing notes, memoranda, reports, decks, timelines / 
chronologies, evaluations / assessments, and meeting minutes / summaries relating 
to Idle No More. The timeframe for the request is December 1, 2012 to January 31, 
2013; and 
 
3. A-2012-01723 I am requesting copies of all PowerPoint decks related to Idle No 
More from between November 1st, 2012, and today [November 2013].  
 
These records were disclosed in part, following certain exemptions in the Access to 
Information Act. The fourth request was made to Transport Canada on March 1, 2014 to 
further validate initial findings. Following advice from Transport Canada, the amended 
request sought:  
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4. Policy documents (briefings, decks, etc.), (2) consultation with stakeholders and 
Aboriginal groups, and (3) correspondence between stakeholders and Aboriginal 
groups and the Minister or Deputy Minister that directly pertain to the 
amendments to the NWPA contained in Bill C-45. 
  
Despite limiting the scope of the request, the maximum number of extensions were applied, 
giving a deadline of August 5, 2014. Given the strength of the existing data, any new 
insights provided from this forthcoming data will be integrated into future publications but 
are not included in this thesis.  
Primary data on or about INM was collected from four resources. First, INM’s 
website was used as the main source for official data on and from INM. Content, such as 
key issues, manifestos, letters, and press releases from INM were found on its current 
website and from the oldest versions of the INM website available using the Internet 
Archive: Way Back Machine (November and December 2012). It was necessary to use 
archives because the current version of INM’s website was created months after the 
movement’s emergence. In order to understand sentiments at the start of INM, it is 
necessary to go back and analyze the oldest versions of the website. Second, Twitter was 
used to find the initial tweets about INM. Using advanced search function of Twitter, the 
first results for #IdleNoMore were produced and validated against a social media analysis 
of INM. Twitter was selected because it provides a unique forum for direct, uninterpreted 
communication. Third, videos posted online featuring the founders and supporters of INM 
discussing the emergence of INM were identified and reviewed. Lastly, newspapers, 
magazines, and blogs provided valuable data, including quotes by the founders, supporters, 
and protest organizers. While media articles are not as rigorously reviewed as academic 
sources, they were necessary because of the novelty of INM. Media sources were searched 
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using Factiva, but also by targeting major reputable national media: the Globe and Mail, 
the National Post, Maclean’s, and CBC News. Additional content, including blogs (e.g. 
rabble.ca), were used to capture the grassroots, peripheral perspectives of the movement. 
These various forms of online documentation were collected electronically using Boolean 
search logic.  
A strategic decision was made to use both content posted directly to the Internet by 
INM and the mainstream media’s coverage. By doing so, the research captures “the 
interplay between different forms of mediation and [the] wide variety of media 
practices/formats that has particular relevance for present-day activism and practices of 
resistance” (Cammaerts, Mattoni and McCurdy, 2013, p.3). It is through such variety of 
mediums, utilized as ‘communication and broadcast tools’, that movements communicate 
and are communicated about (Cammaerts et al., 2013).  
Secondary data (journal articles and books) were used to guide, support and verify 
the primary data. Academic literature was gathered concurrently with primary data. 
Scholarly articles and books were found electronically by employing well-defined Boolean 
searches, primarily using Memorial University of Newfoundland’s (MUN) search function 
called “Summon”. Literature was collected by searching the websites of key identified 
academic journals (such as Mobilization), searching thesis databases, and Google Scholar. 
Google Scholar Alerts were created for “Idle No More” to ensure new publications, 
including theses, were reviewed as they were published. Data from literature was also 
obtained from print sources via MUN’s libraries and electronically using Google books. 
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1.5.3 Data Analysis  
 
The data was analyzed using content analysis, “a research method for the subjective 
interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of 
coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, p. 1278). Saldana 
(2013) defines coding as “the transitional process between data collection and more 
extensive data analysis” whereby codes22 are used as an interpretative process in order to 
make sense of data (p. 5). This was an appropriate method of analyzing qualitative data, as 
coding is common in social movement literature (McAdam, 1982; Meyer, 2004). Content 
analysis was completed using NVivo 10, qualitative data analysis (coding) software. 
Directed content analysis was conducted to answer the research questions by using theory 
and initial observation to develop codes in the beginning (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). 
Directed content analysis was selected to ensure congruence between the theoretical 
models, research questions, data collection, and data analysis. As explained by Yin (2009), 
‘pattern matching’ was used to compare the empirical results of the coded content analysis 
to the theoretical models. 
There were initially only three codes to explore the first part of the research question 
[Was Bill C-45 the mobilizing grievance that led to the emergence of INM?]: (mobilizing) 
grievance, INM and Bill C-45. Over time, more codes emerged from the data. For example, 
the 100 protest images were coded based on the words or images they contained, normally 
using the words of the protesters as codes. There was an iterative process between data 
                                                 
22 A code is defined as a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-
capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data (Saldana, 2013, p. 3) 
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collection and analysis. As new data was collected and new codes developed, previously 
coded documents were reviewed. Over time four broad themes materialized and the codes 
were grouped under these broad categories: environmental issues, Aboriginal issues, 
political issues, and public policy – see Table 2 for key examples. In addition to these codes, 
data was specifically coded if it was a direct quote by a founder or if it was qualified as a 
core concept to INM. To answer the second part of the research question [why or why not 
was Bill C-45 the mobilizing grievance], seven codes were developed following Wallner’s 
framework for public policy legitimacy: legitimacy (general), substantive, procedural 
(general), incubation period, emotive appeals, and Aboriginal engagement/consultation.  
Table 2. Codes that Emerged from the Data 
 
Environmental Issues Aboriginal Issues Political Issues Public Policy 
Flora, fauna, Fish First Nations Constitution  Bill C-45 
Environmental 
Protection  
Land (designation) Political Leadership CEAA / CEAA 2012 
Development (e.g. 
pipelines) 
Rights (Treaty or 
Aboriginal) 
Justice / Injustice  Public policy (general)  
Water (including 
lakes and rivers) 
Sovereignty  Political Influencers  NWPA 
Land (protection) Treaties Democracy Indian Act 
 
After coding was complete, NVivo was used to analyze the data. A series of queries 
were conducted to show the relationships in the data and codes. For example, analysis was 
conducted on certain types of data, like protest signs, to determine what codes were used. 
Data was also analyzed to determine where codes overlapped, for example how often text 
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was coded both INM and Bill C-45 compared to INM and Aboriginal or Treaty Rights. The 
content analysis produced both qualitative findings and descriptive statistics. 
1.5.4 Reliability and validity  
 
Data was collected using Yin’s (2009) three principles of data collection for case 
studies. First, the thesis used multiple sources of evidence. By using different sources to 
corroborate “facts”, this research ensured data triangulation, thereby improving its 
construct validity (Yin, 2009). Second, a case study database was created using NVivo. 
This NVivo database contains all the data collected and evolution of the research. This 
database allows for outside authentication, as the data can be reviewed in order to determine 
if another researcher would make similar conclusions. Consequentially, by creating this 
database, the reliability of my thesis was increased (Yin, 2009). Third, I maintained a clear 
chain of evidence. As explained by Yin (2009), 
The principle is to allow an external observer… to follow the derivation of any evidence 
from initial research questions to ultimate case study conclusions. Moreover, this external 
observer should be able to trace the steps in either direction (from conclusions back to initial 
research questions or from questions to conclusions). (p. 122) 
 
NVivo was used to build a database to establish the chain of evidence, which improved 
reliability.  
 
1.6 Ethical Considerations 
 
The Grenfell Research Ethics Board approved the proposal for this thesis. The 
Board determined that the proposal met the requirements of ethical acceptability as given 
by the Tri-Council Policy Statement on the Ethical Conduct for Research Involving 
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Humans. Due to previous and concurrent work with the federal government on issues 
related to law reform and Aboriginal affairs, the purpose and methods of this research were 
disclosed to the Values, Ethics, and Integrity Branch of Environment Canada. The 
assessment determined that there was neither a real nor potential conflict of interest, but an 
apparent conflict of interest. That is, a person may perceive there to be a conflict, whether 
or not it is the case. A number of requirements were prescribed and met to mitigate any 
perception of a conflict of interest. For instance, this thesis contains no privileged 
information that is not publicly available, government resources were only used for 
officially sanctioned activities, and none of my assignments were directly related to this 
research.   
 
Chapter 2 – Literature Review  
 
Owing to the interdisciplinary nature of this research, which draws from sociology, 
political science, and public administration, this literature review covers four bodies of 
literature: the history of Aboriginal mobilization in Canada, the emergence of INM, the 
common explanations on the emergence of social movements (Political Process Theory and 
grievances/mobilizing grievances), and the legitimacy of public policy reforms. 
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2.1 The Legacy of Aboriginal Mobilization in Canada 
 
Much has been written about the history of Aboriginal mobilization in Canada (see 
Alcantara, 2010; Braun, 2002; Coates, 2000; Corrigall-Brown and Wilkes, 2012; Hodgins 
et al., 2003; Lambertus, 2004; Ledwell, 2014; Miller, 2000; Ramos, 2006; Ramos, 2008; 
Richardson, 1989; Wilkes, 2004, Wilkes 2006). The major foci of these works are 
sovereignty, Aboriginal and Treaty rights, protest methods, media coverage, First Nations 
specific protests, resource development, and identity (for media coverage see Corrigall-
Brown and Wilkes, 2012; Lambertus, 2004; Wilkes, Corrigall-Brown and Meyer, 2010). 
The literature noted below highlights some key events and points to studies on why 
Aboriginal Peoples in Canada have mobilized, rather than how.  
Aboriginal Peoples in North America have engaged in contentious politics amongst 
their own nations for thousands of years before colonization. For instance, hundreds of 
years before colonial contact, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy was established following 
a ‘peaceful revolution’ amongst the Cayuga, Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, and Seneca 
Nations (Ladner, 2014). However, the arrival of Europeans in North America marked a 
new chapter. Since the Royal Proclamation of 1763, one of the main elements influencing 
the relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal Peoples has been the ownership and 
use of land—Aboriginal rights and title. Many of the protests by First Nations in British 
Columbia during the late 1800s, for example, were in response to the GoC’s and the 
provincial government’s inaction on negotiating treaties (Lambertus, 2004).  
Marking the 1969 release of the federal White Paper as a contemporary catalyst, 
there have been more than 500 distinct instances of collective resistance by Aboriginal 
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Peoples in Canada, peaking in the 1990s, and stabilizing around 10-20 instances per year 
(Blomley, 1996; Lambertus, 2004; Ramos, 2006; Ramos, 2008; Wilkes, 2004; Wilkes, 
2006). While some instances of protest occur in solidarity, most social mobilization by 
Aboriginal Peoples in Canada appears to be localized. For example, when the Haida Nation 
famously protested logging on Haida Gwaii, they were responding to a local-level issue 
and policy decision to issue logging permits (Passelac-Ross and Smith, 2013) beyond the 
continued marginalization of First Nations in the area (Braun, 2002). The same goes for the 
Temagami First Nation in Ontario protesting resource development in their traditional 
territory (Wilkes and Ibrahim, 2013), the 1990 Oka Crisis (Ladner, 2014), the Algonquin 
objecting to uranium mining (Lovelace, 2009), or the 2013 anti-shale gas protests by the 
Elsipogtog First Nation in New Brunswick (Ornelas, 2014). Other instances of social 
mobilization, specifically the responses to the Meech Lake Accord and the 1969 White 
Paper, are clearly cross-country responses to macro-level policy decisions (Ladner, 2014).  
While there have been continuous actions of resistance and mobilization by 
Aboriginal Peoples against the Crown since colonialism (Ladner, 2014), until INM Canada 
had not experienced such an unplanned, widespread, and transformative national 
Aboriginal movement since the 1990 Oka Crisis between the Mohawk of Kanesatake and 
the city of Oka, Quebec (Woons, 2013; Graveline, 2013). That changed in October 2012 
with the emergence of the ‘Canada’s Native winter,’ better known as INM (Wotherspoon 
and Hansen, 2013). Wotherspoon and Hansen (2013) argue that “Idle No More is both a 
specific movement and an awakening to re-engage in the ages-old resistance against 
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colonialism and imperialism” (p. 23). Despite its novelty, INM must be contextualized in 
the larger history of Aboriginal mobilization in Canada (Ladner, 2008).  
Ladner’s 2014 study on the history of First Nations social movements in Canada 
suggests that there are currently nine eras of Aboriginal mobilization in Canada—which 
move from individual outbreaks of protest actions to fully institutionalized social 
movement organizations. These eras are summarized in Table 3 below. She suggests that 
the isolated bursts of mobilization are all part of the same social movement, one that is 
rooted in “the deep belief in Indigenous nationhood and decolonization” (p. 228). Despite 
the decades and different actors, five broad issues have underpinned all the instances of 
Aboriginal activism in Canada: good governance, quality of life, economic and resource 
rights, land and territory, and self-determination/sovereignty. These issues are collective 
and allow for the movement to span time, space and different constructs of Aboriginality 
(e.g. treaty vs. non-treaty, status vs. non-status, and reserve vs. urban).  
Table 3. Ladner's (2014) Eras of Aboriginal Mobilization in Canada 
 
Defining Events Outcomes 
Era 1: Sovereignty (1700-1900) 
- 1763 - 1766 rebellion by Obwandiyag against 
the British. 
- 1869 - 70 and 1885 Métis resistance by Louis 
Riel. 
- Nehiyaw’s 1870 – 1885 resistance against the 
GoC. 
Challenging the nation-to-nation 
relationship between the Crown and 
Aboriginal Peoples. 
Era 2: Material Well-being (1945 – 1950)  
- Establishment of the League of Indians in 
Canada. 
The Indian Act made it illegal for 
unsanctioned gatherings, making 
mobilization illegal.  
Era 3: Regional Rights (1950s) 
- Repeal of various restrictions under the Indian 
Act. 
- Growth of provincial associations. 
Focus on improving the civil rights of 
local First Nations constituencies. 
Era 4: National Rights (1960s – 1970s)  
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- Creation of the National Indian Brotherhood 
(NIB) (1967) 
- The 1969 Statement of the GoC on Indian policy 
(The White Paper) to abolish Indian Status, inter 
alia. 
- The Indian Association of Alberta released its 
Citizen Plus (known as the ‘Red Paper’) (1970). 
- The Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs 
was formed and released its own ‘Brown Paper’ 
(1970). 
First Nations backlash resulted in the 
government abandoning its policy 
positions. A new national, rights 
oriented discourse development – 
marking a watershed moment in the 
transition from a traditional social 
movement (focused on material well-
being) to a new social movement 
(focuses on intangibles).  
Era 5: Diverse Identities (1970s) 
- New specialized organizations to support the 
budding movement, for example the Native 
Council of Canada (NCC) and the Native 
Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC).  
New more targeted social movement 
organizations emerged, but it was the 
rights-based agenda of the NIB that 
galvanized the base. 
Era 6: Constitutional Window of Opportunity (1970s – 1982)  
- When the Constitution Act, 1897 was being 
overhauled, the various fractions of the 
Aboriginal rights movement lobbied every level 
of government, held huge demonstrations, and 
even contacted the Vatican to promote and 
ensure the protection of their Aboriginal and 
treaty rights, treaty implementation, and First 
Nations sovereignty. 
- Meech Lake Accord. 
Aboriginal and Treaty rights were 
enshrined in the Constitution Act, 1982. 
But the effort strained the NIB and the 
NCC, resulting in two new 
organizations:  
1. The NIB became the Assembly of 
First Nations (AFN). 
2. The Métis National Council (MNC) 
formed after the Métis left the 
NCC. 
Era 7: Rejected Constitutional Opportunity (1982 – 1992) 
- Charlottetown Accord was negotiated between 
the federal and provincial/ territorial government 
and Aboriginal groups. 
- Rejection of the Charlottetown Accord by 
referendum. 
- Oka Crisis. 
Required Aboriginal groups to refocus 
their efforts from solely constitutional 
change to broader mandates and to 
identify new ways to work with the 
governments. 
Era 8: Working with the System? (1990 – 2000s)  
- Organizations became “bureaucratized, involved 
in policy networks, and integrated into the 
federal government’s machinery” (Ladner, 2008, 
p. 237). 
- Upperwash Crisis. 
- The GoC used the NCC rather than the AFN to 
consult with Aboriginal Peoples. 
- The GoC planned to amend the Indian Act with 
its First Nations Governance Act initiative. 
The MNC and the AFN withdrew from 
some contracting partnerships and the 
failure of the First Nations Governance 
Act initiative to pass into law.  
 
Era 9: Strained Relationships (2004 – present)  
- Canada-Aboriginal Peoples Round Table 
process. 
- The Kelowna Accord. 
The incoming Conservative 
Government strains the improved 
relationship built with the Liberal 
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- The election of the Conservative Government 
and rejection of the Kelowna Accord.  
Government and Idle No More 
emerges. 
 
Ladner (2014) goes on to suggest that Political Process Theory partly explains the 
continued existence of Aboriginal social mobilization in Canada: 
…the Indigenous movement and its episodes of mobilization have been influenced, shaped, 
confined, and defined by the state— just as Tarrow (1998) and other social movement 
theorists who endorse the political process model suggest. That said, however, Indigenous 
politics of contestation do not fully fit with Tarrow’s theorization of social movements or 
with the theories of other social movement scholars. Though influenced by the state and 
opportunity structures, Indigenous movements are fundamentally grounded in and defined 
by issues of nationhood and (de)colonization— considerations that have been largely 
overlooked in the social movement literature. (p. 247) 
 
However, the issues of nationhood and colonization could be conceptualized as long-term 
grievances under Snow and Soule’s model. Collective grievances cited by Ladner (2014) 
and others (see Blomley, 1996; Wilkes, 2004; Wilkes, 2006) include inadequate provision 
of health care, education, and housing, and the sale of disputed territory and Crown land 
for various purposes (e.g. resource development, infrastructure, and military bases) without 
adequate consultation, consent, or compensation, and are seen as a failure of the Crown to 
meet its fiduciary duty. 
Alcantara (2010), Ramos (2006 and 2008), and Wilkes (2004 and 2006) examine 
the reasons why Aboriginal Peoples in Canada have mobilized in the past. Using rationale 
choice and political opportunity structure, Alcantara (2010) explores the motivation for the 
Labrador Innu to mobilize in the 1980s and 1990s against military airplane exercises. By 
testing five conditions hypothesized by Taiaiake Alfred23, he concludes that mobilization 
                                                 
23 In order for an Aboriginal movement to exist 1. the movement must have access to institutional power, 
such as government organizations and the media; 2. there must be political and social divisions among the 
Settler elite, in terms of either political parties, economic classes, or ideologies; 3. the movement must have 
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was spurred by divergent preferences between the government and Innu, the frequent 
intrusion of the state on Aboriginal land, the successful framing, and the tolerance by the 
federal government. Responses to ‘raw grievances’ are assumed not to be a factor behind 
mobilization. However, his evidence suggests that increasingly disruptive activity at a 
military air base in Happy Valley-Goose Bay was a necessary grievance for the Labrador 
Innu to mobilize. Snow and Soule’s (2010) model could have provided another framework 
for analysis beyond the rationale choice and political opportunity structure. 
Ramos uses the elements of Political Process Theory with the idea of critical events 
to conduct a longitudinal analysis of the influences on Aboriginal mobilization in Canada 
from 1951 to 2000. He suggests that resources (new organizations and federal funding) and 
opportunities (media attention and completion of land claims) are the greatest influencers 
of protests. Ramos (2006) argues that PanAboriginal identity is a weak influence on 
mobilization because of the divergent localized identities constructed due to the legal status 
amongst Aboriginal Peoples. He contends that differences in legal status and identity, for 
example status versus non-status Indians, influences the perception of grievances. That is, 
what may be deemed a grievance for a status Indian, such as a failure to fulfill treaty 
obligations, may not be a concern for non-status Indians (Ramos, 2006).  Ramos (2008) 
further emphasizes the importance of structural opportunities, specifically resources, to 
explain the occurrence of political opportunities for Aboriginal groups to mobilize. While 
                                                 
the support and cooperation of allies in the Settler society; 4. the state's ability or capacity for repression 
must be in decline, in either physical terms or due to legal constraints or the political or social context; and, 
5. the movement must be capable of advancing its claims and delegitimizing the state in the mass media 
(Alfred, 2005, p.  64.) 
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grievances are not a focus of his works, he points to the 1969 White Paper, the process in 
the 1980s to reform the Constitution Act, and the negotiation of land claims as all being 
critical events and sources of grievances. For example, he suggests that, 
…as the number of land claims settled increase contentious action will decrease but 
organization formation will increase. This is because their resolution eliminates a primary 
grievance for a number of Aboriginal actors… but also leads to the availability of new 
resources and points of accessing the dominant polity” (p. 806).  
 
Overall, while providing important longitudinal analyses and applying useful frameworks, 
Ramos takes for granted the importance of grievances and fails to directly link their 
existence to mobilization.  
 
Wilkes (2006) similarly uses Political Process Theory to suggest that Canada lacks 
a sustained national Aboriginal social movement because the country lacks strong 
leadership by social movement organization, political networks, and a national collective 
identity. However, he acknowledges the importance of unresolved historical and 
contemporary grievances to collective mobilization. Her earlier 2004 work suggests that 
higher levels of deprivation (operationalized as unemployment) and resources 
(operationalized as socioeconomic status) encouraged participation by First Nations in 
collective action (Wilkes, 2004). Overall, these findings suggest that identity, relationships 
with the federal government, resources, and grievances are all important indicators of why 
Canada’s history is peppered with instances of Aboriginal mobilization.  
Turning to the present and future, a recent paper uses the ‘feasibility hypothesis’ to 
explain why Aboriginal mobilization in Canada is currently possible (Bland, 2013). This 
hypothesis suggests that social fractionalization, a ‘warrior cohort’, the proportion of 
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natural resources in gross domestic product, level of security, and topography are the five 
main determinants for mobilization. In other words, feasibility rather than a ‘root cause’ 
determines mobilization. Importantly, Bland’s 2013 article emphasizes contemporary 
policy over historical grievances:  
The possibility of a catastrophic confrontation between Canada’s settler and Aboriginal 
communities, spurred not by yesterday’s grievances but by the central features and 
consequences of our national policies, have the potential to make such an uprising feasible 
if not, one hopes, inevitable. (p. 8)  
 
While long-term grievances are recognized as a powerful motivational driver within this 
hypothesis, they are insufficient to explain mobilization. This thinking reflects the 
assumptions of the necessary but insufficient independent variables of Snow and Soule’s 
model.  
Understanding the long and tumultuous history of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada is 
fundamental to understanding the complexity of Canada’s political landscape. INM in 
many ways is a continuation, but a new branch, of the long history of the contentious 
relationship between Aboriginal Peoples and the federal government (Ladner, 2008; 
Wotherspoon and Hansen, 2013). 
 
2.2 The Emergence of Idle No More 
 
Since INM is a relatively new social phenomenon, the academic literature on it is 
limited but growing. Every article specifically points to Bill C-45 as a critical event (see 
Graveline, 2013; Heinrichs, 2013; Paradis, 2013; Trahant, 2013). For example, in their 
study on the emergence of and public response to INM, Wotherspoon and Hansen (2013) 
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state that Bill C-45 was the breaking point following a long series of grievances 
experienced by Aboriginal Peoples. In particular, INM’s 
… most immediate roots lie with an initiative undertaken not by formal Indigenous 
leaders, but from unofficial leaders… in the course of discussing how their concerns 
about recent measures hidden in massive budget legislation could be translated into 
action. Their stance against provisions contained within Bill C-45. (p. 23) 
 
Woons (2013) concurs, suggesting that INM “began as a response to federal legislation 
introduced in November 2012 that reduced environmental protection of important lands 
and waters within traditional Indigenous territories” (p. 173). Bill C-45 is widely linked to 
the emergence of INM.   
Many authors point specifically to Bill C-45’s reforms to the NWPA (Anderson, 
2013; Becker, 2013; Heinrichs, 2013; Philp, 2012; Graveline, 2013) as the key legislative 
change that sparked INM. Philp (2012) holds that the primary grievance in Bill C-45 was 
specifically 
…the overhaul of the Navigable Waters Protection Act which removes environmental 
protection from all but 97 of the 32,000 lakes and rivers previously protected. This will 
allow unbridled industrial and urban development, threatening species at risk and the 
habitat for many more and possibly the water supplies of some communities (p. 1).  
 
Others note a general weakening of environmental protection as being a cause of outrage 
(Kirchhoff, Gardner, and Tsuji, 2013; Kovach, 2013; Wotherspoon and Hansen, 2013). In 
particular, Scott (2013) sees INM as a grassroots indigenous resistance to the federal 
government’s ‘responsible resource development’ agenda (p. 33).  
The literature also extends beyond discussions of the environment to the reforms of 
the Indian Act (Heinrichs, 2013; Becker, 2013; Philp, 2012). The perceived failure of the 
GoC to respect treaties or meet its constitutional duty to consult and accommodate 
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Aboriginal Peoples when their Aboriginal or Treaty rights may be infringed – by the 
reforms contained in Bill C-38 and Bill C-45 – is also deemed a primary reason for the 
emergence of INM (Inman, Smis, and Cambou, 2013; Kovach, 2013; Kirchhoff, Gardner, 
and Tsuji, 2013; Philp, 2012; Heinrichs, 2013; Paradis, 2013).  
The issues of sovereignty, nationhood, and identity are additionally discussed as 
important confounding factors that influenced the emergence of INM (Wotherspoon and 
Hansen, 2013; Paradis, 2013; Heinrichs, 2013). Several authors also point to the importance 
of how the government introduced the reforms, specifically through a budget omnibus bill 
(Graveline, 2013; Kirchhoff, Gardner, and Tsuji, 2013). Anderson (2013) also emphasizes 
the role of clear leadership and the use of technology. Overall, there are many elements 
identified in the growing literature on INM that help to identify the factors that led to 
emergence. However, they generally point to Bill C-45 or some aspect of it as the specific 
catalyst (Hudson, 2014). 
Wotherspoon and Hansen (2013) further suggest that the high level of social 
exclusion historically experienced by Aboriginal Peoples in Canada (produced and 
reproduced through complex dynamics of policies, economic development, historical and 
contemporary colonialism, racism, and conceptions of justice) is necessary to explain the 
long-term context of INM. However, it was “the recognition that Bill C-45 contains 
provisions that are likely to extend a colonial legacy in which Indigenous people have 
encountered numerous forms of oppression and inequalities” that directly prompted INM. 
They further suggest that,  
The movement is important because it is rooted in old Indigenous laws that speak of our 
duty to protect the water and land for the future generations. It marks the re-awakening of 
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an Indigenous tradition and culture grounded in respect for the environment, fostering 
resistance to the kinds of exploitation of land and water conveyed through many of the 
terms of Bill C-45. (Wotherspoon and Hansen, 2013, p. 23) 
 
They conclude by noting,  
For academic researchers as well as political observers, ongoing attention is needed to 
explore both the roots and possible futures of the movement and the kinds of influence, if 
any, it will generate over time. (Wotherspoon and Hansen, 2013, p. 34) 
 
This study will help build that understanding by further exploring its emergence using 
mobilizing grievances and public policy legitimacy as a different lens of analysis.  
 
2.3 The Emergence of Social Movements and the Role of 
Grievances  
The literature on contentious politics, as the home of the study of social movements, 
has a long history of exploring the impact of policies on the emergence of social movements 
and vice versa (Meyer, 2005; Opp, 2009). There are many factors that theorists have 
suggested are necessary for the emergence of a social movement, such as the generation of 
collective identity (Van Stekelenburg, 2013). Building from its behavioural and 
psychological roots, one of the predominant methods to explore social movement 
emergence is Political Process Theory (see Costain, 1992; Noonan, 1995; Meyer, 1993; 
Haddadian, 2012). This theory was originally developed by McAdam in his 1982 study to 
explain the emergence of the black insurgency in the United States. Political Process 
Theory (i.e. Political Process Model of Movement Emergence) combines cognitive 
liberation, expanding political opportunities, and established organizations as the necessary 
variables for movement emergence. Over time, these three elements became political 
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opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes (McAdam, 1996; Della Porta, 
2013; Haddadian, 2012).  
Despite it being the hegemonic explanatory theory of the emergence of social 
movements (McAdam, 1996), there is much criticism of Political Process Theory, both 
from within the school of thought and from other theoretical schools (see Bevington and 
Dixon, 2005; Caren, 2007; Gamson and Meyer, 1996; Goodwin and Jasper, 2012; Meyer, 
2004). There are a number of compelling critiques. Political Process Theory ignores the 
role of collective grievances and implicitly assumes that the organizers are able to identify 
opportunities using a cost-benefit style of analysis (Pinard, 2011; Della Porta, 2013). It is 
overly structural and does not take into account agency and the importance of emotions 
(Goodwin and Jasper, 2012). Despite its different elements, Political Process Theory is 
practically synonymous with Political Opportunity Theory, because scholars tend to 
emphasize or exclusively focus on the 'opportunity' variable (Meyer, 2004; Goodwin and 
Jasper, 2012). It is also practically unfalsifiable because of its broad operationalization 
(Caren, 2007; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996). Nearly everything can be construed 
as an opportunity; both the closing and opening of opportunities have been said to spur 
mobilization. The broad conceptualization of “opportunities” even prompted McAdam 
(1996) to try to narrow the scope. Lastly, and related to the other critiques, Meyer (2004) 
states that, 
…this model [Political Process Theory] is clearly not always applicable. Unfavorable 
changes in policy can spur mobilization, even at such times when mobilization is unlikely 
to have much noticeable effect on policy. Indeed, social movements that arise in response 
to proposed or actual unwelcome changes in policy may see their inﬂuence in moderating 
the efforts or achievements of their opponents or, more favorably, maintaining the status 
quo…. Bad news in policy and increased distance from effective policymaking both seem 
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to improve the prospects for political mobilization. In this case, opportunities for 
mobilization appear at exactly those times when inﬂuence on policy, at least proactive 
inﬂuence, is least likely. (p. 137-8) 
 
Meyer himself admits that Political Process Theory cannot explain mobilization following 
unfavourable policy reforms.  
Based on these critiques, Political Process Theory is not an appropriate theory to 
explore the emergence of INM. Snow and Soule’s (2010) General Framework for Social 
Movement Emergence, on the other hand, is more robust than Political Process Theory. It 
adds mobilizing grievances, as discussed below, and does not abandon its other elements 
entirely. Instead, it offers a clearer conceptualization of the variables to ensure that the 
meaning of political opportunity is not ambiguous and that it does not overshadow other 
variables.  
Like opportunities, much has been written about the fundamental role of grievances 
in social mobilization literature (see Ennis and Schreuer 1987; Gurr, 1970; Law and Walsh, 
1983; Marx and Holzner 1977; Meyer 2004; Schurman and Munro, 2006). The negative 
feelings that fuel mobilization have been in both the foreground and background of various 
studies on social movement emergence. Pinard (2011) proposes that grievances “imply felt 
sentiments” whereas deprivations, which are often mentioned in the early literature, “refer 
to objective conditions” (p. 5).  Even if they are not the focus of study, grievances are found 
throughout the literature on social movements.  
Grievances can be defined as the “troublesome matters or conditions, and the 
feelings associated with them—such as dissatisfaction, fear, indignation, [and] resentment” 
that individuals feel on a regular basis (Snow and Soule, 2010, p. 23). They relate to 
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conditions or “matters about which [people] are deeply troubled, have considerable 
concern, and feel passionately” (Snow, 2013, p. 540). Since they are fundamentally 
emotional, it is often purported that strong emotions are essential to the emergence of social 
movements (Eyerman, 2005; Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, 2001).  
While many grievances are long-term, others appear abruptly. ‘Suddenly imposed 
grievances’ occur when an unanticipated change threatens peoples’ rights, status, 
principles, or values (Walsh, 1981; Walsh and Warland, 1983; van Stekelenburg and 
Klandermans, 2013). The central elements of a suddenly imposed grievance are that the 
grievance is new, unexpected, divisive and “provides the primary motivational impetus for 
organizing social movement campaigns and for engaging in social movement activities” 
(Snow, 2013, p. 540). Moral shock is often discussed as a suddenly imposed grievance and 
possible catalyst for collective outrage and action (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001; 
Lemonik Arthur, 2013; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013). Moral shock is “the 
experience of sudden and deeply emotional stimulus that causes an individual to come to 
terms with a reality that is quite opposed to the values and morals already held by that 
individual” (Lemonik Arthur, 2013, p. 776). Suddenly imposed grievances, like moral 
shock, may be by-products of a 'critical event', for which mobilization becomes a form of 
retaliation (see Rohlinger, 2009). In many ways, some scholars see an initial grievance as 
necessary for a social movement.  
Despite these and other concepts, the depth of the theoretical and empirical 
scholarship on grievances is not what one may assume (Snow and Soule, 2010). This is 
because the three dominant theoretical perspectives within the field of social movement 
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scholarship (i.e. Political Opportunity Theory, Resource Mobilization Theory, and Framing 
Theory) generally marginalize grievances (Haddadian, 2012). Grievances do not play an 
important role in these theories, and are often suggested to be insufficient to explain 
collective action (e.g. Tilly, 1978; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Tarrow, 1994). In fact, they 
are often taken-for-granted or seen as ubiquitous (Snow and Soule, 2010). For example, 
during the 1970s and 1980s Resource Mobilization Theory explored how movements 
mobilize rather than why (Meyer, 2004). To do so, Resource Mobilization scholars 
minimized the importance of grievances (i.e. the basic ‘why’ question), often seeing 
grievances as commonplace and thus lacking any explanatory power (Law and Walsh, 
1983; Regan and Norton, 2005; Oberschall, 1973; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Jenkins and 
Perrow, 1977; Snow and Soule, 2010; Opp 1988; Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013). 
However, the shift to incorporate culture (e.g. values and beliefs) and emotions through 
‘framing processes’24 has renewed the importance of grievances when studying social 
movements (Melucci, 1996; Rochon, 1998; Schurman and Munro, 2006; Snow and Soule, 
2010).  
Working to explain and ultimately dispel these perceptions, Snow and Soule (2010) 
argue that grievances have been wrongly marginalized. Working from the aforementioned 
individualistic/ubiquity critique of grievances, they have conceptualized mobilizing 
grievances. Mobilizing grievances are a specific type of grievance, defined as 
                                                 
24 Similar to social constructionism, framing purports that interpretation is central to understanding why 
mobilization occurs: “the meanings objects or events hold for people are not intrinsic—they do not, in other 
words, attach to them automatically - but are assigned or imputed through interpretative processes” 
(McAdam and Snow, 1997, p. 233).  
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Troublesome matters or conditions, and the feelings associated with them, which are shared 
among a number of actors, be they individuals or organizations, and that are felt to be 
sufficiently serious to warrant not only collective complaint but also some kind of 
corrective, collective action. (Snow and Soule, 2010, p. 24) 
 
The key conceptual difference is that “individual level grievances may be ubiquitous, but 
mobilizing grievances are not” (Snow and Soule, 2010, p. 26). Mobilizing grievances are 
the collective, deeply felt grievances that may spark or reinvigorate social movements 
(Snow and Soule, 2010; Snow 2013). To distinguish between these conceptualizations 
Snow (2013) provides a useful metaphor: “mobilizing grievances are more like mushrooms 
after a spring rainfall than weeds; they don’t flourish continuously and everywhere, but 
only under specifiable conditions” (p. 541).  
Grievances, while often dismissed as ubiquitous and thus uninformative, may be 
quite the opposite if they are mobilizing grievances. Snow (2013) suggests that mobilizing 
grievances are of paramount importance: 
Although there are various sets of conditions that contribute to the emergence…[of] social 
movements—such as the degree of perceived political opportunity, organization, and 
resource acquisition, none of these factors is more important than the generation of 
mobilizing grievances. (p. 540) 
 
Arguing that mobilizing grievances are of central relevance to the emergence of a social 
movement is to suggest that social movements are not simply rational, instrumentalist 
avenues to achieve desirable outcomes. People do not mobilize after clear cost-benefit 
analysis leads them to determine that mobilization is the best course of action based on 
available resources and political conduciveness. Mobilization is driven instead by complex 
and culminating, potentially irrational, factors, including a sense of collective outrage, 
which is exemplified by Snow and Soule’s model. As Schurman and Munro (2006) aver, 
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“what people think in their heads, as well as hold in their hearts, really matters” (p. 32). To 
apply this logic to mobilizing grievances is to suggest that what people collectively think 
and feel is fundamentally important to why social movements emerge.  
 
2.4 The Legitimacy of Public Policies 
 
In nondemocratic systems there usually is little need, in considering legitimacy, to distinguish 
between the regime and its policy…. In democracies the same thing may seem to be true. The 
(genuine) legitimacy of … parliament and prime minister, may seem to give a certain prima facie 
legitimacy to their policy. They have been elected, afterall, by the people. Hence it may not seem 
obvious why legitimacy might be a separate need for their policy and why, therefore, one might 
wish to consider a question like ‘policy legitimacy’. 
 
- Smoke, 1994, p. 98 
   
With roots in the works of John Rawls, Max Weber, and John Locke, political 
legitimacy is a well-studied and well-theorized field (c.f. Grimes, 2008; Easton, 1979). 
While it is beyond the scope of this work to debate what exactly constitutes political 
legitimacy, the conceptualization of Bakvis and Skogstad (2012) is informative for this 
research. Rooted in a Weberian understanding, they aver that “governments must be 
perceived as legitimate if they are to count on the unequivocal support of citizens. 
Legitimacy is a reflection of the public’s perceptions of the appropriateness of governing 
arrangements and their outcomes” (p. 15). In other words, if a government lacks the explicit 
support of their citizens, it lacks legitimacy. Legitimacy derives from both the actual 
legality of actions taken by the government, and from the public’s perception of those 
actions within their own understanding of right and wrong (Grimes, 2008). These 
government actions are often policy decisions (Bakvis and Skogstad, 2012). As explained 
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by Bovens, t’Hart, and Kuipers (2001), part of political legitimacy is “public satisfaction 
with policy” (p. 21). Beyond the important questions of who is included in the public, such 
as Aboriginal Peoples who may not identify as a citizen of Canada and rather as a citizen 
of their nation, and if public consensus is required, this raises the question: what is public 
policy legitimacy? 
There are many competing ideas about what constitutes policy legitimacy in the 
literature. An early conceptualization suggests that there are two necessary elements: the 
normative element that “requires that the policy be consistent with, and express, [the 
country’s] political values,” and the cognitive element that requires the perception of 
feasibility of the policy objectives (Smoke, 1994, p. 99, c.f. George, 1980). Peters (1986) 
contends that policy “legitimacy is largely psychological. It depends on the majority’s 
acceptance of the rightness of government” (p. 63). However, to those who adhere to 
Immanuel Kant’s Metaphysics of Moral, deliberation (i.e. deliberative democracy) 
determines if policies are legitimate (Woolley, 2008). Issalys (2005) links the idea of 
legitimacy in public action, including policies, to be grounded in the idea of (good) 
governance rather than government. Following the work of Schön and Rein (1994), Lett, 
Hier, and Walby (2012) see policy legitimacy as “confidence among stakeholders and 
members of the public that policy options are justified, appropriate, and fair. Policy options 
need to be framed in a manner that appears to address putative problems by generating 
appropriate policy solutions” (p. 330). Hanberger (2003) similarly contends that public 
policy legitimacy is “the product of satisfying felt needs and solving perceived problems” 
(p. 258). Gains and Stoker (2009) suggest there is general agreement that it is necessary for 
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the public to support the decision makers and their decisions (i.e. policies) in order for both 
to be legitimate (Gains and Stoker, 2009). Legitimacy then is based on subjective 
assessments and will vary across and between stakeholders and the general public 
(McConnell, 2010; Wallner, 2008). Legitimacy may be understood as a normative 
evaluation that differs between individuals, but like mobilizing grievances, assessments of 
legitimacy can be felt collectively. Legitimacy is assessed against the values and beliefs of 
a collective identity (e.g. Canadian citizens, Aboriginal Peoples, environmentalists).  
A nuanced idea of policy legitimacy comes from Beetham’s (1991) classic, The 
Legitimation of Power. In it he argues that a policy decision or instrument is legitimate if 
it meets three requirements: (1) it conforms to established rules (or it is illegitimate); (2) 
the exercise of power can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both the dominant 
and the subordinate (or it has a legitimacy deficit); and (3) there is evidence of consent by 
the subordinate (or it is delegitimizing) (Jagers and Hammar, 2009; Montpetit, 2008). 
Beetham (1991) disagrees with Peters (1986) and others by suggesting that public 
perception does not determine legitimacy (Montpetit, 2008). Instead, critical public 
perception creates a legitimacy deficit or is delegitimizing. As explained by Montpetit 
(2008), there can be a ‘deep legitimacy deficit’ if a policy design is out of line with the 
beliefs of actors, which can result in delegitimation through the wide mobilization of 
outraged actors. This idea is supported by Issalys (2005) who suggests legitimacy is borne 
from the acceptance of the public to be governed and in their acceptance of the 
government’s rules. Obedience is “the behavioural expression of legitimacy” meaning that 
disobedience is the expression of illegitimacy which has “implications for the stability of a 
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political system” (Grimes, 2008, p. 525; c.f. Easton 1979). Thus, critical public opinion 
might not make the policy legally illegitimate, but may delegitimize it and the political 
actor behind it. Based on these conceptualizations, there are five key elements that should 
ensure policy legitimacy: the citizenry recognizes a problem, they are involved in (or at 
least approve of) the process to address it, they support the policy solution, the policy does 
not privilege one group of society, and the policy is intra vires.  
The basic premise behind all these discussions of legitimacy is that ensuring the 
legitimacy of public policies, not just their efficiency or efficacy, should be a priority for 
democratic governments when designing and implementing policy (Hanberger, 2003; 
Smoke 1994; Wallner, 2008). While the efficiency, efficacy and legitimacy of policies are 
often contrasted during policy development, they must all be present in order for policies 
to be sustainable and to build public support (Jagers and Hammar, 2009; Montpetit, 2008).  
Gross-Stein (2001) suggests that ensuring efficacy, unlike efficiency, is integral to 
ensuring the legitimacy of policies. The relationship between legitimacy and efﬁcacy is the 
basis for Scharpf’s (1997) input-oriented and output-oriented legitimacy. Input-oriented 
processes involve meaningful engagement of citizens during the development of policies, 
which stimulates legitimacy by giving the citizenry direct influence over policy efficacy 
(Montpetit, 2008; Scharpf, 1997). This idea of input legitimacy returns to the notion of 
deliberation (see Woolley, 2008; Parkinson, 2003). In contrast, “output-oriented legitimacy 
derives from the efﬁcacy of a policy in improving a situation believed problematic for 
society” which requires engaging key experts in the policy design (Montpetit, 2008, p. 264; 
Parkinson, 2003). Legitimacy is stimulated by using their knowledge to make policies 
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successful, i.e. to achieve efficacy. Importantly, the public’s perception of policy 
legitimacy is based on both input and output legitimacy (Bakvis and Skogstad, 2012, p. 
17). 
Montpetit (2008) further addresses input and output legitimacy in his writing on 
policy design. He asserts that,  
When legitimacy is the prime concern of policy designers, output-oriented processes should 
be short and involve a limited number of knowledgeable actors. Input-oriented processes 
should be long and involve a large number of citizens. (p. 27) 
 
 This gives the effect of public involvement and improves the likelihood that the public will 
approve the final policy decision. Parkinson (2003) further contends that “expert opinions 
have weight, but only in as much as they are offered in a process of public deliberation, and 
are found persuasive by those to whom they are offered” (p. 183). Montpetit goes further 
by arguing that “an input-oriented process, whose duration allows for both deliberation and 
inclusiveness carries a higher legitimacy potential than a process which is only deliberative 
or only inclusive” (Montpetit, 2008, p. 267). Consequentially, output models can produce 
legitimacy deficits (Montpetit, 2008, p. 265). Even if a policy on paper is legally 
‘legitimate’ due to the use of experts, good governance25 requires that it should be fully 
legitimate by using input from the citizenry (Issalys, 2005). 
Continuing the relationship between efficacy and legitimacy, policy legitimacy is 
also implicated in the assessment of policy success (see Marsh and McConnell, 2010; 
                                                 
25 Good governance itself is a complex and highly theorized concept. Its exploration is beyond the purview 
of this thesis. For this study, good governance “promotes equity, participation, pluralism, transparency, 
accountability and the rule of law, in a manner that is effective, efficient and enduring” (United Nations, 
2014, para. 2). 
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McConnell, 2010; Wallner, 2008). McConnell’s (2010) conceptualization of policy success 
includes three elements: program success, political success, and process success. The latter 
directly considers the legitimacy of (unimplemented) public policies. McConnell (2010) 
defines process success, inter alia, as “the preservation of government’s policy goals and 
instruments, having done so with constitutional/quasi-constitutional legitimacy” (p. 225). 
This returns to Beetham’s (1991) notion that a policy is legitimate if it conforms to 
established rules. McConnell (2010) suggests “a policy that is produced through 
constitutional and quasi-constitutional procedures will confer a large degree of legitimacy 
on policy outcomes, even when those policies are contested” (p. 41). On the other hand, a 
policy put forward without constitutional and quasi-constitutional legitimacy will be met 
with legal challenges and criticism from stakeholders (Marsh and McConnell, 2010). 
Nevertheless, by following the legitimate constitutional process, a government can 
successfully put forth a policy—regardless of its content—without fearing that others will 
question its authority to do so (McConnell, 2010). One may disagree with the policy intent, 
but not typically with the government’s right to pursue it.26 That is, unless the government’s 
jurisdiction and constitutional basis is contested. This is the case with some First Nations 
who challenge the authority and sovereignty of the Crown, often on the basis of their 
inherent right of self-government and even claims of self-determination (Papillon, 2008; 
2012). 
                                                 
26 For example, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy and the Stl’atl’imx Nation have challenged the 
sovereignty of the Crown on their traditional territory (Asch, 2014). Both Hunter (2003) and Papillon 
(2012) suggest the history of Canadian federalism, including the exclusion of Aboriginal Peoples from its 
design, means that Aboriginal Peoples view federal institutions as illegitimate. 
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On the other hand, Wallner (2008) addresses policy failure. She argues that 
legitimacy—beyond effectiveness, efficiency, and performance—is crucial to study when 
understanding why policies are unsuccessful. “Failure in policy legitimacy,” Wallner 
writes, “may subsequently compromise the long-term goals and interests of authoritative 
decision makers by eroding society’s acceptance of their legitimate claims to govern” (p. 
422). Wallner (2008) suggests that legitimacy is a normative concept rooted in the 
“subjective interpretation found in the beliefs and perceptions of individuals and groups 
toward the actions and behaviors of others” (p. 423).  
Taking a broader approach than McConnell (2010), Wallner holds that policies are 
illegitimate if they are perceived as procedurally and substantively illegitimate (also see 
Lett et al., 2012; Montpetit, 2008; Bakvis and Skogstad, 2012). That is, policies are 
legitimate if their content aligns with public and stakeholder ideals, and if the decision 
makers follow the accepted processes and norms during the policy cycle. Wallner provides 
a framework for analyzing the legitimacy of policies based on procedural and substantive 
elements—not constitutional or legal reasons (see Table 4). These categories contain most 
of the definitional elements discussed earlier, for example problem identification. Each is 
explored in turn below.  
Table 4. Core Elements of Legitimacy in Public Policy (Wallner, 2008) 
 
Legitimacy Type Core Elements 
Substantive Policy content aligned with stakeholders and the public 
Procedural  Incubation period Emotive appeals Stakeholder 
engagement 
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Substantive legitimacy is widely accepted as necessary for policy legitimacy. For 
Wallner this means “policy content should align with the dominant attitudes of the affected 
stakeholders and, ideally, the broader public” (Wallner, 2008, p. 422). Lett et al. (2012) 
provide a similar definition for substantive legitimacy: “the ways in which the substantive 
content of a policy aligns with the dominant attitudes of stakeholders and members of the 
public (i.e., the constituents ﬁnd policy options reasonable)” (p. 330). Essentially, a policy 
is substantively legitimate if its components (i.e. policy goals, instruments, and outcomes) 
are deemed to be reasonable, appropriate, in the public interest, and in line with the values 
of the impacted group and/or society at large (Wallner, 2008; Bakvis and Skogstad, 2002). 
Actors normally will not support something that runs counter to their substantive goals. For 
example, if the GoC introduced legislation to privatize healthcare, that would likely be 
perceived as substantively illegitimate based on Canadian beliefs and values. At the very 
least, the policy should be framed in such a way that suggests its substance reflects widely 
held or popular views (Schön and Rein, 1994). However, the public is not homogenous and 
policies impact different groups in different ways, therefore “it is necessary to consider the 
achievement [of] legitimacy among different groups and interests” (Wallner, 2008, p. 423).  
Procedural legitimacy is rooted in process—or process success, to return to 
McConnell (2010). If the government follows and respects the accepted steps at every step 
of the policy cycle, it should be procedurally legitimate. Lett et al. (2012) define procedural 
legitimacy as “the ways in which policy advocates persuade stakeholders and members of 
local communities that formal standards of policymaking have been addressed” (p. 331). 
Moreover, policies may be evaluated against the measures of public deliberation 
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(consensus, reason, rationality in discussion, and equality) to determine their procedural 
legitimacy (Woolley, 2008; Haggerty, 2009; Lett et al., 2012). Providing concrete 
requirements, Wallner (2008) avers that three aspects determine the procedural legitimacy 
of public policies: incubation period, emotive appeals, and stakeholder engagement.  
Incubation period simply refers to how much time the public has had to consider 
the problem that the policy addresses (c.f. Hanberger, 2003; Schön and Rein, 1994; Lett et 
al., 2012). Wallner adopts the term ‘incubation’ from Polsby (1984), who suggests that time 
is a necessary incubator for an idea to become an agenda item. Looking to the policy cycle, 
the whole incubation period could be determined by how long it takes for problem 
identification, agenda setting, and policy development. Wallner, in speaking to research by 
Hacker (1997), identifies two services provided by incubation period: 
First, incubation ensures that the ideas of reform are secure in the minds of public ofﬁcials 
and policy professionals who are responsible for the agenda itself. Second, incubation 
allows the time to educate members of the policy community and the public of the value of 
the proposed strategies. (p. 425)  
 
While recognizing that governments do not always have control over the timing of policies, 
if the government fails to provide an adequate incubation period, “they may be unable to 
garner support from the community to enable successful implementation or create a 
meaningful consensus to guarantee the sustainability of the initiatives” (Wallner, 2008, p. 
425). However, as shown in Wallner (2008), the introduction of rapid reforms may not 
reduce legitimacy if the phases of problem identification, agenda setting, and policy 
development have been long underway.  
The use of emotive appeals by the political actor is necessary to ensure stakeholders 
and the public view the policies favourably, thereby building broad-based support 
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(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Emotive appeals are constructed through discourse and 
framing processes, whereby claim-makers attempt to use language, symbols, and imagery 
to construct the narrative and the problem (Hannigan, 1995). Emotive appeals are how 
political actors try to persuade the public into supporting their agenda:  
Emotive appeals consist of evaluative elements including the symbols and discourse used 
to frame a policy problem and its solution, and scholars of public policy recognize that 
language plays an important symbolic role shaping the policy agenda… Political actors, 
therefore, try to manipulate symbols and craft the discourse to stimulate support for their 
policy agenda and strengthen its legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders and the public. 
(Wallner, 2008, p. 425) 
 
Hence, the choice and use of emotive appeals is critically important for policy legitimacy. 
If the public and stakeholders fail to find the appeals convincing, it may put the policy at 
risk (Wallner, 2008). Whether or not the government is effective in framing the policy is 
of central importance to achieving procedural legitimacy.  
Finally, the legitimacy accrued by consulting the public and stakeholders in the 
policy process will come as no surprise to anyone who studies public policy, or has come 
across the idea of input legitimacy. Public participation (Lett et al., 2012, p. 331) or 
deliberation (Woolley, 2008) are essential in order for policies to be perceived as legitimate. 
This speaks to ideas of transparency, democracy, and accountable decision-making (Bakvis 
and Skogstad, 2012). If a government choses to forgo these processes for the sake of 
expediency, efficiency, or simplicity—or to preserve its agenda—it may face backlash 
upon introduction of the policy. The same principle holds true if consultations are not 
meaningful. The public and stakeholders will not feel a sense of policy ownership, nor will 
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they likely feel that the government practiced good governance. The outcome may also be 
perceived as illegitimate: 
One would expect ordinary citizens to support federal practices that yield effective policies 
by addressing problems in a timely and efficient manner. If the political culture places a 
high priority on democratic processes, however, policies arrived at through closed, non-
transparent, and unaccountable processes may still be viewed as illegitimate, even if they 
are highly effective in delivering certain outcomes. (Bakvis and Skogstad, 2012, p. 17) 
 
Moreover, if policies are in (perceived) conflict with the objectives of stakeholders 
and citizens, they “may protest against an initiative, arguing that it insufficiently responds 
to their goals and interests” (Wallner, 2008, p. 423; c.f. Carmine, Darnall, and Mil-Homens, 
2003; King, Feltey, and O’Neill Susel, 1998). The opposite is also true: meaningful public 
and stakeholder consultation or engagement may increase the legitimacy of a policy 
(Wallner, 2008). However, it is insufficient for the government to just consult; “the 
subsequent policy prescriptions [should be]… reasonably congruent with popular attitudes” 
expressed through the consultation process (Wallner, 2008, p. 424). Therefore, involving 
stakeholders and the public, early and meaningfully, through engagement or consultation 
is an important determinant of procedural legitimacy. While doing so may reduce 
expediency, efficiency, and simplicity, and may steer the government away from its 
agenda, it is necessary to improve the likelihood the public and stakeholders support the 
policy decision.  
In summary, the literature on public policy legitimacy suggests that a policy will 
likely be considered legitimate if its content aligns with the beliefs and values of the public 
and stakeholders, if they are engaged in the policy process, if the government uses 
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compelling discourse and framing, and if the policy and policy problem have sufficient 
time to incubate in the public’s consciousness.  
But why does policy legitimacy matter? If a policy proves to be illegitimate, society 
may lose “confidence in the fairness and suitability of their government… and damage the 
specific party in power” (Wallner, 2008, p. 423). For example, in Wallner’s comparative 
case study, the Albertan government saw strong electoral victories and a larger education 
mandate following legitimate reforms to education, whereas the Government of Ontario’s 
efforts lacked procedural legitimacy and resulted in the incumbent Minister of Education 
losing his seat and overall party defeat. Wallner measures the outcome of policy legitimacy 
with electoral outcomes, agenda implementation, public support, and stakeholder support. 
Public support could be measured by the extent to which the policies prompted rallies, 
strikes, protests, boycotts, marches, and social movement mobilization. In whatever way it 
manifests, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of policies has implications far beyond their 
specific target.  
 
2.5 Linkages between the Literatures   
 
While the literatures reviewed above come from different traditions and fields 
within the social sciences, they have common themes and concepts that are significant to 
this research. Throughout the literature, there are discourses of power, inequality, decision-
making structures, and structural influences. A major theme within the reviewed literature 
is the societal and political importance of non-state actors, specifically Aboriginal Peoples 
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in Canada.27 Social movement emergence literature regularly emphasizes non-actors, 
including their emotions, identities, and resources, as the central subject of analysis. The 
literature on INM and the broader literature on Aboriginal Peoples in Canada provides 
examples of grassroots and non-state Aboriginal actors responding to various opportunities, 
grievances, events, and so forth. Moreover, unlike many branches of public administration 
that emphasize the polity almost exclusively, the literature on policy legitimacy regularly 
recognizes the ability of non-state actors to accrue and affirm the legitimacy of a policy 
decision and the polity more generally. Through these literatures, it is clear that non-state 
actors, like INM, are valid foci of study.  
Additionally, the reviewed bodies of literature indicate that policy decisions can be 
so aggravating that they produce protests and mass mobilization. The literature on INM 
highlights Bill C-45. The history of Aboriginal mobilization points to several policy 
decisions as critical events: the 1969 White Paper, the occupation and use of (unceded) 
traditional territory, and the reforms to the Indian Act. The GoC’s policy positions on 
sovereignty, consultation and accommodation, and resource development are similarly 
identified as causing widespread discontentment from Aboriginal Peoples. Building from 
this finding, the literatures further suggest that there is a reciprocal relationship between 
public policy reform and social movement emergence. While Ozen and Ozen (2010) 
explicitly make this claim, the other bodies of literatures support it. The 1969 White Paper 
and First Nations’ response, for example, demonstrates that social movements can be 
                                                 
27 Recognizing debate over issues of sovereignty and statehood, and the existence of many Aboriginal 
governments and governance bodies in Canada, the Aboriginal Peoples and their representation in social 
movements are identified as non-state actors since they are not Member States of the United Nations.  
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launched because of policy decisions and that social movements can result in policy 
changes. While often not at the forefront of study, the literature demonstrates that complex 
relationships exist between social movements and public policies.  
These crosscutting themes, and the literature more broadly, support the research 
question and objectives of this thesis. In particular, the research question builds from the 
literature on INM by addressing an explanatory gap, the literature on Aboriginal 
mobilization in Canada by contributing a novel and national case study, the literature on 
social movement emergence theory by applying the idea of a mobilizing grievance, and the 
literature on public policy legitimacy by using it as an innovative framework to explain 
why a policy decision could result in mobilization. By doing so, this thesis builds on and 
strengthens these research areas. It contributes to each field independently while making 
explicit linkages. It provides not only an empirical case study, but it contributes to the 
theoretical basis by suggesting legitimacy is an appropriate indicator for assessing 
unimplemented policies as the critical event, or mobilizing grievance, necessary for the 
emergence of a social movement. 
 
Chapter 3 – INM’s Focus on Bill C-45 
 
 
Initial observations and the existing literature strongly suggest INM emerged as a 
direct and deliberate response to Bill C-45—specifically to contest it from becoming law. 
The purpose of this chapter is to test these assertions. The causal relationship between Bill 
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C-45 and the emergence of INM is explored by conducting content analysis on four data 
sources:  
1. the earliest available versions of the INM website;  
2. media coverage of INM’s emergence, including statements by members, 
supporters, founders and representatives of INM;  
3. social media content, specifically Twitter and Facebook, from the start of 
INM; and  
4. the content of protest signs at early INM protests and rallies.  
 
These sources were initially coded using codes identified during the literature review 
process and then recoded as new codes emerged from the data. How often data is coded to 
both ‘reason[s] for the emergence of INM’ and ‘Bill C-45’, relative to all other codes, is 
used as the measure to determine if Bill C-45 was the mobilizing grievance. Each source is 
analyzed below. 
 
3.1 INM Website  
 
The official INM website provides the most authoritative insights into the 
movement. The extent to which it emphasizes or ignores Bill C-45 when speaking about 
why the movement formed provides a strong indicator as to its importance as the key causal 
variable. The December 16, 2012 version of the INM website, the earliest available using 
Internet archives, provides critical insights into the initial emotions, issues, and actions of 
INM as a collective entity. In particular, it supports the central relevance of Bill C-45 to the 
initial days of INM.  
There are references to Bill C-45 throughout the various webpages of the INM 
website. The INM History webpage stated unequivocally that “The focus [of INM] is 
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on grassroots voices, treaty and sovereignty, it began in the early part of October when 
discussing Bill C 45” (Idle No More, 2012 December 13, para. 2). Raising awareness about 
Bill C-45 was the first activity undertaken in the name of INM (Idle No More, 2012 
December 13). Even where Bill C-45 is not directly named, the description of the 
grievances behind INM point to Bill C-45. For example, the Manifesto contended that the 
GoC sought to pass laws changing the land ownership under the Indian Act, which would 
negatively impact the environment and Aboriginal and Treaty rights (Idle No More, 2012 
December 11b). 
Bill C-45 permeated the entire content of the website, through both explicit and 
implicit mentions. As shown in Table 5, Bill C-45 was the fourth highest code on the five 
available webpages.28 While there were more codes overall, Bill C-45 was coded to every 
reference explaining the motivation for the movement. In fact, many of the other codes 
were also coded to Bill C-45. For instance, “This [Bill C-45] is an attempt to take away 
sovereignty and the inherent right to land and resources from First Nations peoples” (Idle 
No More, 2012 December 11b, para. 2). 
                                                 
28 Importantly, the other references were often also coded to Bill C-45. Nine of the seventeen references 
coded to Aboriginal Issues were also coded to Bill C-45.  
Table 5. Top five codes on the five available webpages 
 
Nodes 
Number of coding 
references 
Environment > Land 19 
Aboriginal Issues  17 
Environment > Water (e.g. Lakes and Rivers) 13 
Bill C-45 11 
General policy, laws, bills, legislation 9 
Sovereignty 8 
61 
 
Overall, the early versions of the INM website confirm that Bill C-45 was incredibly 
important to the formation of INM because the bill was deemed a legislative attack on 
Aboriginal and Treaty rights, sovereignty, First Nations, the land, and the water. While not 
exclusively dependent on Bill C-45, all of the environmental and Aboriginal issues raised 
stemmed from the bill. Had Bill C-45 not been introduced, it is unlikely that these concerns 
would have been raised at this time in the same way. As explained in the History of INM 
webpage, with “the passage of Bill C45, Idle No More has come to symbolize and be 
the platform to voice the refusal of First Nations people to be ignored any further by any 
other Canadian government” (Idle No More, 2012 December 13, para. 8).  
Beyond theses general linkages, one of the most significant pieces of information 
is a standard letter for MPs that Jessica Gordon posted to the INM website:  
RE: Bill C-45 
  
This message is to strongly express that I do not support Bill C-45. 
 
This Conservative government is blatantly violating the rights of all Canadians and its 
Indigenous people to transparency on critical issues facing all people. Currently, there are 
numerous MP’s being investigated for the undemocratic and criminal practice of using 
robocalls to redirect voters, which calls into question the legitimacy of this government. I 
contend that these MP’s do not legally or constitutionally represent their constituents, and 
demand that the government cease passing any forms of legislation until the outcome of 
these investigations are determined. 
 
Furthermore, Bill C-45 specifically affects Indigenous sovereignty and inherent rights to 
the land, and therefore must receive due consideration, consultation and consent from the 
First Nations leaders and communities in which it directly impacts. The Treaties that were 
signed between the Crown and Indigenous peoples are nation to nation covenants that 
cannot be arbitrarily changed through unilateral legislation. Bill C-45 alters sections of the 
Indian Act and disregards the Treaties without consultation and consent. 
 
Upon review of Bill C-45, it is clear that this legislation benefits corporations involved in 
oil pipelines and nuclear energy, without due attention and consideration given to the 
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impact that it will have on the land and environment. This government has proposed 
reconciliation with First Nations peoples, yet continues to enforce numerous policies such 
as Bill C-45 using paternalistic and neocolonial processes. 
 
I demand that Bill C-45 be stopped until a democratic process of consultation and consent 
is duly followed by the various groups that it does impact. 
  
Sincerely, 
__________________ 
 
(Idle No More, 2012 December 5a) 
 
This letter indicates one of the primary objectives of INM – stopping Bill C-45. While it 
does not explicitly say that INM emerged to collectively contest the Bill, the letter was 
posted on the INM website by a founder, and provides a concise list of the collective 
grievances that members of INM experienced. All of this strongly supports the idea that 
Bill C-45 was the central concern of INM in early December 2012.  
This focus on Bill C-45 and its implications are reiterated in the current version29 
of the Vision of INM. It makes the broad call for “all people to join in a peaceful revolution 
to honour Indigenous sovereignty and to protect the land & water” (Idle No More, 2014 
May 19c). Its current manifesto speaks to a history of colonization, social inequity, resource 
exploitation, profiteering, and the need to become sustainable (Idle No More, 2014 May 
19b). The methods to achieve these grand ideas are explained in its six-prong30 “call to 
change,” including: 
1. Repeal provisions of Bill C-45 (including changes to the Indian Act and Navigable 
Waters Act, which infringe on environmental protections, Aboriginal and Treaty rights) 
and abandon all pending legislation which does the same. 
                                                 
29 May 2014 version of the INM Vision webpage. 
30 The four other calls relate to retaining free, prior and informed consent, respecting Aboriginal Title and 
Rights, to honouring historic treaties, and to protecting (Aboriginal) women from violence. It is evident 
based on this call to change that INM takes aim at governance in Canada. 
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2. Deepen democracy in Canada through practices such as proportional representation 
and consultation on all legislation concerning collective rights and environmental 
protections, and include legislation which restricts corporate interests. (Idle No More, 
2014 May 19a) 
 
Bill C-45 is the first and foremost grievance indicated. It is also significant that the first call 
to change is explicitly to repeal portions of Bill C-45, the specific sections deemed as 
infringing on environmental protections and Aboriginal and Treaty rights. There is not a 
challenge to Bill C-45 en masse, but certain elements.  
In summary, the evidence from the early versions of the INM website affirms the 
observation that Bill C-45 was the initial mobilizing grievance that drove people to form 
and join INM. The various other collective grievances, e.g. violations of Aboriginal or 
Treaty rights and diminished environmental protection, stem from Bill C-45. 
 
3.2 Media Coverage 
 
Bill C-45 is referenced in ninety-eight percent (98%; 84/85) of analyzed news 
articles on the initial days of INM. While some articles acknowledge long-term grievances, 
Bill C-45 is identified as the primary grievance in every article that discusses the inception 
of INM (see Bernd, 2012 January 29; Bradshaw and McCarthy, 2013 January 1; Caven, 
2013; Palmater, 2012 December 28; Seraphim, 2012 December 25). Hopper’s (2012 
December 26) article states INM was “conceived in November by four Saskatchewan 
women frustrated with the Tories’ latest omnibus budget bill” (para. 1). Palmater, who is a 
spokesperson for INM, stated that INM “originally started as a way to oppose Bill C45, the 
omnibus legislation impacting water rights and land rights under the Indian Act” (2012 
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December 28, para. 6). Bill C-45 was, without exception, identified as the immediate 
grievance that compelled collective, corrective action.  
The founders and representatives of INM provided quotations to journalists on the 
movement’s origins and on their motivation to start and spread INM. Some of these 
statements are provided in Table 6 and confirm the causal relationship between Bill C-45 
and INM.  
Table 6. Exemplary Statements in the Media about why INM initially emerged 
 
Speaker Quotation Source 
McAdam When I read Bill C-45, I was horrified. I got into a chat on 
Facebook with Jessica and Nina, and I started explaining to 
them the implications of C-45 for the environment, for the 
waters. I told them there’s something in law called 
acquiescence. That means that if you’re silent, then your 
silence is taken as consent. All of us agreed that we couldn’t 
be silent, that grassroots people have a right to know.  
 
Van 
Gelder, 
2013 
Palmater We are standing up not only to protect our lands and 
waters… but also to restore justice for First Nations and 
democracy for Canadians. 
 
Hasselriis 
(n.d)  
McAdam Bill C-45 is not just about a budget…it is an attack on First 
Nations Lands and on the bodies of water we all share from 
across the country. 
 
Seraphim, 
2012 
December 
25 
Cuthand Idle No More is a reaction to years of setback, inaction and 
one-sided legislative change by the Harper government. 
 
Cuthand, 
2012 
December 
28  
Chief Allan 
Adam of the 
Athabasca 
Chipewyan First 
Nation 
This anger has actually been building up for years…It’s 
taken on a bigger meaning since Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper passed bills that threaten traditional ways of life, 
passing them without our consultation. 
 
McDermott 
2012 
December 
19 
Melina 
Laboucan-
Massimo of the 
Lubicon Cree 
First Nation and a 
protest organizers 
Idle No More exists because we can no longer believe that 
the government respects us,” she said. “If they listened or 
understood us, they would realize these new laws will 
essentially bring havoc to our communities. 
McDermott 
2012 
December 
20 
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Palmater The GoC’s “aggressive legislative agenda…is the spark that 
ignited the Idle No More movement into action…. We 
always knew action would be required at some point, but the 
legislation posed an imminent threat and required immediate 
mobilization. That is how a movement was born. In the 
early days, some were calling [it] the Idle No More 
movement, some calling it an Indigenous rights movements, 
but we all agreed that we needed to immediately oppose 
Harper's assimilatory legislative agenda. So many of the 
early activities included teach-ins which helped explain the 
legislation's potential impacts on First Nations and more 
importantly, what we could do to oppose it.” 
 
Palmater, 
2013 
January 4  
 
Bill C-45 is again identified as the immediate and primary catalyst. While there are 
many compounding historical and contemporary collective grievances, the budget bill was 
the one that promoted mass, national mobilization by Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
Peoples alike (Kirkup, 2012 December 22). Importantly, Bill C-45 was framed as part of a 
larger legislative agenda – one that Bill C-45 seemingly embodied.  
 
3.3 Social Media  
 
 The use of social media, specifically Twitter, as a resource for mobilization, was 
incredibly important to the emergence and growth of INM (Hudson, 2014). The content of 
the first tweets using #IdleNoMore (i.e. the Idle No More hashtag) provides unfiltered 
access to the primary issues and opinions at the time INM emerged.  
A full content analysis of the first months of #IdleNoMore could not be completed 
because Twitter does not provide such analytics and NCapture for NVivo only captures the 
last seven days of tweets; it does not capture historical tweets. Only the initial tweets using 
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#IdleNoMore are analyzed, in part due to the sheer number of later tweets.31 However, 
since the focus of this research is 
emergence, not coalescence and 
growth, these first few tweets are the 
most critical and provide sufficient 
evidence about the importance of Bill 
C-45 to INM.  
As explained in Full Duplex’s 
(2013) analysis of the first six months 
of INM on Twitter and reproduced in 
Figure 3, unlike some reports in the 
media, the first tweets using 
#IdleNoMore were made by Jessica 
Gordon, not Tanya Kappo, at the end 
of October and early November 2012. 
The next earliest available tweet is an 
exchange between Gordon and 
Palmater on November 19, 2012 and 
Kappo’s often credited tweet on 
                                                 
31 A study on INM and Twitter identified 113,409 unique Twitter users and 867,614 tweets between 
November 25, 2012 and January 19, 2013 (Belvis, 2013 January 25). 
October 30, 2012 
 
 
November 4, 2012 
 
 
November 22, 2012 
 
 
Figure 3. First #INM Tweets (Full Duplex, 2013) 
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November 30, 2012. The common threads linking these tweets were #billc45 and 
#IdleNoMore. 
While the focus of social media analysis is on Twitter, INM also uses Facebook as 
a platform for organization and dissemination. On November 22, 2012, the founders of 
INM created the "Idle No More" Facebook page and created an event for November 10, 
2012 to protest Bill C-45 (Full Duplex, 2013). This is the event Gordon links to on her 
November 22, 2012 tweet and the link provided by Kappo.  
 
 
In sum, Bill C-45 was the sole issue in the first tweets about INM and is the reason for the 
INM Facebook page. The social media data further supports the assertion that Bill C-45 
was the primary driver behind INM’s emergence in October 2012.  
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3.4 Protest Signs  
 
This focus on Bill C-45 was mirrored in the words of those on the streets. The events 
that Gordon and Kappo linked to, and dozens of other INM protests across Canada, 
produced a wealth of data, in particular due to the sharing of pictures of protest signs on 
the Internet (see Figure 4). Beyond advertising nearly all of the INM protests as protests 
against Bill C-45, many early protest signs convey a clear anti-Bill C-45 message.  
In fact, twenty five percent (25%) of all the protest signs analyzed directly 
referenced Bill C-45. This is a substantial number given the critiques that INM is unfocused 
and without a clear message (Ladner, 2014). After water and Aboriginal issues, Bill C-45 
was the third most frequent concept coded in the protest signs. Many more signs allude to 
policy changes. Importantly, as was the case with the website’s content, the references to 
water, land, sovereignty, and Aboriginal and Treaty rights all stem from Bill C-45. Bill C-
45, and trying to stop it, was clearly the motivating factor that drew participants to the early 
INM protests.  
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Figure 4. Protest Signs Coded to Bill C-45 at Protetsts across Canada in December 2012  
 
 
3.5 Bill C-45 is the Mobilizing Grievance 
 
 
Analysis from various protest signs, social media, media articles, and INM’s official 
website indicates that opposing Bill C-45 was the major driving force of the early protests. 
In fact, all of the evidence points to Bill C-45 as the primary catalyst for INM. For instance, 
the INM website specified that INM “began in the early part of October when discussing 
Bill C 45” (Idle No More, 2012 December 13). By triangulating the data through these 
various sources, the reliability and validity of the common assumption of INM’s roots is 
confirmed. While there are centuries worth of grievances building towards a national 
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Aboriginal-orientated social movement in Canada, Bill C-45 was the spark (Cuthand, 2012 
December 21; Kirkup, 2012 December 22).  
 
 
 
Based on the timing, the discourse from INM leaders and followers, and the actions of the 
movement, the emergence of INM is very clearly linked to Bill C-45. The empirical 
evidence confirms initial observations: Bill C-45 was the mobilizing grievance.  
 
Chapter 4 – The Legitimacy of Bill C-45 
 
Following Snow and Soule’s conceptualization of a mobilizing grievance, it is 
necessary to determine what about Bill C-45 made it serious enough to warrant collective 
complaint and corrective action. However, Snow and Soule are silent on how to make such 
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(Mobilizing 
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Opportunity 
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Mobilization 
Ecological  
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=   (3) INM 
(2) Contextual 
Conditions 
Figure 5. Snow and Soule's (2010) General Model of Social Movement Emergence, with Bill 
C-45 and INM 
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an assessment. Therefore, a supplemental framework is necessary. Since INM emerged 
before Bill C-45 was implemented, it is impossible that the effectiveness, efficiency, and 
performance of its reforms were assessed by INM and deemed sufficiently serious to 
warrant mass mobilization. In this context, assessments of legitimacy are more suitable 
(Wallner, 2008). As supported in the literature on social movement emergence and policy 
legitimacy, social mobilization can be both an indicator and an outcome of policy decisions 
or instruments with questionable legitimacy (see Section 2.3), making it an appropriate 
framework to assess Bill C-45 against.  
Following Wallner’s (2008) framework in Table 7, if the findings of this research 
suggest that Bill C-45 lacked procedural and substantive legitimacy, it will provide a 
compelling explanation as to why Bill C-45 was a mobilizing grievance. Alternatively, if 
Bill C-45 is shown to be legitimate, this will temper the importance of legitimacy and will 
suggest that additional elements of unimplemented policies should be studied further.  
Table 7. Core Elements of Legitimacy in Public Policy to Assess Bill C-45 
Legitimacy Type Core Elements 
Substantive Policy content aligned with stakeholders and the public 
Procedural Incubation period Emotive appeals 
Stakeholder engagement 
(Aboriginal 
Consultation) 
 
This chapter therefore analyzes the available data on Bill C-45 and INM to 
determine if Bill C-45 meets the substantive and procedural requirements of legitimate 
public policy, and if INM contested the substantive and procedural aspects of Bill C-45. 
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4.1 Substantive Legitimacy  
 
Bill C-45 can be called substantively legitimate if its content is shown to align with 
the beliefs and values of the members of the public. If it does not, it is likely substantively 
illegitimate (Wallner, 2008) and has a legitimacy deficit (Beetham, 1991). In this case, I 
am primarily concerned with its alignment with the values and beliefs of the members and 
supporters of INM. In other words, did they take issue with the actual content of the reforms 
and/or the overall policy direction? As demonstrated in Chapter 3, they did protest the Bill, 
but it is necessary to ascertain if and to what extent their outrage was directed at the actual 
substance of the amendments, which is used as a proxy for determining their opinions.  
To determine whether or not INM members and supporters found Bill C-45 
substantively legitimate, multiple sources of evidence (e.g. protest signs; INM’s website; 
quotes from INM leaders, spokespersons, and organizers; and media coverage) are used to 
identify what elements of Bill C-45 members and supporters of INM emphasized and how 
they may conflict with their demonstrated values and beliefs, including respect for 
Aboriginal and Treaty rights, environmental protection and stewardship, and empowered 
and self-reliant Aboriginal communities and peoples. Importantly, this research does not 
generalize, conflate or romanticize the interests, values, and beliefs of Aboriginal Peoples 
as being inherently environmentalist (see Braun, 2002; McGregor, 2009). As explained by 
Haluza-Delay, O’Riley, Cole, and Agyeman (2009),  
…there is, and has long been, an ambiguous relationship between environmentalists and 
Aboriginal peoples. While environmentalists often appropriate Aboriginality as an 
exemplar of environmental praxis, this stereotypes Aboriginal peoples as well as 
essentializes them. (p. 16) 
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Acknowledging this tendency and that personal interpretation to some degree is 
unavoidable, this research seeks to rely on the data, words, and issues raised by members 
of INM—Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal—to explore the movement’s substantive 
concerns during its emergence. 
 
4.1.1 INM’s Substantive Assessment of Bill C-45 
 
The content of the early versions of the INM website emphasizes how significant 
the content of Bill C-45 was to the emergence of INM. The December 2012 version of the 
INM’s website stated:  
Idle No More began with 4 ladies; Nina Wilson, Sylvia McAdam, Jessica Gordon & 
Sheelah McLean who felt it was urgent to act on current and upcoming legislation that not 
only affects our First Nations people but the rest of Canada's citizens, lands and waters. 
(Idle No More, 2012 December 13, para. 1) 
 
This type of causal sentiment is repeated throughout its website. “Bill C 45 is not just about 
a budget,” it said, “it is a direct attack on First Nations lands and on the bodies of water we 
all share from across this country” (Idle No More, 2012 December 13, para. 5). The earliest 
available INM Manifesto further states that Bill C-45 will leave “nothing but poisoned 
water, land and air. This is an attempt to take away sovereignty and the inherent right to 
land and resources from First Nations peoples” (Idle No More, 2012 December 11b, para. 
3). These are clear criticisms of the perceived outcomes of the implementation of Bill C-
45. These are concerns about substance. Within these critiques, there are two32 major 
                                                 
32 The amendments to the Fisheries Act and CEAA 2012 are referenced but less frequently.   
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substantive policy reforms contained in the hundreds of pages of Bill C-45 that are 
repeatedly discussed in the data on the emergence of INM: the protection for waterways 
under the NWPA regulatory regime, and the designation (voting) process for reserve land 
under the Indian Act (Idle No More, 2014 May 19a; Thompson, 2012 December 19). Each 
is explored below. First, the substantive policy changes are explored and then INM’s 
reaction to them is analyzed.  
 
4.1.2 NWPA 
 
 Bill C-45 significantly overhauled the NWPA. Through section 316 of Bill C-45, 
the short title of the act was officially renamed the ‘Navigation Protection Act’, rather than 
the ‘Navigable Waters Protection Act.’ This change directly and unmistakably 
demonstrates the GoC’s effort to separate the protection of navigation from the protection 
of navigable water (Ecojustice, 2012). This change of direction is accomplished through 
the subsequent amendments.  
 Sections 3 to 18 of the NWPA were repealed and replaced. It is through these 
massive changes that the GoC limited the application of the act to “works in certain 
navigable waters that are set out in its schedule” while maintaining the designation scheme 
for works. As explained by Ecojustice (2012), 
The NPA will only protect navigation on waters listed in a schedule to the Act. The 
proposed schedule includes 3 oceans, 97 lakes, and portions of 62 rivers. By comparison, 
Canada is estimated to contain nearly 32,000 major lakes and more than 2.25 million rivers: 
The NPA would exclude 99.7 per cent of Canada’s lakes and more than 99.9 per cent of 
Canada’s rivers from federal oversight. Notably absent from the proposed schedule are 
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significant rivers in British Columbia, such as the Kitimat and Upper Fraser Rivers, which 
lie along the path of the proposed Northern Gateway pipeline. Notably included are popular 
cottage-country lakes such as those in Muskoka, where wealthy powerboat owners will 
continue to enjoy unfettered navigation protections.  
Practically speaking, this means that the vast majority of non-listed Canadian navigable 
waters will be left unprotected in the following ways:  
Proponents will not have to notify the government that they are building a work 
that interferes with navigation;  
 
Proponents will not need the Minister of Transport’s approval before building a 
work that interferes with navigation; and  
 
The Minister of Transport will have no legislative authority under the NPA to 
remove obstructions or require that owners of such obstructions do so themselves, 
with one exception. Beyond infringing the right of navigation, this may have 
significant environmental consequences, as sunken vessels and other obstructions 
may indefinitely release harmful substances into waterways without a removal 
requirement. (p. 7-8) 
 
These changes and the enabling authorities for the Minister of Transport to make orders33 
resulted in a more permissive and narrower regulatory regime, specifically regarding types 
of works and quantity of waterways.  
 Moreover, in order to reflect the use of the schedule, the existing subsection 5(1) 
prohibition (“No work shall be built or placed in, on, over, under, through or across any 
navigable water without the Minister’s prior approval of the work, its site and the plans for 
it”) is replaced by:  
New section 3 - It is prohibited to construct, place, alter, repair, rebuild, remove or 
decommission a work in, on, over, under, through or across any navigable water that is 
listed in the schedule except in accordance with this Act or any other federal Act. 
 
New subsection 5(1) - An owner who proposes to construct, place, alter, repair, rebuild, 
remove or decommission a work — other than a designated work — in, on, over, under, 
                                                 
33 See new section 22(2) 
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through or across any navigable water that is listed in the schedule shall give notice of the 
proposal to the Minister. 
 
New subsection 10(1) - An owner may construct, place, alter, repair, rebuild, remove or 
decommission a designated work in, on, over, under, through or across any navigable water 
that is listed in the schedule only if the construction, placement, alteration, repair, 
rebuilding, removal or decommissioning is in accordance with the requirements under this 
Act.  
 
In addition, Bill C-45’s coordinating amendments to the National Energy Board Act and 
the Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act state that power lines34 and pipelines35 are not 
works under the NPA. These amendments demonstrate the extent to which specific works 
are or may be exempted.  
 Beyond these reforms, there are numerous additional amendments to the NWPA, 
including enforcement measures (e.g. administrative monetary penalties), violations, and 
offences. Changes also include prohibitions against throwing or depositing various 
materials (new section 22) and against dewatering any navigable water (new section 23). 
Overall, Bill C-45 brought forward major substantive reforms to the NWPA that limited its 
application across Canada, both in terms of works and bodies of water.  
 
INM’s Reaction to the Substantive Reforms to the NWPA 
 
The reforms to the NWPA are highly emphasized in the data on INM’s emergence. 
The media coverage of INM consistently cites the NWPA as one of the few acts whose 
amendments galvanized the movement. One hundred percent (100%) of the coded 
                                                 
34 Section 349(a) 
35 Sections 249(5) and 249(9)(a) 
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newspaper articles that discuss the emergence INM identify the important role the 
substantive changes to the NWPA played in the generation of collective outrage.  
This finding is further justified by the extent the discussion and messaging at INM 
protests emphasized the changes to scope of the NWPA. Twenty-three percent (23%) of all 
the protest signs coded included content on water. The explicit and latent content of the 
following signs elucidates the importance placed on the new policy position:  
Protected: 97 lakes, 62 rivers. Unprotected: Our future (Corner Brook, 2013 January 
27) 
Bill C-45 will destroy Canada’s water - 1% protected (Calgary, 2012 December) 
 
Moreover, an INM organizer in Niagara, Ontario summarized her concern as, "Ninety 
percent of our water is unprotected. Pipelines could be laid anywhere... That should be 
everyone's concern" (Day, 2012 December 31, para. 11). She and many others are primarily 
concerned about two things. First, there is an exhaustive list of waterways that are regulated 
under the NPA. Second, the list is relatively short. These are issues about the contents of 
the amendments.  
While Bill C-45 made numerous amendments to the NWPA, there is one consistent 
complaint: it will decrease the number of rivers and lakes that are regulated under the 
newly-named NPA. The findings suggests that in its formative days, INM members 
regularly stressed above all else that they are outraged because ninety-nine percent of 
Canada’s lakes and rivers are outside of the scope of the NPA’s regulatory regime. 
Specifically, they are outraged that this substantive amendment will leave thousands of 
bodies of water unregulated and will allow for development (e.g. pipelines) that may block 
navigation, thereby indirectly lowering environmental protection (see CBC, 2013 January 
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5; Day, 2012 December 31; Hager, 2012 December 23; McKibben, 2013 January 10). INM 
co-founder Sheelah McLean has repeatedly stated that “(the) bill is about everyone... The 
changes they are making to the environmental legislation (are) stunning in terms of the 
protections it will take away from the bodies of water" (Seraphim, 2012 December 25, para. 
4; Idle No More, 2012 December 13, para. 6). She is again concerned by the substantive 
changes brought by introducing an exhaustive schedule under the NWA and changing the 
prohibitions.  
In order to understand why this substantive change would cause such concern, it is 
necessary to determine if it aligns with or contradicts the values and beliefs of those 
protesting. Like many supporters of INM, Chief Isadore Day, the Chief of the Serpent River 
First Nation, emphasizes that the decreased protection of water as his primary concern with 
Bill C-45. His concern stems from the fact that water is invaluable to the Serpent River 
First Nation:  
The protection of water is a sacred obligation to Indigenous people. Without clean water, 
life will cease to exist. Our obligation to protect water is an overall respect for life itself… 
This [the reforms to the NWPA] is why our people are opposed to the omnibus bill; it 
blatantly disregards water. (Scoffield, December 27, 2012, para. 12) 
 
This substantive reform carries weight for members and supporters of INM because the 
protection of water affects all Canadians—be it for drinking, for navigation, or for spiritual 
purposes (see Spray, December 11, 2012; Thompson, December 20, 2012).  
Donald (2013) suggests it was the substantive environmental changes in Bill C-45 
that prompted non-Aboriginal Peoples to join INM. Unlike Treaty or Aboriginal rights, the 
value placed on clean water is ubiquitous. This finding is consistent across the coverage of 
INM. It was the common belief in the need to protect water (be it for future generations, as 
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a spiritual duty, or due to environmental ethic) that brought together the grassroots, the 
Chiefs, university students, and educators to oppose the substance of Bill C-45. 
The importance of these reforms is best encapsulated by repeating a quote above 
from Wotherspoon and Hansen (2013) when they say that INM, 
…is rooted in old Indigenous laws that speak of our duty to protect the water and land for 
the future generations. It marks the re-awakening of an Indigenous tradition and culture 
grounded in respect for the environment, fostering resistance to the kinds of exploitation of 
land and water conveyed through many of the terms of Bill C-45. (p. 23) 
 
INM and its members and supporters do not agree with the developmental (i.e. “responsible 
resource”) agenda behind the reforms (Scott, 2013). Their beliefs and values about the 
utilization of the environment and reserve land are fundamentally different to the business-
friendly policy agenda of the reforms.  
In sum, Bill C-45’s changes to the regulatory regime governing lakes and rivers 
under the NWPA were central to the concerns of INM in its early days. The rationale behind 
the reforms to the NWPA, specifically developing a list of bodies of water that would be 
regulated under the NWPA, did not align with the views and values of the public that joined 
forces under INM. Supporters of INM believe that all waterways deserve protection—not 
just those on a list.  
 
4.1.3 Indian Act 
 
 As explained in the introduction to Bill C-45, the budget bill amended the Indian 
Act by changing “the voting and approval procedures in relation to proposed land 
designations.” The substantive amendments were narrowly targeted to a few specific 
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individual sections. Unlike the broad and massive change to the NWPA, the targeted 
amendments to the Indian Act allow for a direct comparison of the Indian Act, pre and post 
Bill C-45—see Appendix B.  
 Importantly, the reforms were exclusively used to create a new process for land 
designation (i.e. leasing)36. This required two steps. First, four of the nine amendments were 
used to create a new process for the designation of land, new subsections 37(2), 39.1, and 
40.1(1) and (2). Second, subsection 37(2) allowed for lands that are designated to be leased 
and have an interest in them granted. Sections 39.1 and 40.1 set out the conditions and 
process for designation: 
1. A referendum is held in accordance with the regulations; 
2. The majority of the voters in attendance at the referendum support designation (simple 
majority);  
3. The proposed designation is certified on oath by an officer of AANDC and by the chief or 
a member of the council of the band; 
4. The council of the band recommends designation to the Minister of AANDC;  
5. The Minister accepts or rejects the proposed designation.  
 
These were the main changes to the Indian Act brought forward in Bill C-45. By doing so, 
the process to designate land was separated from the process to surrender land. The process 
for designation is easier and has its own provisions in the Indian Act. 
 The other five amendments to subsections 39(1), (2), and (3), and section 40 only 
removed references to designation and contained miscellaneous drafting convention 
                                                 
36 Section 2 of the Indian Act defines “designated lands” as a tract of land or any interest therein the legal 
title to which remains vested in Her Majesty and in which the band for whose use and benefit it was set 
apart as a reserve has, otherwise than absolutely, released or surrendered its rights or interests, whether 
before or after the coming into force of this definition.  
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updates. There was no change to the process to surrender land37; however, a reader may 
reasonably, but still incorrectly, assume that changes were made to process to surrender 
land if one only reviews Bill C-45 because the bill strikes out references to land surrender, 
in line with legislative drafting conventions.  
 
INM’s Reaction to the Substantive Reforms to the Indian Act 
 
The substantive reforms impacting the land designation process under the Indian 
Act are also critically important to the emergence of INM. Indeed, much of the data speaks 
to concerns about land. Fifteen percent (15%) of all of the protest images were coded to 
either land (protection) or land (management). Signs like “Time to Stop Harper’s land grab” 
(Edmonton, 2012 December 21) and, “I did not give anyone the right to sell our land!” 
(Prince Albert, 2012 December 30), are clearly implicitly targeting the content of the 
reforms to the Indian Act. Additionally, the INM website’s description of Bill C-45 focuses 
exclusively on the land designation voting process reform under the Indian Act (Idle No 
More, 2012 December 11a). The decision to lower the voting threshold to a simple majority 
in order to designate reserve lands is a demonstrated substantive concern of INM members 
in its early days. However, the substance of the reforms is often misunderstood and 
mischaracterized as changing the process for land surrender, as exemplified in the protest 
signs. Surrender rather than designation would be a much more contentious substantive 
reform.  
                                                 
37 Section 2 of the Indian Act defines “surrendered lands” as a reserve or part of a reserve or any interest 
therein, the legal title to which remains vested in Her Majesty, that has been released or surrendered by the 
band for whose use and benefit it was set apart; 
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However, despite these concerns, the content of these changes is more in line with 
First Nations leadership than one might suspect. The Assembly of First Nations (AFN) 
supported the substance of the reforms to the Indian Act at the Standing Senate Committee 
on Aboriginal Peoples (Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, 2012 
November 20; Flanagan, 2012 December 29). While the AFN does not represent INM, or 
vice versa, their position demonstrates that the substantive elements of the Indian Act 
reforms did align with the representative voice of many First Nations peoples in Canada. 
However, Daniel Salée, a professor at Concordia University, told the media,  
There are important differences between elected chiefs, the AFN, and INM… (Idle no 
More) seems to be a rejection of aboriginal leadership, a rejection of local chiefs and chiefs 
on the national stage… People seem to feel as though their leaders aren't working in their 
best interest or that they simply aren't getting the job done. (Curtis, 2012 December 31, 
para. 14) 
 
It is less clear if the content of the actual, rather than the perceived, reforms to the Indian 
Act triggered collective outrage. This issue is explored further in Chapter 5. The findings 
do suggest, unsurprisingly, that substantive policy reforms that make it easier for First 
Nations to lose their land base would result in immense resistance. However, all of the 
specific instances of concern over the content of the reforms were directed at selling or 
surrendering land, rather than the actual substantive policy change to make designation (i.e. 
leasing) more efficient. Despite misunderstandings of surrender versus designate, 
members of INM rallied against the idea making it easier for land to leave the control of 
the First Nation. This reflects their belief in the value of community consent and continuous 
land-base. 
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4.2 Procedural Legitimacy 
 
In order for Bill C-45 to be procedurally legitimate, it must have had sufficient time 
for policy problemization and acceptance, successful discourse and framing by the 
proponents, and public engagement and consultation. Ensuring that all three requirements 
are met will afford Bill C-45 a higher degree of legitimacy. Missing just one element can 
undermine overall legitimacy. The sections below explore if Bill C-45 and the substantive 
amendments noted in Section 4.1 are procedurally legitimate. Based on a slightly modified 
version Wallner’s framework, incubation period is considered first, emotive appeals by the 
GoC second, and Aboriginal consultation third.  
 
4.2.1 Incubation Period 
 
In order for an idea to become an ‘agenda item’ that a political actor must address, 
the public must have adequate time to recognize a problem, accept it, and consider options 
to address it (Polsby, 1984; Wallner, 2008). This is the basic premise of an incubation 
period and is integral to the first stage of the policy cycle: agenda setting. In order for the 
public to accept the need for and value of government intervention (or further change in 
something the government is already intervening in), it must first recognize the issue and 
accept (or demand) that the government take action.  
Incubation periods are critically important because without sufficient time 
dedicated to building understanding, the policy decision may fail to resonate and capture 
support, and can ultimately fail. Simply put, policy decisions lack an incubation period if 
they appear to come out of the blue. A successful incubation period is thus determined by 
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the adequacy of the time given for agenda setting at a minimum, and also by the time given 
to policy formulation and decision-making. The durations may vary. For example, it may 
take only days for an issue to emerge, be noticed, and become a policy problem, while other 
issues can take months or years to take hold in the public consciousness.  
To understand the incubation periods of Bill C-45 and the specific reforms that INM 
contested, I consider the degree to which the policy problems were part of the public agenda 
by exploring: 
a. The efforts by political actors to put the reforms on the public agenda; 
b. The relationship between the contents of Budget 2012 and Bill C-45; 
c. The time span between the introduction of Bill C-45 and its passing; and 
d. The emphasis INM placed on policy incubation. 
 
The reforms to the NWPA and the Indian Act are explored in turn. 
 
a. Efforts by Political Actors to Put the Reforms on the Public Agenda 
(Long-term) 
 
In order to understand the complete time span of policy incubation it is necessary 
to explore when the reforms are first publicly raised, and then the degree to which the 
political actors problematized them. The earlier and the greater the efforts by political 
actors to get policy problems on the public agenda, the more time citizens have to digest 
the issues, the policy options, and the need to intervene. If the incubation period is adequate, 
the action taken by the government will be anticipated, or at least unsurprising.  
 
 
NWPA 
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After remaining essentially unaltered for 126 years, the GoC publically proposed 
substantial reforms to the NWPA on February 12, 2008. The reforms were raised at the 
House of Commons Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities 
(TRAN), which met at the request of the Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and 
Communities (Minister of Transport) to study “the current status of navigation protection 
of the Canadian waterways, including their governance and use and the operation of the 
current Navigable Waters Protection Act.” This TRAN meeting set the stage for the reforms 
that the GoC would pursue for the next four years. 
At this meeting, an Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) of Transport Canada said that 
they were “here to discuss the modernization of the Navigable Waters Protection Act... to 
solicit your views and hopefully your assistance in undertaking public consultation on a 
proposed framework for new navigation protection legislation” (Standing Committee on 
Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, 2008 February 12)38. The ADM stressed 
throughout his remarks that for years Canadians, industries, and other levels of government 
expressed concerns about the NWPA’s outdated regulatory regime. In particular he 
suggested that the Act, as then interpreted and applied, no long met navigational needs, was 
burdensome on project proponents, and regulated waterways that are not used for 
navigation but met the definition of ‘navigable water.’ He called for the “development of 
new navigation protection legislation” and recommended that the NWPA be renamed the 
NPA to fix what is deemed an imbalance between protecting the public right of navigation 
and ensuring timely and predictable review of projects. It is at this TRAN meeting that the 
                                                 
38 See Section 4.2.3 for more information on the resulting consultation process.  
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idea of rescoping the NWPA was brought to the public, and this marks the start of the 
incubation period.  
In 2009, following some of the recommendations of TRAN’s public consultation 
and study, select aspects of the NWPA were amended by the 2009 Budget Implementation 
Bill (Bill C-10). These reforms included creating a five year review of the Act, reducing 
the requirements for public notification and consultation, creating classes of works and 
waterways, removing the approval process for “named works,” and exempting certain types 
of works and waterways from the NWPA—meaning they would no longer trigger an 
environmental assessment under CEAA (Ecojustice, 2012; Standing Senate Committee on 
Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources [SSCEENR], 2009 June).  
These reforms were met with apprehension and opposition from Aboriginal groups 
and various stakeholders, such as canoeing enthusiasts. Yet there was no major action taken 
to oppose the reforms contained in Bill C-10. Following the passing of Bill C-10, there was 
however enough concern over public awareness that SSCEENR (2009) recommended that, 
Transport Canada develop and implement an effective communication strategy and 
consultation process to seek the views of waterway stakeholders on any future amendments 
to the Act, including any changes to regulations, and during the five year review of the Act. 
(p. 9) 
 
Based on the available data, Transport Canada did not develop the recommended 
communication strategy.  
Beyond the missing strategy, there were no further studies conducted by TRAN on 
the NWPA between 2009 and 2012. In fact, the archive of Transport Canada’s speeches, 
news releases, media advisories, and media coverage indicates that there was negligible 
coverage of the Act at all. There was also no mainstream media coverage discussing the 
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proposed reforms between Bill C-10 and Bill C-45—outside of the reforms in Bill C-38. 
These findings suggest that reform of the NWPA was not a talking point for the GoC from 
2009 to 2012. By not publicly discussing the NWPA in avenues such as in the media or in 
parliamentary committees, the GoC and the regulatees failed to make it a policy problem 
that warranted addressing. The NWPA was not problematized before the introduction of 
Bill C-45.  
Public communication began on October 18, 2012 when the Minister of Transport 
announced Bill C-45’s proposed reforms to the NWPA. In his speech he states that the 2009 
reforms were “a good first step. But municipalities, provincial and territorial governments, 
and other stakeholders have urged us to do more” (Transport Canada, 2012 October 18b, 
para. 30). A subsequent news release from Transport Canada explains that the other levels 
of government have experienced problems with the regulatory regime of the NWPA and 
have called for its reform:  
For years, provincial, territorial and municipal governments have asked us to make it easier 
for communities to build important infrastructure like roads, bridges and wharfs that create 
jobs… The new Navigation Protection Act will cut through the red tape that slows down 
bridge work and respect navigation rights to keep Canadians moving. (Transport Canada, 
2012 October 18a, para. 5) 
 
Again, the GoC claims that for years there have been calls from three levels of 
government to streamline the NWPA. The available data indicates that this statement may 
be accurate. However the evidence is too limited to conclusively confirm broad support. 
For example, the Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM) has raised 
concerns over the scope and application of the NWPA for years (Fitzpatrick, 2013 January 
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7) and the Canadian Federation of Municipalities fully supported the intent of the reforms. 
There is no evidence pointing to additional support.  
Furthermore, the support from industry that the ADM of Transport Canada suggests 
is so strong is even less certain. While the President of the Canadian Construction 
Association (not registered to lobby on the NWPA) helped announce the reforms on 
October 18, 2012, many organizations registered to lobby on the NWPA denied seeking 
the 2012 reforms (Mazereeuw, 2012 October 25). Lobbyists for the Canadian Association 
of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), the Mining Association of Canada, the Canadian 
Electricity Association, and a forestry official claim they did not actively lobby for changes 
to the NWPA (Mazereeuw, 2012 October 25). However, CAPP, the Canadian Petroleum 
Products Institute, the Canadian Energy Pipelines Association, and the Canadian Gas 
Association sent a letter dated December 21, 2011, to the Minister of the Environment and 
the Minster of Natural Resources calling for regulatory reform, to “adjust several pieces of 
legislation” and that “planned and taken together, these changes can create a more modern, 
integrated, efficient framework of environmental legislation” (Energy Framework 
Initiative, 2011 December 21). They specifically point to CEAA, SARA, the Migratory 
Bird Convention Act, and the NWPA. Accordingly, there is evidence that some major 
industries, specifically the petroleum industry, supported the GoC’s reformation agenda, 
but not in a public way that could have afforded incubation. 
While the governmental records indicate that the idea to overhaul the NWPA into 
the NPA has been in the public domain since 2008, this mention at a meeting of TRAN is 
insufficient to launch a meaningful incubation period. While some information is readily 
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available on the Internet, it is unreasonable to presume that citizens are actively reviewing 
the transcripts of committee meetings to glean insights into the GoC’s legislative agenda. 
Having an idea buried in the transcript of a HoC Committee meeting cannot reasonably be 
considered agenda setting for the public sphere. Moreover, the failure of the GoC to frame 
the 2009 reforms as an initial step rather than their response to TRAN’s study allowed 
onlookers to reasonably assume that no additional reforms were coming before the newly 
enacted 5-year review. In other words, it is fairly likely that one of the main reasons the 
substantive reforms were unexpected in 2012 is because the 2009 reform included the 
introduction of a five-year review. Based on this review timeline, one would reasonably 
assume that major reforms would not be brought forward before the first review was 
completed in 2014.  
Overall, the GoC and the proponents failed to create a sufficient incubation period. 
Major policy reforms were raised at HoC committee meetings four years prior to Bill C-
45, but a subsequent omnibus bill addressed many of the policy problems and there were 
no further consultations following the changes. There was little to no public discussion on 
the need to further amend the NWPA until the introduction of Bill C-45. This series of 
events fails to qualify as an adequate incubation period. The ideas behind the reforms were 
not properly problematized. They did not undergo full agenda setting. Concerns raised to a 
parliamentary committee cannot reasonably be expected to be on the public radar. This is 
not to suggest the changes to the NWPA have not been in the works for years, but rather 
that the failure to clearly and publically articulate the need for the changes resulted in an 
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insufficient incubation period. The GoC failed to make it an issue, a problem, and an agenda 
item.  
 
Indian Act 
Bill C-45’s reforms to the land designation process under the Indian Act have been 
discussed for some time between various First Nations Chiefs and Councils, such as the 
Penticton Indian Band, the Assembly of First Nations, and AANDC (Standing Senate 
Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, 2012 November 7). Four direct and indirect references 
problematizing the land designation process were found in the long-term public record 
before Bill C-45 was introduced. First, Chapter 9 of the Auditor General of Canada’s 2003 
Report referred briefly to the added time that the designation process creates (Office of the 
Auditor General of Canada, 2003). Second, based on testimony from numerous First 
Nations representatives, a 2007 report by the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal 
Peoples found that “slow and burdensome Indian Act processes, particularly around 
designating land for commercial purposes, often results in lost business opportunities” 
(Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, 2007 March, p. xiii). Third, the fifth 
‘step for action’ generated at the January 2012 Crown-First Nations Gathering spoke 
generally to improving economic development. This indirect linkage was emphasized by 
the Minister of AANDC who stated that these amendments specifically “deliver on the 
Prime Minister's pledge at the Crown-First Nations Gathering…to provide options for 
practical, incremental and real change for First Nations to overcome the obstacles of the 
Indian Act” (Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, 2012 November 7). The 
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Crown-First Nations Gathering Progress Report 2013 further links this set of reforms to the 
economic development action item:  
As part of the Jobs and Growth Act, 2012, our government introduced amendments to the 
land designation provisions of the Indian Act that will allow First Nations to speed up the 
process for leasing portions of reserve land to a third party for the purposes of economic 
development while retaining ownership of their lands. The proposed amendments respond 
to First Nations who have expressed frustration at the cumbersome and time consuming 
process that had existed previously, which had negatively impacted their ability to attract 
and retain investors. (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2013 January 
24, para. 57) 
 
Finally, fourteen days before Budget 2012 was released on March 29, 2012, the National 
Aboriginal Economic Development Board addressed the HoC Standing Committee on 
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development (AANO). During its testimony the witness 
stated, “First Nations do not have an ability to move swiftly in developing their lands as a 
result of the restrictions that arise under the Indian Act and the red tape that comes with 
them” (Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, 2012 
March 15,  para. 48). The National Aboriginal Economic Development Board pointed to 
the process to designating “as one of the most problematic barriers, due to the length and 
complexity of the process, which adds time and cost to transactions, and has placed First 
Nation financing in jeopardy on a number of projects” (Government of Canada, 2012a).  
In summary, the policy problems and solutions around the land designation process 
were discussed at and recommended by committees, referenced by the Auditor General, 
and encompassed the commitments by the Crown-First Nations Gathering. The idea to 
streamline the designation process was incubating since 2003 at the earliest, and March 
2012 at the latest. However, it was not publicized in an accessible way to the grassroots. 
This is in part due to minimal media coverage of the policy problem. Again, while these 
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reports and meetings are in the public sphere, they are not on the radar of the average 
Canadian. Moreover, reforming the designation process was not a regular talking point for 
the GoC, nor was it a campaign promise. While there was some general effort to 
problematize economic development barriers on reserve, and consequentially the land 
designation process, this was not done in a specific, predictable way. There was only 
moderate policy incubation in the long-term. 
 
b. Relationship Between the Contents of Budget 2012 and Bill C-45 
(Medium-term) 
 
Regardless of the longer-term efforts at agenda setting or problematization 
discussed above, the explicit incubation period for any budget implementation bill, such as 
Bill C-45, begins with the introduction of a budget. In this case, the release of Budget 2012 
marked the beginning of the incubation period for the contents of both Bill C-38 and Bill 
C-45. Consequently, the time between the release of Budget 2012 (March 2012) and the 
introduction of the implementation bills (April and October 2012) is the set timeframe for 
the public to read the budget, deliberate on its implications, and come to terms with its 
proposed changes. In essence, a budget implementation bill should contain content that the 
public has had months to digest. There should be no surprises.  
The GoC fervently argues that the substance of Bill C-45 was included in Budget 
2012, meaning they had months to incubate. Jim Flaherty, the then Minister of Finance, 
addressed this concern on October 18, 2012 in the HoC debate. He contended that Bill C-
45 contained no surprises because its contents were introduced six months earlier in 
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March,39 and that those who doubt this fact failed to read and understand Budget 201240 
(Parliament of Canada, 2012 October 18).  
 
NWPA 
Beyond these two general arguments, Minister Flaherty stated that the reforms to 
the NWPA fell under the ‘deficit reduction action plan’ (DRAP) pillar of the budget41 and 
that the changes to the NWPA are on page 282 of Budget 2012 (Parliament of Canada, 
2012 October 18). These statements did not quell the doubt over the relationship between 
Budget 2012, Bill C-45 and the NWPA. Concerns were regularly raised by numerous New 
Democratic Party (NDP) MPs during debate in the HoC.42 This statement by Hoang Mai in 
the HoC debates exemplifies the opposition’s concern about the missing link between 
Budget 2012 and Bill C-45: 
We read his budget a long time ago. When it came out in March, we took notes. He said 
that everything that was in Bill C-45 was in the budget. We had a briefing session with 
senior officials last Monday from 7 p.m. until 1 a.m. just to review Bill C-45 in its entirety. 
I asked those senior officials and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Finance 
where in the budget the changes to the Navigable Waters Protection Act in Bill C-45 were 
mentioned. According to the government and even according to the Department of 
Transport, the purpose of that act is to protect the environment. She referred me to page 
282. Here is an excerpt from this page where the transportation portfolio is mentioned. I 
asked for the exact reference because, of course, there is no reference to the environment 
or to navigable waters protection. She mentioned one line: “Transport Canada, 2012-13, 
                                                 
39 “The budget is a wonderful document. Here it is. We delivered it in March. There is nothing new. What is 
in the bill today is in the budget.” 
40 “If you have not read the budget, I say to my hon. friends on the other side, I do not know what you did 
all summer. You got paid. You had a good pension plan. So, do your work; do your job.” 
41 “One of the pillars of the budget was the deficit reduction action plan. Part of that dealt with the issues at 
environment and the Navigable Waters Protection Act.” 
42 Examples include Thomas Mulcair (Leader of the Opposition), Mike Sullivan (York South—Weston, 
NDP), Hoang Mai (Brossard—La Prairie, NDP), Ms. Hélène LeBlanc (LaSalle—Émard, NDP), Lysane 
Blanchette-Lamothe (Pierrefonds—Dollard, NDP), Élaine Michaud (Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, NDP), 
Pierre-Luc Dusseault (Sherbrooke, NDP), Rathika Sitsabaiesan (Scarborough—Rouge River, NDP) and 
Jinny Jogindera Sims (Newton—North Delta, NDP). 
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$37 million.” According to the Minister of Finance, we should have understood that this 
was a direct reference to the protection of navigable waters, of all of Canada's lakes and 
rivers. He seemed to be saying that environmental protection is covered in one tiny little 
line that mentions $37 million. By the way, $37 million is the amount cut from the budget 
for transport. Go figure. The Minister of Finance said we had not done our homework. It is 
very difficult to do our homework when the minister himself hides what is happening. The 
other side is improvising. This is why we are faced with a bill which now includes things 
that were not originally in the budget, things that we need to ask questions about. 
(Parliament of Canada, 2012 October 26) 
 
As the Finance Minister correctly points out, it is the job of MPs to know the contents of 
the Budget, so any lack of understanding and concerns is alarming. If MPs do not see how 
the reforms relate to Budget 2012, how could the general public? How could those who 
formed and joined INM? 
The Finance Minister’s initial positions were repeated and elaborated upon by 
numerous Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) MPs to defend Bill C-45.43 For example, 
Shelly Glover expressed frustration at the requests from opposition MPs to identify the 
location of the references to the NWPA in Budget 2012: 
Mr. Speaker, I have answered these questions from my colleagues on the other side many 
times. Questions such as: What page is it on in the budget? Quite frankly, I am shocked. 
By now, we have given them every page through a briefing that lasted six and a half hours 
and they are still asking this. I will refresh their memories as to where they are. The 
Navigable Waters Protection Act is on page 282. This is a DRAP measure. It is clearly 
indicated on page 282. I would suggest that the member actually look at the annex part of 
the page because that is exactly where it is. (Parliament of Canada, 2012 October 24) 
 
In explaining its connection to the Budget, Cheryl Gallant said that, 
                                                 
43 Examples include Shelly Glover (Saint Boniface, CPC), Richard Harris (Cariboo—Prince George, CPC), 
Costas Menegakis (Richmond Hill, CPC), Mike Wallace (Burlington, CPC), Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—
Nipissing—Pembroke, CPC), Lois Brown (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of International 
Cooperation, CPC), Bob Zimmer (Prince George—Peace River, CPC), and Merv Tweed (Brandon—Souris, 
CPC). 
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The Navigable Waters Protection Act is being amended to allow for jobs and growth. This 
budget is specifically about ensuring that jobs increase and that those people who have jobs 
can sustain them.  
 
and, 
Sky-high electricity rates have led to plant closures in Ontario, for example. This means 
that people are on employment insurance, a federal responsibility. This is the jobs and 
growth act, 2012, so it is directly related to electricity, which in turn is related to the 
Navigable Waters Protection Act. (Parliament of Canada, 2012 October 30) 
 
That same day, Merv Tweed pointed to the reforms in 2009’s Bill C-10: “in reality, most 
of the changes [to the NWPA] that we are now talking about were implemented in 2009, 
when they were first introduced, so it is not a shock to people” (Parliament of Canada, 2012 
October 30). While the logic of this statement is questionable—the reforms in Bill C-45 
could not have been implemented in 2009 and were not introduced in 2009—he does point 
to the larger history of the effort to create the NPA. Later that day Bob Zimmer provided 
his own assessment of where the linkage was between Budget 2012 and the reforms to the 
NWPA. He correlates the reforms to the NWPA to the responsible resource development 
plan and the GoC’s “efforts to streamline the regulatory process” (Parliament of Canada, 
2012 October 30). In sum, Conservative MPs used five different rationales to defend the 
relationship between Budget 2012 and the reforms to the NWPA:  
1. Claiming it met the overarching goals of jobs and growth, 
2. Linking it to the ‘DRAP pillar’,  
3. Pointing to page 282 of the Budget: “Transport Canada, 2012-13, $37 million.” 
4. Relating it to the 2009 reforms, and 
5. Linking it to the Budget’s effort to modernize the regulatory system for project reviews. 
 
The last justification is the most concrete. It is true that Budget 2012 does not 
explicitly mention reforming the NWPA or navigation related legislation. Nevertheless, it 
does mention modernizing the regulatory regime that governs project reviews, an initiative 
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Budget 2012 claims the GoC has been working towards since 2006. Specifically, there is a 
section under the Budget’s Responsible Resource Development chapter entitled 
“Modernizing the Regulatory System for Project Reviews.” This section clearly states that 
“The Government will propose legislation to streamline the review process for major 
economic projects” (Government of Canada, 2012b, p. 89). The GoC is targeting the 
potentially slow and cumbersome project approval process that often involves dozens of 
federal departments, and does not follow the idea of ‘one project, one review’. The central 
message of this section is that CEAA will be reformed to bring about a  
modern regulatory system that support[s] progress on economically viable major economic 
projects and sustain Canada’s reputation as an attractive place to invest, while contributing 
to better environmental outcomes. (Government of Canada, 2012b, p. 91) 
 
Importantly, however, Budget 2012 does not limit itself to only reforming CEAA to achieve 
these policy goals. There are four areas the GoC targets for reform and none are exclusive 
to CEAA:  
1. Making the review process for major projects more predictable and timely; 
2. Reducing duplication and regulatory burden; 
3. Strengthening environmental protection; and 
4. Enhancing consultations with Aboriginal Peoples.  
 
In fact, in order to meet these broad-brush objectives, Budget 2012 notes that: 
 
…the existing system needs comprehensive reform. The Government will bring forward 
legislation to implement system-wide improvements to achieve the goal of “one project, 
one review” in a clearly defined time period. Economic Action Plan 2012 proposes to 
streamline the review process for major economic projects… [Emphasis added, 
Government of Canada, 2012b, p. 88] 
 
The use of the vague terms ‘system-wide’ and ‘comprehensive reforms’ expands the scope 
of the proposed amendments beyond CEAA to other legislation that may inform the 
approval process. Yet it does not actually provide further examples, such as the NWPA. 
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Therefore, while Budget 2012 did not explicitly talk about reforming the NWPA or 
navigation (see Hall, 2012 October 19), reforming this regime, as part of the wider ‘system’ 
targeted for reform, could be interpreted as implicit in the text. Implicit references, 
however, do not provide a strong basis for incubating specific reforms. This wide-cast net 
creates somewhat of a slippery slope as a myriad of reforms could be justified under the 
guise of modernizing the regulatory system for project reviews.  
Lastly, it is notable that the reforms to the NWPA included in the Budget 
Implementation Act, 2009 were explicitly noted in the Budget 2009. Specifically it said 
that: 
Efficiencies will be introduced through legislative amendments to the Navigable Waters 
Protection Act, which has not been substantially amended since 1886. The proposed 
amendments reflect the recommendations that were made in June 2008 by the Standing 
Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities after an exhaustive review of the 
Act (Government of Canada, 2009, p. 144). 
 
Even this general, noncommittal language presents a signal of forthcoming reforms. Budget 
2012 lacked such a signal.  
 
Indian Act 
Like the NWPA, Bill C-45’s reforms to the Indian Act are not explicitly mentioned 
in Budget 2012. They are not included in the four ‘opportunities for Aboriginal Peoples to 
fully participate in the economy,’44 nor are they expressly included in the section on 
‘Improving Economic Potential on First Nations Lands.’ The latter section states that the 
                                                 
44 Investments to Improve First Nations Education, Helping First Nations on Reserve Access the Labour 
Force, Supporting First Nations Fishing Enterprises, and Urban Aboriginal Strategy. 
98 
GoC has the intention to “explore with interested First Nations the option of moving 
forward with legislation that would allow private property ownership within current reserve 
boundaries” (Government of Canada, 2012b, p. 165). This is a clear reference to the 
proposed First Nation Property Ownership Act (FNPOA), or a similar regime. The Indian 
Act amendments do not accomplish this stated aim. They are for designating, not privatizing 
land.  
There are, however, two nuances that may support the argument that the reforms to 
the Indian Act were included in Budget 2012. First, the pluralization of ‘initiatives’:  
The recent Crown-First Nations Gathering underscored the Government’s commitment to 
work with First Nations on shared priorities. Economic Action Plan 2012 supports this 
commitment by introducing initiatives to enhance economic potential on First Nations 
lands. (Government of Canada, 2012b, p. 167) 
 
While only FNPOA and the First Nations Land Management Act (FNLMA) are discussed 
further, this non-descript pluralization opens the door to interpretation as to what the GoC 
actually meant to commit to.  
Second, Budget 2012 states that the GoC “will continue to work with First Nations 
to address barriers to economic development on reserve” (Government of Canada, 2012b, 
p. 171). This general commitment could provide a rationale for the Indian Act reforms, as 
they were done in the name of ‘economic development.’ In fact, this is essentially the line 
used in the October 19, 2012 press release from AANDC:  
In Economic Action Plan 2012, our Government committed to taking further steps to create 
the conditions for First Nation communities to participate more fully in Canada's 
economy… Amending the land designation provisions of the Indian Act is a practical 
approach to increasing opportunities for First Nations to tap economic development 
opportunities, reduce red tape, and allow First Nations to operate at the speed of business. 
(Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2012, para. 2) 
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The Minister of AANDC also repeated it on November 7, 2012 at the Standing 
Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples. The Minister stated that the “amendments in Bill 
C-45 that will enhance economic development opportunities on reserve… [and] will 
address barriers in the Indian Act that stand in the way of economic progress on First Nation 
lands.”  
Yet, both of these references in Budget 2012 are inadequate to send a clear message 
of policy intent. They are vague commitments that would lead no one to expect the specific 
reforms made to the Indian Act. Again, slotting the specific reforms to the Indian Act under 
these general, wide-reaching commitments raises questions of reasonableness, and does not 
help create a sufficient incubation period. 
Like the NWPA, the reforms to the Indian Act were not explicitly mentioned in 
Budget 2012. Again, Budget 2012 did not send a clear signal of a forthcoming reform to 
the Indian Act. The fact that the full title of Bill C-45 is A Second Act to Implement Certain 
Provisions of the Budget Tabled in Parliament On March 29, 2012 and other measures 
(emphasis added) demonstrates that Bill C-45 contains measures not included in the budget 
(Cockram, 2014), some of which include the reforms to the NWPA and the Indian Act—
the substantive amendments that INM focused on.  
 
c. Time Span Between the Introduction Of Bill C-45 and Its Passing 
 
Even without adequate long-and medium-term agenda setting, the duration between 
the formal introduction of a policy and its final approval may provide sufficient time for 
incubation. In other words, hastened process will not inherently lower its legitimacy, for 
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example if the initial stages of problemization and agenda setting are robust. As shown 
above, this was not the case with the reforms to the NWPA and the Indian Act. Due to these 
long-term term insufficiencies, the length of the time between Bill C-45’s first reading and 
royal assent is meaningful for its incubation period, since the policy ideas were not fully on 
the public agenda before introduction. In cases like these, an expeditious legislative process 
may not enable a sufficient incubation period. 
As shown 
in Table 8, Bill C-
45 was introduced 
in the HoC on 
October 18, 2012, 
and received royal 
assent on 
December 14, 2012. It took 58 days, eight of which were spent in the Senate, for Bill C-45 
to become law.  
 
Table 9. Summary of Budget Bills from 1997 to 2013, numbers of days and pages 
 
Year Range 
a - Average 
Number of 
Days 
b - Median 
Number of 
Days 
c - Average 
Number of 
Pages 
d - Median 
Number of 
Pages 
e - Average 
Pages Per 
Day 
f - Median 
Pages Per 
Day 
1997 - 2005 80.56 87 81.11 79 1.53 1.20 
2006 - 2013 69.43 65 328.36 186 7.64 4.38 
1997 - 2013 70.71 75 221.96 132.5 4.97 1.91 
 
Table 8. Timeline for the Legislative Process for Bill C-45 
 
Stage in the  
Legislative Process  
House of Commons Senate 
Date 
First Reading  October 18, 2012 December 6, 2012 
Second Reading  October 30, 2012 December 12, 2012 
Committee Report Presented  November 26, 2012 December 11, 2012 
Third Reading  | Royal Assent  December 5, 2012 December 14, 2012 
 
101 
Table 9 provides context for how short or long that relates to budget implementation 
bills from 1997 to 2005 (Liberal leadership), 2006 to 2013 (Conservative leadership), and 
1997 to 2013 (the full data set).45 Bill C-45’s 58 days is below all of the average and median 
values, columns a and b respectively. Bill C-45 went through the legislative process 18% 
faster than the average budget implementation bill since 1997. Bill C-45 also exceeded the 
average and median number of pages of budget implementation bills. As shown in column 
c, at 428 pages, Bill C-45 is 428%, 30%, and 92% longer than the average number of pages 
from 1997-2005, 2006-2013, and 1997-2013, respectively.  
Lastly, based on the number of days (n= 58) and number of pages (n=428), the 
average number of pages per day for Bill C-45 was 7.38. That is, in order to understand its 
content, MPs, Senators, and the public would have to review and comprehend the content 
of 7.38 pages per day from first reading to royal assent. This value is 48.5% greater than 
the average for 1997-2013, and 382% larger compared to 1997-2005. Overall, Bill C-45 
was debated and approved more quickly than the average budget implementation bill since 
1997, and MPs and Senators had to review more pages in a shorter time period.  
While there may be numerous variables that influence the duration of a legislative 
process (e.g. if an election is called), Bill C-45’s quick approval was called for early on by 
Minister Flaherty (Kirkup, 2012 December 6). Following this signal, there were two time 
allocation motions in the HoC and one time allotment motion in the Senate to limit debate—
see Appendix C for the motions. The Leader of the Government in the HoC justified these 
                                                 
45 1997 was selected because it was the first year with the full information on first reading and royal assent 
on LEGISinfo.   
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motions by suggesting that Bill C-45 needed to pass quickly to ensure Canada’s economic 
recovery. Following the second motion, the president of the Treasury Board told the media 
that the review by eleven HoC committees provided the time for proper examination and 
that it was time to act (Fekete, 2012 December 4). The Leader of the Government in the 
Senate similarly suggested that previous studies by Senate committees (six committees, 62 
hours, 30 meetings, 135 witnesses) is why “an additional six hours will be more than 
enough time to proceed with passing this bill” (Parliament of Canada, 2012 December 13). 
He further submitted that the opposition leader’s speech on the Bill demonstrated a deep 
analysis, meaning there must have been “enough time to conduct a rather comprehensive 
review of the bill” (Parliament of Canada, 2012 December 13). Time (i.e. debate) limiting 
motions were strategically used to hasten the passing of Bill C-45.  
As demonstrated by the historical comparison and the use of time allocation 
motions, the data suggests Bill C-45 was expedited through the legislative process. While 
there can be a debate over the merits and implications of this decision, the fact remains that 
the GoC purposefully limited the timespan between introduction and royal assent. Given 
the limited understanding the general public, and members and supporters of INM, had 
about the reforms to the NWPA and Indian Act, this hastened process did not allow for 
proper incubation of its more contentious policy reforms.  
Building from the brisk legislative process for Bill C-38 (Gibson, 2012; Kirchhoff, 
et. al, 2013), Bill C-45 was introduced, debated and passed unusually quickly. This decision 
by the GoC did not afford the opportunity for the ideas to be fully considered, understood, 
and potentially accepted by the public. While this has happened in the past and did not 
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result in protests and social movements, it is important to consider the additional factors 
discussed that influence the overall legitimacy of public policy. Bill C-45 and the specific 
reforms targeted by INM did not have an adequate incubation period in the long, medium 
or short term, which reduced its procedural legitimacy.  
 
d. The Emphasis INM placed on Policy Incubation 
INM’s narrative of Bill C-45 includes numerous references to a lack of policy 
incubation. For example, Tanya Kappo stated that “the people in our communities had 
absolutely no idea what we were facing, no idea what plans Stephen Harper had in store 
for us” (Idle No More, 2012 December 13). Many supporters and members of INM contend 
that the measures to reform the NWPA and the Indian Act were not in Budget 2012. Doug 
Cuthand, a Cree columnist, said exactly this in his December 7, 2012 column: “Bill C-45, 
the omnibus budget bill, was tabled and it contained amendments to the Indian Act and to 
the Navigable Waters Protection Act that caught our people off guard;” he went on to say, 
“These two amendments were buried in the omnibus budget bill and have nothing to do 
with the budget” (para. 9). A resident of Rama, Ontario (a First Nations community in the 
Chippewas of Rama First Nation reserve) and INM supporter reiterated this concern, 
stating, “everything was just kept so quiet and I don’t think people realized what was in the 
Bill when it came to the land” (Ross, December 21, 2012, para. 8). Moreover, one of the 
main overarching discourses in the early days of INM was Bill C-45 as an erosion of 
democracy and the democratic process as it was sped through the parliamentary process 
(Bradshaw and McCarthy, 2013 January 1; Kirkup, 2012 December 6). Sheelah Gordon 
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said that “the legislation [is] being pushed through undemocratically” (Warren, 2012 
December 19, para. 7). Signs protesting Bill C-45 at INM events spoke specifically to the 
issue of democracy, such as “Fighting to Keep Democracy Alive! #IdleNOMore” (Fort 
McMurrary, 2012 December; see Chilliwack, 2012 December 21; Salish, 2012 December 
11; Toronto, 2012 December 10). While part of their democratic concerns likely stems from 
the size and scope of the Bill, given adequate time those apprehensions would be addressed. 
The concern over time is inherent in their alarms about democracy. INM did contest the 
amount of time given to the consideration and approval of Bill C-45 as a bill, but also the 
long-term incubation of its content. There was a disconnect between long-term policy 
incubation, the content of Budget 2012, citizens’ expectations, and Bill C-45. 
 
4.2.2 Emotive Appeals  
 
Like the incubation period, the GoC’s use of emotive appeals when introducing, 
debating, and passing Bill C-45 is important because it helps to frame the issues and speaks 
to why four women would form INM. How the amendments and the Bill at large were 
constructed through the GoC’s discourse, symbols, and framing processes directly impacts 
the public’s perception of legitimacy. The use of emotive appeals likely had implications 
for why INM emerged. Consequentially, is it necessary to identify the discourse used by 
the GoC to try to construct the issues and galvanize the public’s support for Bill C-45, and, 
in this case, explore why they failed to do so.  
Starting with the Department of Finance’s official press release on Bill C-45, the 
GoC attempted to develop a narrative. The narrative was about continuing on the road to 
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economic recovery by focusing on communities, creating jobs, supporting families, 
promoting clean energy, making the tax system neutral, and respecting taxpayers’ money 
(Department of Finance Canada, October 18, 2012). It further suggests that the amendments 
contained in Bill C-45 are specifically designed to ensure Canada maintains its economic 
recovery and that new jobs would be created. Bill C-45 was part of the ‘pro-growth’ agenda. 
As such, it was presented as a holistic vision for the country, from a whole-government 
approach.  
The reforms that INM targeted were not mentioned in the Department of Finance’s 
official press release, nor were they included in the Sponsor’s Speech which mirrored the 
same themes as the press release (Parliament of Canada, 2012 October 24). The specific 
amendments to the NWPA were instead framed by a Transport Canada (2012 October 18b) 
press release that employed strong discourse and symbols to justify the amendments: 
1. The historic and modern intent of the NWPA was exclusively for the safe 
and efficient movement of marine traffic (so ‘boats and bridges can co-
exist’);  
2. The current scope of the Act on all navigable waterways means “significant 
delays and unnecessary red tape”; and 
3. Logically, then, it must be amended to make job creation easier.  
 
These claims presented a well thought out attempt to construct the NWPA, its purpose, and 
the reforms brought forward in Bill C-45. AANDC released a similar statement on the 
amendments to the Indian Act. It emphasized its link to Budget 2012 and its demand by 
First Nations (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2012 October 19). 
These three press releases were the initial emotive appeals put forth by the GoC and focused 
on economic growth. The emotive appeals deployed by the GoC changed somewhat over 
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time and became more defensive in response to criticisms from INM, opposition MPs and 
Senators, the media, and the general public.  
Beyond the discourse relating to incubation period and Aboriginal consultation (See 
sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.3, respectively), there are three main discursive themes that the GoC 
used throughout the legislative process to frame the amendments to the NWPA and Indian 
Act. First, the NWPA is about protecting navigation, not the environment. Second, the 
NWPA and Indian Act must be amended to ensure economic growth. Specifically, the 
NWPA needs to reflect contemporary realities and reduce unnecessary bureaucracy, and 
the land designation process under the Indian Act needs to happen more rapidly to reflect 
industry’s timelines. Lastly, First Nations want the reforms to the Indian Act because it 
removes a layer of government control. Due to the scope of this research, only the first 
theme is examined for its framing capabilities and the degree to which the public, 
specifically INM, was convinced by or contested this narrative. 
 
Framing the NWPA 
  
One of the first major framing exercises the GoC undertook was stating that the 
NWPA is about protecting navigation, as demonstrated in Transport Canada’s press release 
(2012, October 18a). There was no mention of the environment, just navigation. This focus 
was mirrored in the backgrounder the GoC released on Bill C-45, which provided an 
entirely navigational and economic rationale for the NWPA and its amendments: 
In line with the Government of Canada’s commitment to streamlining the regulatory 
process and encouraging long-term economic growth and job creation, the proposed 
amendments to the Act not only usher in a risk-based approach to the regulation of works 
and obstruction and build on the 2009 amendments, but seize the opportunity to create a 
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modern, robust, and flexible legislative scheme that is effectively responsive to the needs 
of Canada in the future. Ultimately, re-focusing the scope and application of the legislation 
to better balance the efficient movement of marine traffic with the need to construct works, 
such as bridges, wharfs and transmission lines. (Government of Canada, 2012a, p. 34) 
 
This ‘rescoping’ seeks to balance navigation with economic growth, not environmental 
protection. The shift is exemplified by changing its name from the Navigable Waters 
Protection Act to the Navigation Protection Act. The former implies protection of navigable 
waters whereas the latter implies protection of navigation.  
While discussing the NWPA, the GoC did not mention the environment until INM, 
environmental groups, and opposition MPs raised the issue. These actors put forth two 
related arguments to contest the GoC’s framing of the NWPA as having no environmental 
implications. First is the idea that any act or policy that regulates water has environmental 
consequences. This is the basic premise found in much of the INM protest materials. 
Regulating water to ensure there is clear navigation cannot be untangled from protecting 
water for environmental concerns. Protecting water from pipelines in the name of 
navigation still has environmental outcomes. Moreover, exempting pipelines has 
environmental forethought and potential consequences. This perspective reflects a 
worldview where water is not separated into water for different purposes—water is simply 
water.  
The second argument is that case law concludes that the NWPA has clear ties to the 
environment. This position is largely based on a Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) case, the 
Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada [Minister of Transport]. In its decision, the 
SCC concluded that  
…it defies reason to assert that Parliament is constitutionally barred from weighing the 
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broad environmental repercussions, including socio-economic concerns, when legislating 
with respect to decisions of this nature. The same can be said for… navigation and shipping. 
[Sections 22 and 23] … of the Navigable Waters Protection Act are aimed directly at 
biophysical environmental concerns that affect navigation…As I mentioned earlier in these 
reasons, the [Navigable Waters Protection] Act has a more expansive environmental 
dimension, given the common law context in which it was enacted. 
 
It follows that the legislation need not be interpreted narrowly as ignoring current realities. 
Based on these nuanced and critical reactions, the GoC’s initial emotive appeals did not 
prompt support of its reforms to the NWPA, and instead resulted in skepticism and 
criticism.  
Once these concerns were raised about the impact of the reforms on the 
environmental integrity of waterways, the GoC discourse turned from exclusion to 
refutation. The GoC dismissed any linkage between navigation and water protection. All 
Conservative MPs and Senators maintained the apparent official position: the intent of the 
NWPA was to protect the right of navigation—nothing else. As MP Cathy McLeod stated: 
“It is not about environment. Navigable waters is about navigation” (Parliament of Canada, 
2012 October 25) and “It is a 100-year-old piece of legislation that does not speak to the 
environment at all. It is really about navigation on our waterways” (Parliament of Canada, 
2012 October 29). MP Jim Hillyer followed suit, responding that the reforms do “not 
eliminate environmental controls or protections… This is not a move against environmental 
protection; it is a move against useless regulations that neither protect the environment nor 
help the economy” (Parliament of Canada, 2012 October 29). Unfortunately for the GoC, 
the continued and growing INM movement demonstrates that these emotive appeals failed 
to convince the public, and change the minds of many already questioning the 
environmental repercussions of the changes to the NWPA.  
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4.2.3 Aboriginal Consultation  
 
The GoC has a common law duty to consult and, where appropriate, accommodate 
when it “contemplates conduct that might adversely impact potential or established 
Aboriginal or Treaty rights,” which are recognized and confirmed under section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2011, p. 1). 
The duty to consult is rooted formally in the Honour of the Crown and the special 
relationship between Canada and First Nations which seeks further reconciliation. As such, 
it exists beyond statutory (statutes and regulations) and contractual (land claims, self-
government, or consultation agreements) obligations for consultation. This legal duty has 
been interpreted and clarified in numerous SCC rulings, specifically Haida (2004) Taku 
River (2004), Mikisew Cree (2005), Rio Tinto (2010), Little Salmon (2010).  
There is a three-part test to determine if the duty to consult has been triggered: 
1. Contemplated Crown conduct, 
2. Potential adverse impact, and 
3. Potential or established Aboriginal or Treaty rights (Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development Canada, 2011, p. 12).  
 
The threshold for triggering the duty is low, but all three elements must be present. 
Moreover, while the strength of the claim of Aboriginal or Treaty rights and the seriousness 
of the adverse impacts on those rights determine the scope of consultation, there must 
always be contemplated Crown conduct. Importantly, the duty to consult requires that 
consultation occur early in the planning, design, or decision-making process. That is, well 
before any action is taken. 
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In Rio Tinto the SCC confirmed that Crown conduct includes ‘higher level strategic 
decisions’ that may have an impact on Aboriginal claims and rights, including “structural 
or organizational changes that reduce the Crown’s oversight and decision-making ability” 
(Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2011, p. 36). However, the SCC 
opted to “leave for another day the question of whether government conduct includes 
legislative action” (Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010, para. 44). 
There is currently no clear duty to consult on bills like Bill C-45.  
While the duty to 
consult is often referenced, as 
shown in Table 10, it is just 
one reason the GoC may 
decide to consult Aboriginal 
Peoples. Consultation can be 
used for strategic reasons, 
including political motivation, 
or to increase legitimacy, 
transparency and accountability in otherwise closed-door activities. Regardless of any legal 
obligation, the GoC may consult, or at least engage, with Aboriginal communities or groups 
about potential Crown conduct in the name of good governance.  
The purpose here is not to determine if the GoC had and met a constitutional duty 
to consult on Bill C-45—that is for the Federal Court’s ongoing (at the time of writing) 
Table 10. Reasons to Consult (Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development Canada, 2011, p. 5) 
Good Governance / 
Policy Reasons 
Legal Reasons 
Make informed and 
appropriate 
decisions 
Statutory requirements 
Create and improve 
working relations 
with all those 
affected 
Section 35 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, common law 
requirements (applies exclusively 
to Aboriginal peoples) 
Address new 
business and policy 
developments 
Agreements / Contractual 
requirements 
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judicial review to determine.46 However, the fact that this question is being considered in 
federal court is significant. Since consultation is an element of good governance regardless 
of legal requirements, this research aims to establish if Aboriginal Peoples were consulted 
and how that consultation was perceived by INM. Did the GoC consult specifically on the 
reforms to the NWPA and the Indian Act? Were the members and supporters of INM 
concerned with the consultation process of Bill C-45? These questions are answered below.  
 
a. Consultations for the NWPA Reforms 
 
Following the previously discussed TRAN meeting on February 12, 2008, the 
committee proceeded to seek input from some stakeholders (provincial governments, 
municipalities and an environmental group) on proposed amendments to the NWPA. They 
presented their recommendations to the HoC on June 12, 2008. In their report TRAN stated 
that “this is the first stage in our process in dealing with amendments to the NWPA. Once 
we receive the government’s proposed amendments we will be undertaking further 
consultations on this piece of legislation” (Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure 
and Communities, 2008 June, p. 5). However, there is no evidence that further consultations 
took place between 2009 and 2012. TRAN’s consultation informed the 2009 reforms, but 
it is uncertain whether there is a direct link to the 2012 reforms. Importantly, given the 
implementation of the 2009 amendments, new consultations would likely be necessary to 
assess their effectiveness, efficiency, and performance. 
                                                 
46 An application for a judicial review on Bill C-38 and Bill c-45 was filed by the Mikisew Cree First 
Nation and Frog Lake First Nation. 
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During the summer 2011 pre-budget consultations for Budget 2012, the HoC 
Standing Committee on Finance (FINA) received 771 submissions. Two of these 
submissions mentioned navigable water or the NWPA. One is a submission from SARM 
and the other is from the Canadian Energy Pipeline Association. SARM’s 
recommendations include reviewing the NWPA and modifying the definition of ‘navigable 
water’ (Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, 2011 August 12). The Canadian 
Energy Pipeline Association lists new regulations under the NWPA as a ‘positive change’ 
and that “more can and should be done to continue these improvements, and further 
initiatives should be undertaken through Budget 2012” (Saskatchewan Association of Rural 
Municipalities, 2011 August 12). As the outcome of the 771 submissions, FINA’s 
December 2011 report recommends that “the federal government work with municipalities, 
especially in rural Canada, to continuously review the Navigable Waters Protection Act” 
(Standing Committee on Finance, 2011 December, p. 48). This appears to be the only open 
and public consultation process that fed directly into its inclusion in Bill C-45. It does not 
call for reforms in Budget 2012, but rather for continued, collaborative review.  
Then in the summer of 2012, Transport Canada consulted with provinces and 
territories on the NWPA amendments that would be included in Bill C-45 (Transport 
Canada, 2012 October 18a). During TRAN’s study of Bill C-45, the Director General of 
Transport Canada’s Navigable Waters Protection Task Force said the provinces and 
territories were aware of the reforms, but clarified that he “wouldn't categorize them as 
consultations; I would categorize them as in-depth discussions” (Standing Committee on 
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, 2012 November 12). In his official 
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announcement of the reforms, the Minister of Transport noted these limited ‘consultations’ 
and assured that “technical briefings will be held through the fall with industry and 
Aboriginal groups, and other interested parties” (Transport Canada, 2012 October 18a). As 
stated by the Minister of Transport and top public servants, the GoC did not consult the 
public or Aboriginal groups on its proposed reforms to the NWPA.  
 
b. Consultations for the Indian Act Reforms 
 
The GoC similarly failed to consult First Nations on the reforms to the Indian Act. 
Starting with the public pre-budget consultations, not one of the 771 submissions received 
by FINA mentioned reforming the land designation process or the Indian Act generally. 
Consequentially, FINA did not recommend reviewing or reforming the Indian Act as part 
of Budget 2012. It did however recommend examining “the concept of a First Nations 
Property Ownership Act as proposed by the First Nations Tax Commission” (Standing 
Committee on Finance, 2011 December, p. 48), which the GoC did explicitly include in 
Budget 2012. 
There were no pre-introduction consultations during the summer of 2012. 
AANDC’s ‘proposed outreach on budget implementation act II’ used a four-prong 
approach to ‘outreach’ on the land designation amendments.47 A letter was to be sent from 
the Minister of AANDC to ‘stakeholders’ within 24 hours of introduction. On the day of 
introduction, the Deputy Minister was to email his provincial counterparts, the Minister’s 
                                                 
47 As AANDC’s ‘proposed outreach on budget implementation act II,’ was accessed through the ATIP 
request on the consultation record for Bill C-45.  
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office was to telephone ‘stakeholders,’ and the AANDC website was to post a public press 
release. This ‘outreach’ strategy does not include engagement or consultation during the 
development of policy, but only information sharing after the fact. This finding is further 
confirmed by an internal email from the Lands Modernization Directorate of AADNC, 
accessed through an ATIP request. It said: 
As you know, there has been no official consultation process specific to these [land 
designation] amendments, however First Nations have officially and off-the-record 
maintained (for several years now!) that the Department’s land designation process is too 
lengthy.  
 
This email was from early September 2012—a month before Bill C-45 was introduced. The 
lack of consultation is something AANDC recognized before introducing the amendments. 
On November 7, 2012, the Minister of AANDC admitted this fact to the Standing 
Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples when he said “there was never a consultation 
engagement process” (para. 59). Instead, the GoC proceeded with what the Minister called 
a “no-brainer” and sent a letter to “every chief and council across Canada explaining what 
we were doing with sections 37, 39 and 40 of the Indian Act” on October 22, 2012—4 days 
after the introduction of Bill C-45 (Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal People, 2012 
November 7, para. 70). This process was justified, according to the Minister, because “the 
consultation came to us,” suggesting that there were previous requests, from unspecified, 
unquantified actors, for these changes (Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal People, 
2012 November 7, para. 55). The lack of consultation was further justified by what the 
Minister characterized as a lack of ‘push back’ from Chiefs and Councils.  
However, as the representative from the AFN told the Standing Senate Committee 
on Aboriginal Peoples on November 20, 2012, some First Nations opposed the changes 
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based on procedural concerns, specifically the lack of formal consultation. She explained 
that the AFN “opposes the bill for the lack of integrity in the process by which we get here,” 
specifically because the missing consultation processes “foreclosed any options or any 
examination of options that might have been advanced by First Nations” (Standing Senate 
Committee on Aboriginal People, 2012 November 20, para. 41). In summary, based on all 
accounts the GoC did not consult First Nations on the reforms to the Indian Act.  
 
c. Consultation Concerns Expressed by INM  
 
The relationships between consultation; democracy; free, prior, and informed 
consent48; the Honour of the Crown; and Aboriginal and Treaty rights are often referenced 
by members of INM, including by its founders, in early materials. McAdam expressed her 
concerns over the lack of consultation, which was one reason that compelled the founders 
to organize an opposition. In an interview with the press she said that “we need to let the 
government know that they are doing this without consultation, which is contrary to the 
principles of democracy” (Graney, 2012 November 19, para. 6). She further explained that,  
the biggest part of this is that the government has decided to put those powers into place 
without even consulting the indigenous people who this is going to affect… If the 
government wants to make changes to the Indian Act, then sure, but in its place we must 
fully implement the treaties and they must consult with us. (Graney, 2012 November 19, 
para. 8) 
 
The INM website provides similar criticisms. For instance, it states that because 
“Indigenous peoples and nations have not been consulted” on Bill C-45 it violates Article 
                                                 
48 Free, prior, and informed consent is substantively different than consultation. However they are linked 
and thus included for analytical purposes.  
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19 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which says that 
“States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned 
through their own representative institutions” (Idle No More, 2013 January 1; Idle No 
More, 2012 December 11a). The lack of consultation, stemming from both domestic and 
international legal obligations, was deemed unacceptable by INM. 
Additionally, a template letter to send to Senators was posted by Jessica Gordon to 
the INM website in early December. It is one of the most telling pieces of information about 
how INM viewed consultation:  
Dear Senator,  
 
We are part of a grass roots movement happening across Canada titled Idle No More. We 
have held teach-ins, rallies and protests in numerous provinces, and we have petitioned the 
House of Commons regarding the Omnibus Bills, and specifically Bill C-45. We are aware 
that the lack of consultation regarding the changes to the Indian Act, as well as the changes 
to land and water protections on First nations lands are unconstitutional. Section 35 of The 
Constitution Act, 1982 clearly states that government of Canada have a duty to consult with 
First Nations people in Canada. This consultation process has not occurred and as a result 
The Chiefs from The Assembly of First Nations marched on Parliament at 1:00pm on 
December 4th, 2012. As well, this lack of consultation defies the First Nations rights 
entrenched in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights on Indigenous Peoples, which 
the Canadian government signed and endorsed on November 12, 2010.  
 
We urge the Senate to stop the recent Omnibus Bill that was passed through the House of 
Commons until there is legitimate consultation with First Nations leaders and communities. 
This movement will continue to grow as we educate the public regarding the imminent and 
grievous threats to democracy, The Treaties, Indigenous rights, and environmental 
protections emanating from the process of passing these Omnibus Bills. (Idle No More, 
2012 December 5b) 
 
The lack of consultation is the entire basis of this letter on Bill C-45. It cannot be 
misconstrued or minimized. Consultation mattered to INM during its emergence stage.  
Other data sources further suggest that members and supporters of INM believed 
that Bill C-45 was developed unilaterally, without consultation, and infringes or has 
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adverse effects on Aboriginal and Treaty rights (For examples see Dunn, 2012 December 
22; Tasker, 2012 December 28; Smith, 2012 December 31; Scoffield, 2012 December 27; 
Rice, 2012 December 21; Howell, 2012 December 22; Hopper, December 26, 2012). Many 
protest signs likewise speak to concerns over consultation and consent:  
 “Harper you do not have my consent” (Bellville, December 31, 2012) 
 “Free, prior and informed consent” (Edmonton, December 21, 2012) 
 “Consult” (Kenora, December 10, 2012) 
 “Did not consent to any legislation” (Peterborough, December 2, 2012) 
 “Duty to consult and accommodate” (Toronto, December 21, 2012) 
 “Honour the treaties, Stop C-45” (Vancouver, December 26, 2012) 
 
Finally, the advance unedited version of the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights 
of indigenous peoples, James Anaya: The situation of indigenous peoples in Canada 
likewise found that Aboriginal Peoples have had limited participation of in decision-
making at the federal level: 
…in recent years, indigenous leaders have expressed concern that progress toward this goal 
has been undermined by actions of the Government that limit or ignore the input of 
indigenous governments and representatives in various decisions that concern them. These 
actions in part sparked in December 2012 the “Idle no More” protests throughout the 
country.  
 
Most notable were concerns expressed about a lack of effective participation of indigenous 
peoples in the design of legislation that affects them. In 2012, the federal Government 
enacted or amended a number of statutes affecting Canada’s indigenous peoples, including 
the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, National Energy Board Act, Fisheries Act, 
Navigable Waters Protection Act, and the Indian Act, through two “omnibus” budget 
implementation acts, the Jobs and Growth Act 2012 (Bill C-45) and the Jobs, Growth and 
Long-term Prosperity Act (Bill C-38). Despite the vast scope and impact on indigenous 
nations of the omnibus acts, there was no specific consultation with indigenous peoples 
concerning them. (Anaya, 2014, p. 14-15) 
 
The lack of consultation for Bill C-45 was a driving factor for the emergence of INM. This 
finding is consistent with the analysis of Inman et al. (2013), who conclude that the lack of 
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Aboriginal consultation on the 2012 budget implementation bills may be “why the 
Aboriginal peoples of Canada stood up and refused to be Idle No More” (p. 285). 
 
4.3 Overall Legitimacy  
 
During its formative days, INM members and supporters were predominantly 
protesting the substantive and procedural elements of Bill C-45. In particular, they 
protested the substantive reforms to the NWPA’s new list of regulated waterways and to a 
lesser and more inconclusive degree, the new land designation process under the Indian 
Act. These policy reforms failed to resonate and align with the values and beliefs of enough 
Canadians that they mobilized under the name INM. This was in part due to the belief that 
they would enable increased development and infringe upon Aboriginal and Treaty rights. 
Dramatically reducing the number of waterways protected under the NWPA regime—in 
the name of economic development and expediency—runs counter to the values and belief 
systems of some Aboriginal Peoples and environmentalists. Consequentially, this change 
was protested more often than any of the other amendments. It was deemed so important 
that nearly half of the protest signs chose to dedicate some of the limited space to the 
environment—mostly water. Moreover, the perceived changes made to the voting 
requirements for designating reserve land under the Indian Act did not fully reflect the 
beliefs and values about ownership of First Nations territory. While these amendments 
make up only a fraction of the Bill, Bill C-45 cannot be said to be completely substantively 
legitimate as a result.  
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As important as the content of the policy reforms were to the emergence of INM, 
the data suggests the major legitimacy gap was in terms of procedure. Bill C-45 and the 
reforms targeted by INM were procedurally illegitimate.  
First, there was not sufficient time allotted for policy incubation because the 
political actors failed to put the policy problems on the public agenda, the policy problems 
were not clearly included in Budget 2012, and the timespan from first reading to royal 
assent was accelerated. The reforms to the NWPA were talked about in the public sphere, 
despite being first mentioned in 2008 at a meeting of TRAN. The Indian Act had better, 
but still inadequate, long-term incubation. Moreover, the relationship between Budget 2012 
and Bill C-45 is important because, despite claims by the GoC, the reforms INM focused 
on were not explicitly referenced in the Budget. Even the title of Bill C-45 acknowledges 
this fact: A second Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament 
on March 29, 2012 and other measures. The use of the phrase “Other Measures” is 
significant. The GoC has included measures beyond the provisions of the official Budget 
since 2009—see Appendix A. Lastly, Bill C-45 was sped through the legislative process in 
part due to the use of time allocation/allotment motions that limited debate. These factors 
undermined the legitimacy of Bill C-45 and did not go unnoticed by INM. The lack of a 
proper incubation period for these policy reforms resulted in shock, confusion, concern, 
and outrage—culminating in the rise of INM.  
Second, while the government’s emotive appeals were successful in constructing 
Bill C-45 as a pro-economic growth bill, this unfortunately meant that the GoC was seen 
as staging an indirect attack on environmental protection. Essentially the GoC’s discourse 
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was imbalanced and filled with clear speaking points. For example, navigable water is 
about navigation, not the environment, was a common discourse used by the GoC. 
Suggesting that a regulation governing the navigation of waterways is divorced of any 
implications for the environmental integrity of those waterways is taking a narrow 
interpretation of the environment.  
 Third, the GoC failed to consult with Aboriginal Peoples on the changes to the 
NWPA and with First Nations on the reforms to the Indian Act. For the NWPA, new 
meaningful consultations, either by TRAN or Transport Canada, should have been held. 
Relying on the consultations from 2008 is inadequate because the regulatory regime was 
substantially changed since TRAN’s report and because of concerns over the adequacy of 
consultation for the 2008 consultations. The Standing Senate Committee on Energy the 
Environment and Natural Resources (2009 June) recommended that, 
Transport Canada develop and implement an effective … consultation process to seek the 
views of waterway stakeholders on any future amendments to the Act, including any 
changes to regulations, and during the five year review of the Act. (p. 9) 
 
Like the communication strategy, it does not appear that Transport Canada developed and 
implemented a general and effective consultation processes. While the reforms were 
informed by the 2008 FINA process and two submissions to the pre-budget consultations, 
the GoC should have consulted with stakeholders and Aboriginal groups early in the 
decision making process to ensure good governance.  
Similarly, the GoC did not consult, or even engage, with First Nations about Bill C-
45’s reforms to the Indian Act. In fact, First Nations received notice of the legislative 
changes days after the reforms were introduced, with the assumption that they supported 
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the content of the reforms. This official notice by AANDC was essentially a check-in to 
verify their assumed support. In their report on Bill C-45’s reforms to the Indian Act, The 
Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples did not mince words about this process: 
This [lack of consultation and use of a letter], in the opinion of your committee, is insulting 
to First Nations and is unacceptable. The committee is very concerned that the manner in 
which these amendments were introduced represents a missed opportunity to meaningfully 
engage with First Nations people and to achieve consensus on an issue of importance to all 
First Nations with reserve lands governed by the Indian Act. (Standing Senate Committee 
on Aboriginal Peoples, 2012 November 29, p. 5) 
 
For the reforms both to the NWPA and to the Indian Act, Wotherspoon and Hansen (2013) 
point to the lack of Aboriginal consultation as a grievance and an expression of continued 
colonialism and social exclusion. They suggest, 
Idle No More as a response to the Conservative government's Bill C-45 that represents, in 
the face of recurring broken promises by governments to engage in meaningful consultation 
with Indigenous people on matters that concern their land, communities and people, yet 
another unilateral decision that excludes Indigenous people and perspectives. Idle No More 
is the manifestation of resistance to colonialism. (Wotherspoon and Hansen, 2013, p. 30) 
 
This finding reinforces the idea that procedural legitimacy is fundamentally important. Bill 
C-45 lacked procedural legitimacy on all fronts and INM focused on these failings. As 
Wallner (2008) concluded, even if people agree with the substance of policy decision, 
lackluster or end-of-the-line consultation may result in criticism from those who were 
deprived of the opportunity to provide meaningful input. Input legitimacy is just as 
important as output legitimacy. In order for a policy to be legitimate, it must be both 
substantively and procedurally legitimate. The data suggests, without question, that Bill C-
45 lacked both procedural and substantive legitimacy because of its amendments to the 
NWPA and the Indian Act. It is significant that these were the main issues that INM rallied 
around. Had there been greater procedural legitimacy, through proper incubation, framing 
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and consultation, Bill C-45’s substantive legitimacy would have likely been improved. 
These findings are summarized in Tables 11, 12, and 13.  
Table 11. Legitimacy of Bill C-45 – Indian Act 
Legitimacy 
Type 
Core Elements 
Substantive Inconclusive alignment 
Procedural 
Incubation Emotive appeals 
Aboriginal 
Consultation 
Long-
term 
Moderate - numerous 
parliamentary 
references 
Failed to gain the support of 
members and supporters of 
INM by suggesting First 
Nations want this reform 
and that the land 
designation process must be 
expedited to reflect industry 
timelines and remove a 
layer of government 
bureaucracy 
No Aboriginal 
consultation 
Medium-
term 
Minimal - indirect 
references in Bill C-
45 
Short-
term 
Minimal - rushed 
through the 
parliamentary process 
 
Table 12. Legitimacy of Bill C-45 – NWPA 
Legitimacy 
Type 
Core Elements 
Substantive Limiting the number of waterways protected by the NPA regime did not align 
Procedural 
Incubation Emotive appeals 
Aboriginal 
Consultation 
Long-term 
Minimal - outdated 
parliamentary 
initiatives 
Failed to gain the support of 
members of members and 
supporters of INM because 
it first ignored then 
repudiated the 
environmental linkages of 
the NWPA 
No Aboriginal 
consultation 
Medium-
term 
Minimal - indirect 
references in Bill 
C-45 
Short-term 
Minimal - rushed 
through the 
parliamentary 
process 
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Table 13. Legitimacy of Bill C-45 – Overall 
Legitimacy 
Type 
Core Elements 
Substantive The use of a budget bill to amend non-budgetary related matters did not align  
Procedural 
Incubation Emotive appeals 
Aboriginal 
Consultation 
Inadequate - Not all of its 
contents were directly 
referenced in Budget 
2012 and it was sped 
through the 
parliamentary process  
Failed to gain the support of 
members of members and 
supporters of INM because it was 
advertised as a bill to create jobs 
and growth and did not recognize 
its full implications 
No Aboriginal 
consultation 
 
Chapter 5 – Conclusion 
 
Using an interdisciplinary approach, this research provides an explanation for the 
emergence of INM in the fall of 2012. By exploring the idea of a ‘mobilizing grievance’, 
as per Snow and Soule’s (2010) framework on social movement emergence, this research 
confirmed Bill C-45 as the mobilizing grievance for INM. Members and supporters of INM 
overwhelmingly pointed to 2012’s second omnibus budget implementation bill as the 
reason for their novel collective action.  
In order to explain why Bill C-45 would be deemed so serious that it prompted 
collective action, it was assessed against a framework of public policy legitimacy. The 
results suggest that Bill C-45 was a mobilizing grievance for INM because it lacked 
substantive and procedural legitimacy. Specifically, a small fraction of Bill C-45’s content 
lacked substantive legitimacy: select reforms to the NWPA, and to a lesser degree the 
changes to the Indian Act. While the content of Bill C-45 may have aligned with the values 
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and beliefs of many Canadians, it did not with thousands of others. Thousands of Canadians 
were compelled to join INM and challenge the Bill directly. These two reforms greatly 
reduced the substantive legitimacy of Bill C-45. INM members and supporters also 
protested the procedure of the bill.  
 The data suggests that Bill C-45 as a whole and the noted reforms lacked procedural 
legitimacy. The incubation periods were insufficient. Despite parliamentary discussions 
with stakeholders, the political actors did not make the reforms to the Indian Act or the 
NWPA agenda items in the long-term. Despite mentions in parliamentary documents and 
conversations with stakeholders, there were no efforts (e.g. campaign promises, speaking 
points, mentions to the media) to make the reforms a publically known issue. Moreover, 
the linkages to the 2012 Budget – the clear start of the incubation period for Bill C-45 – 
were at best indirect or unclear and at worst not originally intended. Given these factors, 
the choice to limit debate and speed Bill C-45 through the HoC and the Senate further 
eroded the possibility for a short-term yet sufficient incubation period. 
 This lack of time and understanding was compounded by the use of emotive 
appeals. Bill C-45 was constructed as a pro-economic growth bill, at the cost of 
environmental protection, Aboriginal and Treaty rights, and parliamentary process. The 
GoC’s emotive appeals only antagonised the future members and supporters of INM; they 
produced opposition rather than support. The GoC failed to undertake meaningful 
Aboriginal consultation on the amendments to the NWPA and the Indian Act. The lack of 
consultation was a consistent grievance expressed by INM. Whether or not the GoC had a 
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legal duty to consult, widely accepted standards of good governance should have compelled 
them to consult on such historically and contemporarily significant legislation.  
In summary, Bill C-45 was deemed serious enough to warrant collective complaint 
and corrective action because it failed to meet the requirements for legitimate public policy. 
Given the legacy of Aboriginal mobilization in Canada, the continued tensions between the 
GoC and First Nations, and the procedural and substantive illegitimacy of Bill C-45, it is 
unsurprising that Bill C-45 prompted collected outrage and social mobilization.  
Returning to Beetham’s (1991) The Legitimation of Power, he argues that a policy 
decision or instrument is legitimate if it meets three requirements. Based on these 
requirements, Bill C-45, 
1. Is legitimate because it conformed to the established rules—unless the Federal 
Court rules that the GoC failed to meet its duty to consult; 
2. Has a legitimacy deficit because the exercise of power cannot be justified by 
reference to beliefs shared by both the dominant and the subordinate; and,  
3. Delegitimizes the federal government because of the opposition by INM and others. 
 
Consequentially, Bill C-45 has a ‘deep legitimacy deficit’ because its content and the 
process behind it are out of line with the beliefs of INM and resulted in delegitimation 
through the mobilization of INM. This research thus suggests that Bill C-45 was the 
mobilizing grievance for INM because it lacked substantive and procedural legitimacy, 
producing a deep legitimacy deficit that resulted in INM as a manifestation of 
delegitimizing power. Bill C-45 in fact was a perfect example of policy illegitimacy. INM 
was the ensuing result.  
INM did not begin as an Aboriginal movement with environmental elements, nor 
did it start as an environmental movement that took up Aboriginal issues. What INM was 
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originally is linked to why it emerged in the first place. INM began as a movement to stop 
Bill C-45. The integrations and nuances of INM, which often confounded pundits who 
suggested it must be unfocused, merely reflected its mobilizing grievance. Its concerns over 
environmental protection and Aboriginal issues are not mutually exclusive and are not 
contradictory. Most of the statements on INM’s website and nearly all media articles 
combine these issues in the same sentence. Twelve percent (12%) of the protest images 
explicitly integrated both the environment and Aboriginal issues with Bill C-45:  
• Put First Nations, Water and Soil Before Dirty Oil! (Toronto, December 10, 2012); 
• One People – One Voice – One Earth – One Future #IdleNoMore for the next 7 generations 
(Unknown Location, January 28, 2013); and, 
• Environment (check), 1st Nations (check), Bill C-45 (crossed out) (Salish, December 13, 
2012). 
• Bill C-45 is an insult to the environment, to democracy, to First Nations. Shame” (Salish, 
December 11, 2012).  
 
INM began as a social movement to protect environmental outcomes, to ensure the 
fulfillment of Aboriginal and Treaty rights, and to challenge democratic processes in 
Canada. This relationship however must not be extrapolated to argue that Aboriginal and 
environmentalist interest inherently align. 
While INM has clear links to the environment, as McAdam says, “When you begin 
to go into that realm of Idle No More is 'save the gophers,' then you're losing the vision” 
(Blaze, 2013 January 15). INM relates to the complexity and overlap of environmental 
protection and management, Aboriginal and Treaty rights, sovereignty, jurisdiction, 
representation, and good governance. INM was never simply concerned with protecting the 
environment. It is deeply rooted in the fight for Aboriginal and treaty rights. In fact, INM 
claims that Bill C-45 violates Articles 18, 19 and 20 of the United Nations Declaration on 
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the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Idle No More, 2012 December 11a, para. 2). For reasons 
such as this, Woons (2013) expresses concern with the trend to equate INM with the 
environmental movement. He believes that people, 
fail to consider challenges that might arise given Idle No More is not simply or most 
fundamentally about environmental protection… The Indigenous claim to sovereignty and 
national self-determination is much broader than, though certainly inclusive of, 
environmental protection. (Woons, 2013, p. 174) 
 
INM emerged to contest a specific grievance. Its goals and measures of success derive from 
its initial aim: protesting Bill C-45. Given the existence of the necessary contextual factors, 
the relationship between INM and Bill C-45 suggests that policies that lack legitimacy can 
become mobilizing grievances for social movements. This is a significant theoretical 
finding that suggests that policy actions can be critical events in the development of a social 
movement.  
 
5.1 Policy Implications of the Findings 
 
Beyond the more theoretical findings of this research, its practical findings provide 
a number of lessons that policymakers should heed if they want to ensure future policy 
reforms are legitimate and thereby minimize the probability that they produce another 
movement like INM. The research suggests that, 
1. Policies should be legitimate, not just legally defendable;  
2. The minimal standard for amending legislation directly related to Aboriginal 
governance should be consultation; 
3. Budget implementation bills should contain clearly related parts that are expressly 
traceable to the official budget, 
4. Major reforms should be openly discussed with the public to mitigate confusion;  
5. Debate limiting motions should be used cautiously and sparingly on multifaceted 
bills; and 
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6. Policies without direct environmental intentions may still have environmental 
consequences. 
 
Each of these findings is elaborated below.  
 
5.1.1 Policies should be legitimate, not just legally defendable  
 
McConnell (2010) suggests that “a policy that is produced through constitutional 
and quasi-constitutional procedures will confer a large degree of legitimacy on policy 
outcomes, even when those policies are contested” (p. 41). The findings of this research 
suggest that governments must ensure their policies are fully legitimate. Even if they meet 
the requirements to be constitutionally or quasi-constitutionally sound, they may still result 
in widespread contestation. It is not enough that the political actor has the legal authority 
to act. As McAdam told the media, “even if (the government) has been voted in, they still 
have a duty to consult people about these kinds of things that impact them” (Graney, 2012 
November 19, para. 12). Winning an election does not mean a government has unilateral 
and ultimate authority to drive the policy direction. The government remains accountable 
to its citizens. This becomes even more important if some citizens contest their authority 
over them, as many First Nations do of the Crown (Papillon, 2008; 2012). 
To ensure political actors maintain public support, policies should meet the 
requirements for legitimacy. The research findings on substantive legitimacy are quite 
compelling. Following Beetham’s 1991 work on legitimacy, the INM case study further 
supports Montpetit’s (2008) position that a ‘deep legitimacy deficit’ may occur when a 
policy does not align with the public’s values and beliefs. The findings further suggest that 
this deficit can result in the delegitimation of political actors, in this case the GoC and 
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possibly the AFN, through mass mobilization. Criticisms of the GoC throughout various 
protests and documents often lead back to the 2012 omnibus budget bills and their erosion 
of democracy (Cockram 2014).  
Snow and Owen (2013) contend that collective grievances produced by government 
actions, like Bill C-45, are “typically associated with… political decisions and policies that 
are seen as morally bankrupt or advantaging some interests to the exclusion of others” (p. 
293). Bill C-45 exemplifies this proposition. Bill C-45 was seen to advance economic 
interests at the cost of environment protection and Aboriginal and Treaty rights. 
Importantly, while injustice may be the driver behind social movements,  
The kinds of events and conditions constitutive of injustices are rarely self-evident or 
incontestable. Rather, the designation of some condition as an injustice is typically a matter 
of interpretation. (Snow and Soule, 2010, p. 48) 
This returns to the normative, subjective nature of mobilizing grievances and policy 
legitimacy. It speaks to why some people were dismissive of INM, why others joined, and 
why many others were confused about what the problem was and why social mobilization 
was a valid answer.  
Ensuring the legitimacy of public policies, not just their efficiency, efficacy, or 
alignment with party values, should be a priority for democratic governments when 
designing and implementing policy (Hanberger, 2003; Smoke 1994; Wallner, 2008). While 
political actors cannot please everyone, they can act strategically to ensure their actions 
have a basis in legitimacy. This matters because if a policy proves to be illegitimate, society 
may lose “conﬁdence in the fairness and suitability of their government… and damage the 
specific party in power” (Wallner, 2008, p. 423). Legitimacy matters because it may be the 
reason why people deem an otherwise unremarkable policy as being serious enough to 
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prompt collective, corrective action. It matters because in order for the government to have 
the unequivocal support of its citizens, it must be perceived as legitimate (Bakvis and 
Skogstad, 2012). Since public policy is typically viewed as a reflection of the government, 
if their policies lack legitimacy then the government itself is perceived to lack legitimacy. 
Consequentially, the acceptance of the public to be governed by the government’s rules is 
a clear manifestation of policy legitimacy (Issalys, 2005). That is, obedience is “the 
behavioural expression of legitimacy,” whereas disobedience is the expression of 
illegitimacy and has “implications for the stability of a political system” (Grimes, 2008, p. 
525). 
 Hence, governments who want to ensure the stability of their regime and political 
systems at large should pursue legitimate, not just legal, public policies. Policies should 
reflect the values and beliefs of the public. They should be developed in consultation with 
the public and affected stakeholders. They should not be rushed. They should be framed by 
the political in a way that allows for widespread understanding and support. They should 
be seen as fair, reasonable, expected, and in the public interest. If a policy is legitimate, the 
political actor is likely following the values of good governance. 
 
5.1.2 The Minimal Standard for Amending Legislation Directly Related to 
Aboriginal Governance should be Consultation 
 
Given the general support for the substantive changes to the designation process 
under the Indian Act, it may have been a good-news story if, amongst other changes, the 
GoC had broadly consulted with First Nations. By doing so, the GoC could have developed 
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a clear call for change, based on First Nations priorities and experiences. This would have 
resulted in greater acceptance due to a sense of ownership from ‘input legitimacy’.  
The fact that AANDC failed to consult on the reforms to the Indian Act is a 
particularly notable violation of the basis of good governances and policy legitimacy. 
Beyond the historical and reconciliation rationales, at the Crown-First Nations Gathering 
in January 2012 the Prime Minister committed to not doing exactly what Bill C-45 did. In 
his opening remarks he stated: 
To be sure, our Government has no grand scheme to repeal or to unilaterally re-write the 
Indian Act: After 136 years, that tree has deep roots - blowing up the stump would just 
leave a big hole. However, there are ways, creative ways, collaborative ways, ways that 
involve consultation between our Government, the provinces, and First Nations leadership 
and communities, ways that provide options within the Act, or outside of it, for practical, 
incremental and real change. So that will be our approach, to replace elements of the Indian 
Act with more modern legislation and procedures, in partnership with provinces and First 
Nations. (Prime Minister of Canada, 2012 January 24) 
 
Given the commitment between the AFN and the GoC through the Crown-First 
Nations Gatherings, and the GoC’s subsequent failure to uphold their end, it is 
unsurprising that First Nations people would feel like they need to mobilize outside of the 
usual power structure. This implication echoes a recommendation from Anaya’s (2014) 
report: 
New laws, policies and programmes that affect indigenous peoples should be developed in 
consultation and true partnership with them. The federal and provincial/territorial 
governments should not push forward with laws, policies or programmes where significant 
opposition by indigenous governments and leadership still exists. (p. 25) 
 
Policymakers thus should not act unilaterally, even given presumed substantive 
support, to amend Aboriginal-specific policies, like the Indian Act or the First Nations Land 
Management Act, or legislation with specific Aboriginal requirements, like SARA. Given 
the commitments to reconciliation and the recent history of the SCS decisions on 
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consultation under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, the GoC ought to consult 
broadly when it contemplates conduct that may have potentially adverse effects on 
established or potential Aboriginal or Treaty rights. Consultation is not just a legal duty, it 
is an important element of good governance and political legitimacy. 
 
5.1.3 Budget Implementation Bills Should Contain Clearly Related Parts 
that are Expressly Traceable to the Official Budget 
 
One of the main reasons INM reacted to the reforms was because they were 
unexpected. This fevered reaction could have been mitigated had there been specific 
references to the reforms in the 2012 Budget. This inclusion would have ensured incubation 
since its introduction. Bill C-38, as an omnibus budget bill, was widely criticized as an 
inappropriate avenue to repeal and replace the CEAA with CEAA 2012. However, the 
policy intent behind the reform was clearly laid out in Budget 2012 and therefore was not 
entirely unexpected. The same can be said for the 2009 reforms to the NWPA. While some 
objected for substantive reasons, changes to the NWPA in 2009 were included in that year’s 
budget and were thus expected. Clear, unambiguous connections between the federal 
budget and its implementation acts will help to ensure the public does not feel a sense of 
concern upon their introduction. 
In addition to the three indicators of Wallner’s framework, the mechanism used for 
the reforms also eroded the legitimacy of the substantive reforms. Using an omnibus budget 
bill to amend diverse, unrelated, non-financial legislation was regularly contested by INM. 
Omnibus budget bills are increasingly long and complex, amending non-financial 
legislation (Cockram, 2014). Omnibus bills require a clear theme to bind their separate but 
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related parts (Marleau and Montpetit, 2000). Bill C-45’s theme of ‘jobs and growth’ 
became a catch-all that could be applied to nearly anything. 
Despite historical precedence and contemporary practice, policies without a clear 
relationship should not be included in omnibus budget implementation bills. The clear 
linkage is that they were in the budget and/or are financial or budgetary reforms. An MP 
recognized this in 1994 when he rose in the HoC on a point of order and said: 
… I submit to you that it has become a standard practice with governments to bring in 
omnibus legislation following every budget under what we might call the kitchen sink 
approach. 
 
[…] 
 
Mr. Speaker, I would argue that the subject matter of the bill is so diverse that a single vote 
on the content would put members in conflict with their own principles. 
 
In this present case, the drafters of Bill C-17 have incorporated in the same bill the 
following measures: public sector compensation freezes; a freeze in Canada assistance plan 
payments and Public Utilities Income Tax Transfer Act transfers; extension and deepening 
of transportation subsidies; authorization for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation to 
borrow money; and changes to unemployment insurance with respect to benefits and the 
payroll taxes. 
 
First, there is a lack of relevancy of these issues. The omnibus bills we have before us 
attempt to amend several different existing laws. 
 
Second, in the interest of democracy I ask: How can members represent their constituents 
on these various areas when they are forced to vote in a block on such legislation and on 
such concerns? 
 
We can agree with some of the measures but oppose others. How do we express our views 
and the views of our constituents when the matters are so diverse? Dividing the bill into 
several components would allow members to represent views of their constituents on each 
of the different components in the bill. 
 
The bill contains many distinct proposals and principles and asking members to provide 
simple answers to such complex questions is in contradiction to the conventions and 
practices of the House.  
 
[…] 
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I would also ask the government members, particularly those who have spoken on precisely 
this question in the previous Parliament with precisely the same concerns, to give serious 
consideration to this issue of democracy and the functionality of this Parliament now. 
(Parliament of Canada, 1994 March 25).  
 
There are a many striking elements of this point of order. First, this is largely the discourse 
used by opposition MPs and to a lesser extent INM to try to stop Bill C-45. Second, the 
content of the 1994 Bill only contained financial amendments. There was a much clearer 
connection between the separate elements here than in Bill C-45. Third, this budget had no 
‘other measures’ outside of the 1994 Budget. 49 Fourth, it was only 21 pages, including the 
Annexes. Lastly, the MP was Stephen Harper. Problems that INM protested against at the 
end of 2012 were recognized by the Prime Minister when he was an MP. Even if these 
reforms may spur ‘jobs and growth’, their inclusion in a budget bill places principles of 
efficiency above procedural and substantive legitimacy. The connection between the 
budget and the budget implementation bill is lost—as is the democratic integrity of the bill.  
Consequentially, it may have been wiser for the GoC to pursue separate omnibus 
legislation to specifically amend legislation to ensure responsible resource and economic 
development. Alternatively, the major overhaul of the NWPA could have been introduced 
using a standalone bill (i.e. a bill containing major revisions of existing Acts). The Indian 
Act could have similarly been amended using a bill containing amendments to existing 
Acts. Bills do not need to be one hundred pages. They should be developed to ensure proper 
parliamentary review and decision-making. INM can be seen a response to the approach 
                                                 
49 An Act to amend certain statutes to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on 
February 22, 1994.  
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taken by the GoC to “govern by omnibudget, cramming all kinds of unrelated legislation 
in massive bills” (Ottawa Citizen, 2012 December 31, para. 4).  
 
5.1.4 Major Reforms should be Publically Discussed to Minimize Surprise 
and Confusion 
 
As a long and complex omnibus budget bill, Bill C-45 was not an ideal candidate 
for a thorough explanation of its parts. Unlike other bills to amend existing acts, legislative 
summaries are not produced for omnibus budget bills. A legislative summary is an official 
GoC document that clearly explains the bill. Ideally, they make the legalese more 
accessible. Bill C-45 did not have this beneficial document that would have provided a 
clear, non-partisan description. Regardless, it would have been a cumbersome task for the 
GoC to ensure clarity and understanding of its proposed reforms because they were so far 
reaching, removed from their specific legislative context, and put in a financial bill.  
While this method may have been chosen for efficiency reasons, the result was 
confusion and misunderstanding of the policies, both in the HoC, on the streets, and online. 
Based on the information furnished by the GoC and the media, many members and 
supporters of INM misunderstood and mischaracterized the reforms to the Indian Act and 
the NWPA. In large part, this was because the reforms were not incubating in the medium 
to long term and were not initially explained in detail by the GoC. Neither the amendments 
to the Indian Act nor the NWPA were touted in Finance Canada’s overview or in the initial 
speeches by Conservative Party of Canada MPs.  
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When the Indian Act reforms were introduced, AANDC published a brief press 
release on its website. On October 22, 2012—four days after the introduction of Bill C-
45—AANDC mailed out letters to inform First Nation communities of the amendments. 
Even then, this communication was not public; it is not something the founders of INM 
could readily obtain. The need to amend the designation process under the Indian Act was 
raised by parliamentary committees, by the Auditor General, and by band councils. 
However, it was not publicized in an accessible way to the grassroots. This is in part due to 
minimal media coverage of the policy problem. Again, while these reports and meetings 
are in the public sphere, they are not on the radar of the average Canadian. Reforming the 
designation process was not a regular talking point for the GoC; it was not a campaign 
promise. While there was some effort to generally problematize economic development 
barriers on reserve, then theoretically linked to the land designation process, this was not 
done in a specific, predictable way. In particular, it is questionable to assume that the 
commitment to economic development by the Crown-First Nations Gathering would 
incubate specific reforms to the designation process. It was not explicitly problematized to 
the point that the public clearly accepted it as a problem that needed fixing. If it had been, 
the public would not have confused designation with surrender. The GoC failed again to 
make it an issue, a problem, and an agenda item. 
An avoidable outcome of this failure to widely communicate was the confusion over 
what the amendments to the Indian Act did. A number of quotes demonstrate this 
misunderstanding within INM:  
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When it comes to the Indian Act, McAdam said she is most worried that the bill would 
allow the Aboriginal Affairs minister to call a referendum to consider the surrender of a 
band's reserve lands. (Graney, 2012 November 19, para. 7) 
 
Bill C-45 Job and Growth Act (Omnibus bill includes Indian Act amendments regarding 
voting on-reserve, land surrender/designations). (Idle No More, 2012 December 11a) 
 
The Bill brings forward changes specifically to the Indian Act that will lower the threshold 
of community consent in the designation and surrender process of Indian Reserve Lands. 
(Idle No More, 2012 December 13, para. 2) 
 
Two provisions in particular upset them: the reduction in the amount of federally protected 
waterways and a fast tracked process to surrender reserve lands. (Kinew, 2013 January 17, 
para. 3) 
 
The only mention of the Indian Act in the federal budget has to deal with direct taxation 
arrangements, but Bill C-45 would change the way band members vote on and approve the 
surrender of land. (Smith, 2012 October 18, para. 7) 
 
Why is government policy and legislation always wanting us to surrender the land? To cede 
and surrender? (Chief of Onion Lake Cree Nation in Woods, 2013, p. 173). 
 
Importantly, these misunderstandings would have been avoided had there been 
proper consultation and framing. The apparent concern expressed by members of INM over 
its content might reflect a communications deficit between leading Aboriginal 
organizations, the federal government, and the public (or grassroots). This may be 
explained in part by the limited public discussions about the need for the amendments to 
the Indian Act. The GoC opted for a minimal engagement and communication strategy 
despite the fact that AANDC, as demonstrated in a document released in the ATIP request, 
recognized that land designation and land surrender are commonly confused. It is probable 
that if these reforms had been consulted on and introduced in a manner that allowed for 
better understanding and scrutiny, amongst other factors, more First Nations may have 
supported them.  
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During the early days of INM, there was a similar misunderstanding and 
misrepresentation of Bill C-45’s amendments to the NWPA. Specifically, there was the 
misbelief that the amendments to the NWPA directly decreased environmental protection. 
There are two reasons why this understanding was not as accurate as portrayed. First, 
waterways in Canada continue to be protected by legislation specifically designed to protect 
the environment like the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, the Fisheries Act, 
and CEAA 2012. Moreover, some transport and marine safety legislation also includes 
environmental protection provisions, such as the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 
(and its Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Regulations), Canada Marine Act, and the 
Canada Transportation Act. Indeed, one of the explicit purposes of the Canada Marine 
Act, as per section 4, is to ‘provide for a high level of safety and environmental protection.’  
Secondly, there was also confusion over the reforms to the NWPA despite how 
early and strongly public and private sector actors raised their concerns with the GoC. Their 
actions failed to translate into an incubation period because they failed to actively engage 
the public. The specific need to reform the NWPA did not permeate through the public 
sphere. It does not matter that political actors discussed the need for these reforms for years. 
Those discussions generally cannot contribute to an incubation period because they are not 
public. Therefore, due to negligible speaking points, media coverage, and general 
awareness, the public’s knowledge of these discussions was limited to non-existent. This 
lack of awareness, or incubation, occurred because the GoC and the regulated community 
failed to get their message to the masses. It resulted in half-understandings and misplaced 
outrage.  
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Specifically, since the summer of 2012, the NWPA (and the NPA) has no direct 
link to environmental management. INM members and supporters misconstrued the 
meaning of some of the amendments to the NWPA in Bill C-45. Walton’s (2012 October 
29) legal summary of the amendments explains why: 
…commentators have suggested the amendments to the NWPA, in essence, mean it is no 
longer an act that protects the environment. In reality, the NWPA is not, and has never 
been, a statute which provided for protection of the aquatic environment; rather, it provides 
for protection of navigation, over which the federal government has exclusive authority 
under Canada's constitution. However, due to the manner in which the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act, 1992 (CEAA 1992) was structured, there was a link 
between NWPA approvals and environmental protection. This is because under the CEAA 
1992, any approval to be issued under the NWPA triggered a federal environmental 
assessment, which was required to be carried out by the authority issuing the NWPA 
approval – but the approval itself related to navigation, not the environment. If CEAA 1992 
had not recently been repealed, then it would be accurate to state that the proposed revisions 
to the NWPA potentially reduces federal government protection of the environment of 
navigable waters. However, as NWPA approvals have already been removed as a trigger 
for environmental assessment, the narrowing of the scope of approvals required for works 
on navigable waters in the revised NPA does not have specific environmental implications 
– that already occurred when CEAA 1992 was repealed and replaced with a new 
environmental assessment regime earlier this year under Bill C-38. It is also noted that the 
amendments to the NWPA in Bill C-45 do not affect other federal or provincial regimes 
which provide protection of the aquatic environment. (Emphasis added, para. 16) 
 
In sum, the primary environmental element of the NWPA was removed through the 
repeal and replace of CEAA in Bill C-38, not through its overhaul in Bill C-45. While only 
protecting 1% of waterways through a list may be catchier than removing the trigger for 
environmental assessment, the later has much more profound environmental consequences. 
 These two findings indicate a gap between GoC communication and public 
understanding; they do not diminish the inherent relationship between water for navigation 
and water for all purposes—see section 5.1.6. What the GoC failed to do was to explain the 
reforms openly and immediately. It should have been anticipated that given recent water 
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crises across Canada (e.g. Walkerton and boil water advisories on reserves/in rural areas) 
and the reaction to Bill C-38, the GoC would need to develop and execute a well-thought-
out communications plan. Overall, substantive concerns may have been mitigated or 
potentially avoided had the GoC effectively engaged and communicated with stakeholders, 
the general public, and Aboriginal Peoples.  
 
5.1.5 Debate Limiting Motions should be used Cautiously and Sparingly on 
Multifaceted Bills  
 
When debating long and complex omnibus bills whose parts are not clearly related, 
or bills that prompt public (beyond parliamentary) debate, parliamentarians should not put 
forth time limiting motions. Time allocation motions do not allow for proper study, 
scrutiny, and democratic oversight when applied to bills with such breadth in terms of 
content and consequences. Bills should be open to debate and amendment during the 
parliamentary process. Time enables proper study and scrutiny, and thus mistakes or 
oversights can be caught and addressed. For example, errors in CEAA 2012 should have 
been found during the clause-by-clause study of Bill C-38. Bill C-45 should not have been 
needed to amend errors in CEAA 2012. To operate in a climate where opposition parties or 
members of the leading party are not given a reasonable opportunity to improve a bill with 
thoughtful deliberation and amendment is an affront on the basics of parliamentary 
democracy.  
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5.1.6 Policies without Direct Environmental Intentions May Still Have 
 Environmental Consequences  
 
The substantive reforms that INM rallied against are very relevant for understanding 
the broad nature of environmental policy, or policy that has environmental outcomes, even 
if they are not in the traditional list of Canada’s environmental legislation. While the 
NWPA/NPA is at least one step removed from 
being environmental policy, its most direct 
environmental linkages were contingent on it 
triggering environmental assessments under 
CEAA. As noted in Section 5.1.4, this linkage 
was broken with Bill C-38; NWPA projects do 
not trigger environmental assessments under 
CEAA 2012. The Indian Act is not environmental 
legislation either. However, the regime of both 
acts can impact the environment, and that is something that INM noticed.  
As shown in the data, many of the concerns about the reforms to NWPA and the 
Indian Act were because of potential negative environmental consequences. These are the 
changes that INM asserts will negatively impact long term environment protection and 
Aboriginal and Treaty rights. The founders organized the very first INM rally because they 
believed the amendments to the Indian Act “would ultimately make room for oil, nuclear 
and gas industries to tear up the land for profit” (Idle No More, 2013 January 1). Forty-five 
percent (45%) of the protest sign images directly relate to an aspect of the environment 
During the 1990s the Oka crises 
represented a call for Canadians to 
hear such absences as a historical 
counterpoint (or counternarrative) to 
the legacy of colonization. Twenty 
years later grassroots Indigenous 
movements like Idle No More continue 
to provoke us to reject the recent 
federal changes to environmental 
protection laws in Bill C-45 that 
threaten to negate negotiated treaty 
rights between our nations (Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal).  
 
- Ng-A-Fook, 2013, p. 288 
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(e.g. water, land, Mother Nature) with fifty-three individual references within those images. 
Indicative examples include: “Nobody wins a war on environment” (Chilliwack, December 
21, 2012); “Protect the Environment 4 Everyone” (Kingston, January 28, 2013); “Protect 
our land, water, food, plants + animals from greed” (Saskatoon, December 21, 2012); and, 
“Protect our Lakes and Rivers” (Toronto, January 14, 2013). The water and the land are the 
overwhelming dominant subjects of the protest signs. In fact, twenty-three percent (23%) 
of the protest sign images made direct references to water—the most of any individual 
code.  
Similarly, most Canadians would not include the NWPA or the Indian Act when 
listing environmental laws. However, the Energy Framework Initiative (EFI)50 included the 
NWPA in a letter to the federal Ministers of the Environment and Natural Resources in 
December 2011. The letter, accessed through an ATIP request, includes the NWPA in a list 
of legislation that protects the environment. The EFI (2011) stated, 
We believe that the basic approach embodied in existing legislation is outdated. At the heart 
of most existing legislation is a philosophy of prohibiting harm; ‘environmental’ legislation 
is almost entirely focused on preventing bad things from happening rather than enabling 
responsible outcomes. (p. 2) 
 
All of the legislation listed, with the exception of the Migratory Bird Convention Act, 1994, 
was amended in the 2012 omnibus budget bills. This is not to suggest the letter was the 
driving factor, but to suggest that the NWPA is not purely related to transportation. Major 
stakeholders recognized the interplay and broad outcomes of this legislation.  
                                                 
50 The EFI represents Canadian Energy Pipeline Association, Canadian Gas Association, Canadian 
Petroleum Products Institute, and the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers. 
143 
Members and supporters of INM generally believed that the NWPA served to 
protect the water from development that impacted navigation, which resulted in ad hoc 
environmental protection. Because the regime governs water, there is an intrinsic 
connection to the environment. Decreasing the regulation of water, in any regard, to ease 
the approval process of development and projects, will likely be met with opposition. 
Overall, it is difficult to separate and isolate the concerns over the land designation under 
the Indian Act and the decreased number of waterways regulated by the NWPA from their 
potential environmental consequences. Any definitive division between governing land or 
water and protecting the environment is a fabrication. Water and land, after all, are 
inherently environmental resources. Even the perception of reducing their protection, for 
whatever reason, on such a large scale51 will likely cause alarm. It is naïve to suggest or 
believe that parceling out legislative protection for some waterways and relying on the 
common law right of navigation in others would go unnoticed, or that exempting pipelines 
under the NPA on the one percent would not cause concern. Without overgeneralizing, 
water is embedded in the belief systems of many Aboriginal Peoples in Canada. Many rely 
on it for traditional foods, for social and ceremonial purposes, and for transportation. Water 
is simply water – and the belief that changing one aspect of its protection will have ripple 
effects is not difficult to understand. 
Based on the concerns expressed by INM, analysis by Ecojustice, and lobbying by 
the EFI, the GoC could have been more successful with their emotive appeals if they had 
recognized the environmental legacy of the NWPA as recognized by the SCC, and 
                                                 
51 99% of Canadian waterways are not listed under the NPA.  
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acknowledged they were limiting the scope of the Act to what they believed was 
appropriate. Moreover, the GoC could have done a better job of explaining why the 
amendments would not impact the environmental protection of the waterways. For 
example, they should have stressed that waterways continue to be protected by the 
Fisheries Act, CEAA 2012, the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, and various other 
federal marine laws, and their respective regulations. While this would not have fully 
addressed the delinking of navigation and environmental protection, it may have quelled 
some dissenters. The lesson here is that land and water, even when regulated by non-
environmental laws, retain at the very minimum the appearance of being environmental. 
 
5.2 Research Limitations 
 
There are a number of limitations to this research. The main limitations relate to 
data collection. First, I was unable to schedule the planned interviews. I was unsuccessful 
in my attempts to contact the founders and spokespersons for INM. The interviews could 
have provided targeted insights into elements of Bill C-45 potentially beyond the scope of 
the legitimacy framework, which they felt were necessary to the emergence of INM. Thus, 
they could have produced new knowledge or triangulated data that could have further tested 
and validated the framework. Moreover, interviews could have provided additional and 
corroborating insights into the perceived relationship between the NWPA, the Indian Act, 
and environmental integrity.  
Beyond the interviews with representatives of INM, I was unable to interview 
federal policymakers because of the judicial review of Bill C-38 and Bill C-45 launched by 
145 
the Mikisew Cree First Nation and the Frog Lake First Nation. Any requests for interviews 
would have been declined because the issue is currently before the Federal Court. 
Consequentially, the data on the policy changes and GoC rationales was more limited than 
originally designed.  
ATIP requests were used to help offset this missing data, but these requests had 
their own limitations. The results of the completed requests redacted key documents and 
paragraphs that cannot be released for twenty years because they are protected by “Cabinet 
Confidence”. 52 These documents would have been the most beneficial to review. 
Moreover, the original scope of the request to Transport Canada for records on the NWPA 
reforms had to be reduced because it was administratively unreasonable for the department 
to produce. Despite efforts to negotiate the request, it was extended by the maximum of 
120 days.  
 
5.3 Opportunities for Future Research  
 
This research has uncovered several areas for future research, three of which are 
based on Snow and Soule’s model and the limitations to this research. First, this research 
assumed that the necessary but insufficient contextual conditions (political opportunity, 
resource mobilization, and ecological factors) existed. There should be research conducted 
                                                 
52 Section 69(1) of the Access to Information Act means that (b) discussion papers the purpose of which is 
to present background explanations, analyses of problems or policy options to Council for consideration by 
Council in making decisions and (d) records used for or reflecting communications or discussions between 
ministers of the Crown on matters relating to the making of government decisions or the formulation of 
government policy cannot be released in access to information requests. 
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to assess to what extent these variables existed (see Figure 5). What political opportunities, 
resources, and ecological factors were available and utilized in order for INM to emerge? 
Were all of these equally important? By answering these questions, a broader context of 
why INM emerged will be gained.  
 
 
 
Second, and on a related note, Snow and Soule (2010) suggest there are three 
conditions and/or processes found throughout the literature for which their convergence 
accounts for the generation of mobilizing grievances: structural or material conditions, 
social psychological processes, and framing processes. INM should be used as a case study 
to examine the elements theorized to be necessary to generate a mobilizing grievance. 
Lastly, Snow and Soule (2010) suggest that certain grievances are neither individual 
nor ubiquitous, but are experienced collectively, making them central to the idea of 
mobilizing grievances. This policy-oriented research assumed that Bill C-45 was a 
collective grievance: a critical event that was experienced collectively. There should be 
 
(1) Bill C-45 + 
 
(Mobilizing 
Grievance) 
 
Political 
Opportunity 
Resource 
Mobilization 
Ecological  
Factors 
=   (3) INM 
(2) Contextual Conditions 
Figure 5. Snow and Soule's (2010) General Model of Social Movement Emergence, with Bill 
C-45 and INM 
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additional research into what made it a collective grievance. Clearly thousands of people 
across Canada, and around the world, felt wronged following the introduction of Bill C-45. 
In order to determine Bill C-45’s status as a collective grievance, its impact on collective 
identities, including Aboriginal identities, and collective structures/processes should be 
considered in detail. The importance of Aboriginal collectivist culture, rather than 
individualism, is well studied (Aboriginal Human Resource Council, 2007). The 
corresponding collective identities found in Aboriginal cultures should provide a useful 
basis for this analysis.  
There are other areas of research needed outside of completing Snow and Soule’s 
model. First, because the scope of this research was limited to emergence, it does not 
discuss the later stages of INM, which may include coalescence, bureaucratization, and 
decline (Christiansen, 2009). There should also be research exploring the tactics and critical 
events, like the teach-ins, blockades, National Day of Action, hunger strike of Chief 
Theresa Spence (of the north Ontario Attawapiskat First Nation) and Sovereignty Summer. 
Additionally, the new issues targeted by INM since its founding, including raising 
awareness about missing and murdered Aboriginal women (Becker, 2009), are important 
developments for the movement and warrant further study. The gendered aspect of INM 
should further be explored. This research could work from a proposition by Rootes and 
Brulle (2013) that,  
Women play more prominent roles in grassroots mobilizations than national environmental 
movement organizations, reflecting women’s greater involvement with, and confidence in 
acting in, the local community than the wider public sphere (p. 415). 
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There should be research to explore the validity of this proposition across cases 
studies, including INM. Importantly, as part of a long history of mobilization and activism 
by Aboriginal women, INM is novel and noteworthy because it was a grassroots 
mobilization that did not remain localized but instead became a national and international 
phenomenon. 
Finally, there should be research to explain and compare the impact and outcomes 
of INM. Did INM impact Aboriginal or environmental policy? Did it influence Aboriginal 
or Treaty rights, or the negotiation and implementation of self-government agreements and 
comprehensive land claims agreements? Did INM influence the GoC’s use of large, wide-
reaching omnibus budget implementation bills? And how was INM similar to and different 
from other social movements in Canada and around the world? INM remains a fruitful case 
study for scholarly examination.  
 
5.4 Concluding Remarks  
 
Unexpected consequences can emerge at any stage of the policy cycle. In many 
fields, including environmental policy, outcomes can be inherently uncertain. This fact 
reflects the complex systems environmental policies seek to govern, and also the changing 
state of scientific knowledge. These uncertainties are not only often scientific-related but 
also deeply social. Acknowledging the work of scholars on socio-ecological systems (see 
Berkes, Colding, and Folk, 2003; Gunderson and Holling, 2002), the social uncertainties 
that may result from environmental policy reforms are nevertheless generally overlooked. 
For instance, the possibility that a new and distinct social movement may be spurred with 
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the primary aim to challenge a specific policy decision is not sufficiently addressed in the 
literature on policy reform. While the GoC undoubtedly predicted negative responses 
before introducing Bills C-38 and C-45, spurring a full-fledged social movement was not 
likely on their respective risk assessments. Yet it happened and caught the GoC by surprise 
(Palmater, 2012 December 28). The emergence of social movements is something that 
policy makers should consider. 
Overall, Bill C-45 can be framed as a manifestation of the neo-colonial relationship 
between the Crown and Aboriginal Peoples in Canada. The reforms are seen by many 
Aboriginal Peoples as taking place without consultation or consent, without meeting treaty 
obligations, and without reflecting Aboriginal attitudes of environmental management. 
Kovach (2013) notes that while the historical roots of these Aboriginal claims predate 
environmentalist concerns, there have been centuries of Aboriginal environmentalist ethics, 
with specific stewardship paid to the water and land. The overwhelming conclusion of this 
thesis is that the founders of INM mobilized because of their belief that Bill C-45 
“disrespects treaty rights and aboriginal sovereignty and erodes protection of the 
environment” (Cooper, 2012 December 31, para. 2). Using an interdisciplinary theoretical 
approach and qualitative data analysis, this research suggests that INM emerged following 
legislative reform, particularly in response to amendments with environmental 
implications, because the reforms lacked substantive and procedural legitimacy.  
These findings in no way diminish the fact that the emergence of INM has many 
more determining factors than a bill or a few policy decisions. The model applied in this 
research recognizes this fact with its contextual conditions that warrant further research 
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(see Section 5.3). There are a multitude of critically important historical and contemporary 
factors that influenced the emergence of INM. These factors may include the failure of the 
Government of Canada to fulfill its treaty obligations and the various socio-economic 
indicators that show disparity between  Aboriginal Peoples in Canada and the average 
Canadian (see Vowel, 2012 December 12; Palmater, 2012 December 28). Without 
colonization, without the decades of botched “Indian policy”, without an environmental 
ethic, and without social media, it is unlikely that INM would have unfolded as it did. It is 
unlikely that without the decades of accumulated collective grievances, Bill C-45 would 
have been the mobilizing spark that it was. Indeed, as the nuances in its name demonstrate, 
Idle No More reflects history, agency, and power in Canada.  
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Appendix A – Omnibus Budget Implementation Bills, 
Government of Canada, 1997-2013  
 
Year Title 
Bill 
# 
Date of 
First 
Reading 
Date of 
Royal 
Assent 
Duration of 
Legislative 
Process 
Page 
Count 
Pages 
per 
Day 
1997 An Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
Parliament on 
February 18, 1997 
93 09/03/1997 25/04/1997 17 61 3.59 
1998 An Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
Parliament on 
February 24, 1998 
36 19/03/1998 18/06/1998 92 90 0.98 
1999 An Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
Parliament on 
February 16, 1999 
71 16/03/1999 17/06/1999 94 31 0.33 
2000 An Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
Parliament on 
February 28, 2000 
32 07/04/2000 29/06/2000 84 34 0.40 
2001 An Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
Parliament on 
December 10, 
2001 
49 05/02/2002 27/03/2002 51 112 2.20 
2003 An Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
28 25/03/2003 19/06/2003 87 143 1.64 
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Year Title 
Bill 
# 
Date of 
First 
Reading 
Date of 
Royal 
Assent 
Duration of 
Legislative 
Process 
Page 
Count 
Pages 
per 
Day 
Parliament on 
February 18, 2003 
2004 An Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
Parliament on 
March 23, 2004 
30 31/03/2004 14/05/2004 45 62 1.38 
2004 A second Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
Parliament on 
March 23, 2004 
33 08/12/2004 13/05/2005 157 79 0.50 
2005 An Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
Parliament on 
February 23, 2005 
43 24/03/2005 29/06/2005 98 118 1.20 
2006 An Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
Parliament on 
May 2, 2006 
13 11/05/2006 22/06/2006 43 186 4.33 
2006 A second Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
Parliament on 
May 2, 2006 
28 18/10/2006 21/02/2007 127 139 1.09 
2007 An Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
Parliament on 
March 19, 2007 
52 29/03/2007 22/06/2007 86 144 1.67 
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Year Title 
Bill 
# 
Date of 
First 
Reading 
Date of 
Royal 
Assent 
Duration of 
Legislative 
Process 
Page 
Count 
Pages 
per 
Day 
2007 An Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
Parliament on 
March 19, 2007 
and to implement 
certain provisions 
of the economic 
statement tabled in 
Parliament on 
October 30, 2007 
28 21/11/2007 14/12/2007 24 377 15.71 
2008 An Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
Parliament on 
February 26, 2008 
and to enact 
provisions to 
preserve the fiscal 
plan set out in that 
budget 
50 14/03/2008 18/06/2008 97 151 1.56 
2009 An Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
Parliament on 
January 27, 2009 
and related fiscal 
measures 
10 26/02/2009 12/03/2009 15 551 36.73 
2009 An Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
Parliament on 
January 27, 2009 
and to implement 
other measures 
51 30/09/2009 15/12/2009 77 58 0.75 
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Year Title 
Bill 
# 
Date of 
First 
Reading 
Date of 
Royal 
Assent 
Duration of 
Legislative 
Process 
Page 
Count 
Pages 
per 
Day 
2010 An Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
Parliament on 
March 4, 2010 and 
other measures 
9 29/03/2010 12/07/2010 106 903 8.52 
2010 A second Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
Parliament on 
March 4, 2010 and 
other measures 
47 30/09/2010 15/12/2010 77 51 0.66 
2011 An Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
2011 budget as 
updated on June 6, 
2011 
3 14/06/2011 26/06/2011 13 57 4.38 
2011 An Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
2011 budget as 
updated on June 6, 
2011 and other 
measures 
13 04/10/2011 15/12/2011 73 656 8.99 
2012 An Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
Parliament on 
March 29, 2012 
and other 
measures 
38 26/04/2012 29/06/2012 65 450 6.92 
2012 A second Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
Parliament on 
45 18/10/2012 14/12/2012 58 428 7.38 
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Year Title 
Bill 
# 
Date of 
First 
Reading 
Date of 
Royal 
Assent 
Duration of 
Legislative 
Process 
Page 
Count 
Pages 
per 
Day 
March 29, 2012 
and other 
measures 
2013 An Act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
Parliament on 
March 21, 2013 
and other 
measures 
60 29/04/2013 26/06/2013 59 126 2.14 
2013 A second act to 
implement certain 
provisions of the 
budget tabled in 
Parliament on 
March 21, 2013 
and other 
measures 
4 22/10/2013 12/12/2013 52 320 6.15 
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Appendix B – Indian Act before and after Bill C-45 
 
Short 
Description 
Pre-Bill C-45 Bill C-45 Amendment 
Summary of  
Substantive Changes 
37(2)  
Other 
transactions 
 
Except where this Act 
otherwise provides, lands 
in a reserve shall not be 
leased nor an interest in 
them granted until they 
have been surrendered to 
Her Majesty pursuant to 
subsection 38(2) by the 
band for whose use and 
benefit in common the 
reserve was set apart. 
 
Except where this Act 
otherwise provides, 
lands in a reserve shall 
not be leased nor an 
interest in them granted 
until they have been 
designated under 
subsection 38(2) by the 
band for whose use and 
benefit in common the 
reserve was set apart. 
Change from surrender 
to designation in order 
to lands to be leased or 
have an interest 
granted in them.  
39(1)  
Conditions 
— surrender 
An absolute surrender or 
a designation is void 
unless 
An absolute surrender is 
void unless 
Removal of 
designation in a 
provision– to reflect 
the newly added 
process.  
 
No change to the 
surrender process.  
39(1)(b)(ii) 
Special 
meeting 
at a special meeting of 
the band called by the 
Minister for the purpose 
of considering a 
proposed absolute 
surrender or designation, 
or 
 
at a special meeting of 
the band called by the 
Minister for the purpose 
of considering a 
proposed absolute 
surrender, or 
Removal of 
designation in a 
provision– to reflect 
the newly added 
process.  
 
No change to the 
surrender process.  
39(2)  
Minister 
may call 
meeting or 
referendum 
 
Where a majority of the 
electors of a band did not 
vote at a meeting or 
referendum called 
pursuant to subsection 
(1), the Minister may, if 
the proposed absolute 
surrender or designation 
was assented to by a 
majority of the electors 
who did vote, call 
another meeting by 
giving thirty days notice 
thereof or another 
If a majority of the 
electors of a band did 
not vote at a meeting or 
referendum called under 
subsection (1), the 
Minister may, if the 
proposed absolute 
surrender was assented 
to by a majority of the 
electors who did vote, 
call another meeting by 
giving 30 days’ [sic] 
notice of that other 
meeting or another 
Removal of 
designation in a 
provision– to reflect 
the newly added 
process.  
 
No change to the 
surrender process.  
 
Miscellaneous drafting 
convention updates. 
182 
referendum as provided 
in the regulations. 
referendum as provided 
in the regulations. 
39(3)  
Assent of 
band 
 
Where a meeting is 
called pursuant to 
subsection (2) and the 
proposed absolute 
surrender or designation 
is assented to at the 
meeting or referendum 
by a majority of the 
electors voting, the 
surrender or designation 
shall be deemed, for the 
purposes of this section, 
to have been assented to 
by a majority of the 
electors of the band. 
If a meeting or 
referendum is called 
under subsection (2) and 
the proposed absolute 
surrender is assented to 
at the meeting or 
referendum by a 
majority of the electors 
voting, the surrender is 
deemed, for the 
purposes of this section, 
to have been assented to 
by a majority of the 
electors of the band. 
Removal of 
designation in a 
provision– to reflect 
the newly added 
process.  
 
No change to the 
surrender process.  
 
Miscellaneous drafting 
convention updates. 
39.1  
Conditions 
— 
designation 
 
N/A A designation is valid if 
it is made to Her 
Majesty, is assented to 
by a majority of the 
electors of the band 
voting at a referendum 
held in accordance with 
the regulations, is 
recommended to the 
Minister by the council 
of the band and is 
accepted by the 
Minister. 
Land designation 
process requires: 
1. A referendum is 
held in accordance 
with the regulations; 
2. The support of the 
majority of the electors 
of the band voting at a 
referendum; 
3. The council of the 
band to recommend the 
designation to the 
Minister; and  
4. The Minister to 
accept it.  
40.  
Certification 
— surrender 
 
A proposed absolute 
surrender or designation 
that is assented to by the 
band in accordance with 
section 39 shall be 
certified on oath by the 
superintendent or other 
officer who attended the 
meeting and by the chief 
or a member of the 
council of the band, and 
then submitted to the 
Governor in Council for 
acceptance or refusal. 
A proposed absolute 
surrender that is 
assented to by the band 
in accordance with 
section 39 shall be 
certified on oath by the 
superintendent or other 
officer who attended the 
meeting and by the chief 
or a member of the 
council of the band and 
then submitted to the 
Governor in Council for 
acceptance or refusal. 
Removal of 
designation in a 
provision– to reflect 
the newly added 
process.  
 
No change to the 
surrender process.  
 
Miscellaneous drafting 
convention updates. 
183 
40.1 (1) 
Certification 
— 
designation 
 
n/a A proposed designation 
that is assented to in 
accordance with section 
39.1 shall be certified on 
oath by an officer of the 
Department and by the 
chief or a member of the 
council of the band. 
An oath by an officer 
of AADNC and by the 
chief or a member of 
the council of the band 
will certify the 
designation. 
 
 
40.1 (2) 
Ministerial 
decision 
 
n/a  On the recommendation 
of the council of the 
band, the proposed 
designation shall be 
submitted to the 
Minister who may 
accept or reject it. 
Unlike the surrender 
process, the 
designation process 
does not require the 
results of the 
referendum to be 
submitted to the 
Governor in Council 
for acceptance or 
refusal. Ministerial 
acceptance the final 
step (see section 39.1).  
 
  
184 
Appendix C – Motions to Limit Time for Debate on Bill C-45 
 
Date Motioned By Motion 
October 25, 
2012 
Peter Van Loan 
(Leader of the 
Government in 
the House of 
Commons) 
…not more than four further sitting days shall be allotted to 
the consideration of the second reading stage of the bill; and 
that, 15 minutes before the expiry of the time provided for 
government orders on the fourth day allotted to the 
consideration of the second reading stage of the said bill, any 
proceedings before the House shall be interrupted, if 
required for the purpose of this order, and, in turn, every 
question necessary for the disposal of the said stage of the 
bill shall be put forthwith and successively, without further 
debate or amendment.  
December 
3, 2012 
Peter Van Loan …not more than five further hours shall be allotted to the 
consideration of the report stage and one sitting day shall be 
allotted to the third reading stage of the said bill and, at the 
expiry of the time provided for the consideration at report 
stage and at fifteen minutes before the expiry of the time 
provided for government business on the day allotted to the 
consideration of the third reading stage of the said bill, any 
proceedings before the House shall be interrupted, if 
required for the purpose of this order, and in turn every 
question necessary for the disposal of the stage of the bill 
then under consideration shall be put forthwith and 
successively without further debate or amendment.  
December 
13, 2012 
Claude 
Carignan, the 
Deputy Leader 
of the 
Government in 
the Senate 
…not more than a further six hours of debate be allocated for 
consideration at third reading stage of Bill C-45, A second 
Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in 
Parliament on March 29, 2012 and other measures… the 
purpose of this proposal is to manage the time allocated for 
debate on Bill C-45. Debate at third reading of this bill has 
already begun, and the opposition critic had time to share his 
opinion. He delivered a speech that was over 45 minutes long 
and reflected an in-depth analysis. His eloquent speech 
indicated to us that he had enough time to conduct a rather 
comprehensive review of the bill. The bill was studied by six 
committees that met for over 62 hours during 30 meetings; 
135 witnesses were heard by the various committee 
members, who asked questions and studied the bill 
thoroughly. That is why we think  
 
 
